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INTRODUCTION 
Looking from a contemporary perspective, it is almost hard to believe that there 
was a time that coalition cabinets were not a common occurrence. Whenever 
parliamentary elections failed to produce a clear winner, this meant a failure of 
the entire political system and resulted in turmoil. Consequentially, governing 
was made almost impossible because cabinets could not muster a simple majo-
rity in the plenary to pass any legislation, as the experience of the Baltic states 
(and quite many other European countries) during the interwar period demon-
strates. By contrast, from the end of the Second World War onwards more than 
half of the cabinets in Western European states are made up of multiple parties 
and the comparable figure for Central and East European (CEE) states since 
1990 is even higher (Döring & Manow 2016).  
With such a high prevalence of coalition cabinets, understanding how they 
manage to govern together and keep all the coalition partners in line is of para-
mount importance. After all, each of the coalition partners is primarily pursuing 
their own goals and seeking to be reelected. With each of the partners trying to 
pull the coalition policy their own way, this can seriously impede or destroy the 
coalition cabinet. In turn, failure to maintain a functioning coalition cabinet can 
incite political turmoil which is not beneficial for anyone. However, despite 
great inherit risks and diverging interests of the coalition partners, most coali-
tions manage to form more or less productive cabinets. (Strøm, Müller & 
Bergman 2008; Müller & Strøm 2003) 
This dissertation is about some of the instruments used to achieve such sta-
bility. To be more precise, it focuses on informal mutual oversight mechanisms 
(IMOMs) used in coalition cabinets to manage uncertainty, ensure the smooth 
exchange of information between the partners, and to prevent possible agency 
losses or political undercutting. In this dissertation IMOMs are understood as 
various measures taken by the cabinet coalitions such as appointments, agree-
ments and/or meetings that, in addition to their formal or primary functions, 
also serve as means for coalition partners to informally ‘keep tabs’ on each 
other’s activities.  
Over the years, scholars have identified a number of such mechanisms: 
cross-appointments of Committee Chairs and Junior Ministers; Coalition Agree-
ments and Coalition Committees. Each of these mechanisms has a number of 
formal functions that they are supposed to perform: 1. the chairs of par-
liamentary committees have to direct committee work-flow and set the agenda; 
2. Junior Ministers have to assist the minister and, depending on the institu-
tional set-up of a given country, chair a ministerial department or take care of 
certain administrative tasks; 3. Coalition Committees are created to set the gov-
ernmental agenda and overcome the ongoing challenges; and 4. Coalition 
Agreements are the cabinet’s pledges to the electorate about its goals and poli-
cies.  
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However, each of these mechanisms also has an informal function of scruti-
nizing the actions of the coalition partners. Committee Chairs might set-up the 
committee agenda in such a manner that undesirable legislation will not reach 
the floor of the plenary. Junior Ministers might use their positions in the 
ministry to spy on the activities of the minister. Coalition Agreements might 
also serve as instructions on what a certain minister is allowed to do, and how to 
execute it. Finally, Coalition Committees can be used to pressure coalition part-
ners to pursue a certain policy or deter them from certain actions.  
There is a growing amount of evidence suggesting that these mechanisms are 
used in precisely such fashion in many Western European countries (Thies 
2001; Moury 2010; Caroll & Cox 2012; Strøm et al 2010; Martin & Vanberg 
2004). So far, the bulk of scholarly efforts has been concentrated on cataloging 
the usage of IMOMs and determining that these four mechanisms do indeed 
serve an informal oversight function as well. This dissertation aims to provide a 
modest contribution towards the better understanding of IMOM usage. It asks 
three main questions: 1. How are these IMOMs used in the Baltic states?; 2. 
How does their usage depend on the institutional structure of each country?; and 
3. What factors account for the overall usage of IMOMs? 
The dissertation’s contribution to the field is threefold – first, from the ana-
lytical perspective it demonstrates that IMOMs emerge as a means to mitigate 
the uncertainty associated with coalition governance. However, as no single 
IMOM can serve this purpose by itself, they are always used as a system. There-
fore, they should be conceptualized and analyzed as an informal system ena-
bling coalition partners to ‘keep tabs’ on each other rather than just individual 
instruments. This dissertation demonstrates that the performance and the ex-
planatory power of an analytical model can be improved if IMOMs are analyzed 
together as a system of oversight rather than individual mechanisms. In other 
words, this dissertation presents an argument that IMOMs ought to be analyzed 
not individually one-by-one, but always as a part of a larger whole – a system of 
mutual oversight between coalition partners.   
Second, from a theoretical perspective, this dissertation showcases that two 
explanatory factors that have been studied only in a very limited manner – coa-
lition cabinet type and the amount of experience of governing – have together a 
significant impact on how IMOMs are used. Moreover, this relates to both the 
overall amount of IMOM usage and the patterns they form. Finally, from an 
empirical perspective, this dissertation contributes towards a deeper under-
standing of how coalition cabinets work in newly democratized countries. Data 
collected for this dissertation (both quantitative data on coalition appointments 
and insider interviews) help to shed more light on how coalition cabinets 
function in the three Baltic states, and allow to compare their activities in a 
manner previously not undertaken. 
This dissertation studies coalition cabinets that were in office in the Baltic 
states between 1992 and 2012. It analyzes coalition appointment data on Com-
mittee Chairs and Junior Ministers, Coalition Agreements and coalition pro-
grams. Quantitative data from these sources are then supplemented by qualita-
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tive interviews with cabinet insiders who have occupied a high position (either a 
committee chair or a cabinet member) in a coalition cabinet during the period 
analyzed. The detailed rationale for choosing these three countries is presented 
in Chapter Three. However, it is worth mentioning in brief that this choice was 
driven by three main reasons: 1. the Baltic states have been seen as ‘success-
stories’ among newly democratized countries; 2. they exhibit variation in terms 
of constitutional structure, and 3. they feature a range of IMOMs.  
The Baltic states could be called ‘success-stories’ among the newly democ-
ratized states because, despite being in a worse starting position than most states 
in the CEE, they rank very closely to those in the Western Europe and the Nor-
dic region in all comparative measures of democracy and have similar levels of 
cabinet stability to other countries in the region (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1. Democracy Indices and Cabinet Stability Measures 
 Freedom 
House 
Score* 
V-Dem Electoral 
Democracy 
Index** 
V-Dem Liberal 
Component 
Index*** 
Average 
Government 
Duration  
(in days)**** 
Estonia 94 .91 .95 568 
Latvia 87 .84 .88 352 
Lithuania 91 .83 .94 575 
Western 
Europe 
95 .86 .94 - 
CEE 75 .67 .74 565 
*Aggregate Freedom House Score for 2017 < https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-
2017-table-country-scores > (2017 08 21) 
**Index measures freedom and fairness of the elections  
*** Index measures respect for individual freedoms and liberties. Both V-Dem indices 
are reported based on data from V-Dem Online Analysis Tool < https://www.v-dem.net/ 
en/analysis/ > (2017 08 21) 
**** Data from Conrad and Golder (2010) 
 
 
Nonetheless, they are still characterized by relatively high voter volatility and 
fragmented party systems (Bielasiak 2002). The fact that political systems in the 
Baltic states work quite well even under such pressures testifies that cabinet 
coalitions in the Baltic countries have come up with ways of effectively 
working together and delivering results even in the difficult circumstances. 
Hence, it could be argued that the Baltic states represent a case where IMOMs 
have worked quite well and the Baltic experience could yield interesting in-
sights relevant for other newly democratized countries. 
Furthermore, the Baltic states make-up a good sample for this study, since 
they vary significantly in their institutional structures. Latvia and Estonia are 
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examples of parliamentary systems, while Lithuania is semi-presidential. Since 
existing literature on IMOMs mostly focuses on parliamentary systems, insights 
from the Baltic states could contribute to a better understanding of whether 
democratic regime type has an effect on intra-cabinet relations between 
coalition partners. Finally, the Baltic states differ in terms of which IMOMs are 
available for the coalition partners. While Lithuania and Latvia use a full array 
of IMOMs, Estonia has been more circumspect, abandoning, for example, the 
use of Junior Ministers after a brief period of experimentation. Since this 
IMOM has been demonstrated to be one of the main vehicles of oversight in 
Western European states (Thies 2001; Strøm, Müller and Smith 2010), 
analyzing how mutual oversight is carried out without this mechanism can also 
tell us a lot about how the selection of certain IMOMs impacts their overall use.  
The dissertation is divided into three major parts, which are further divided 
into chapters and sections. The first part analyses how IMOMs fit into the 
overall framework of coalition governance. The first chapter explores how 
delegation and accountability works in coalition cabinets and what problems 
associated with power delegation coalition cabinets face. It shows that coalition 
cabinets work in an environment where uncertainties are huge and the means to 
manage them are limited. The second half of the chapter presents IMOMs as 
measures to manage the uncertainties outlined in the previous chapter and 
combat power delegation problems: information asymmetry and agency loss. 
However, no single IMOM can fully meet these requirements, as some of them 
are only good for collecting information, others for facilitating dialogue and 
some others for issuing sanctions for the misbehaving parties. For this reason, 
IMOMs are rarely (if ever) used individually and are mostly used together in 
groups, forming a system of informal oversight. The second chapter considers 
different factors that might affect IMOM usage and presents the five hypotheses 
tested in this study: 
 H1: As the ideological distance between coalition partners increases, IMOM 
usage increases.  
 H2: As the number of coalition partners increases, IMOM usage increases. 
 H3: Coalitions made-up of parties with more coalition experience use 
IMOMs more extensively. 
 H4: Minority coalitions use IMOMs to a lesser extent than majority backed 
coalitions.  
 H5a: Specific features of the national institutional contexts in different coun-
tries do not affect the overall IMOM use. 
 H5b: However, the specific features of national institutional contexts in dif-
ferent countries affect the popularity of individual IMOMs.  
 
The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to how IMOMs are used in the 
Baltic states and explaining these patterns both cross-sectionally and tempo-
rally. The third chapter presents the rationale for analyzing the Baltic states, 
data sources, and methods for analysis. Chapters Four to Seven are dedicated to 
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the individual IMOMs. Each chapter provides some basic information about a 
particular IMOM, the history of its use in the Baltic states and how its use is 
effected by the existing institutional context of each of the Baltic countries. 
These chapters also provide key descriptive statistics and show how these 
IMOMs interact with the factors specified in Chapter Two. The main finding of 
this part is that the analytical model performs quite well on individual IMOMs 
and that their use in the Baltic states has been rather intensive.  
The third part analyses IMOM patterns in the Baltic states and the overall 
intensity of their use. It demonstrates that national institutional particularities 
can have a notable influence over which IMOMs are favored and used more 
intensely. However, when analyzing the intensity of oversight as a whole, 
national effects remain significant, but decrease in importance. IMOM use is 
shown to depend on (in order of importance) the number of coalition partners, 
the amount of experience governing together, national effects and coalition 
cabinet type. Moreover, we will see that, when taken together and analyzed as a 
whole, the combined models perform significantly better than they do for 
individual IMOMs. This can be interpreted as an argument for a new approach 
to the analysis of IMOMs – to analyze them as a coherent system rather than 
focusing on the use of individual mechanisms. One final question asked in this 
part is, does IMOM use have an impact on coalition cabinets? The analysis 
demonstrates that with time the usage of IMOMs and cabinet longevity have 
increased and that greater IMOM use has had a stabilizing effect on the 
coalition cabinets in the Baltic states. The findings of the dissertation are for the 
most part consistent with those of the other case studies (Indridason & 
Kristinsson 2013; Clark & Jurgelevičiūtė 2008; Carroll & Cox 2012; Dong Hun 
and Loewenberg 2005) with one notable exception: the effect of ideological 
distance between the coalition partners. Previous studies have established that 
ideological distance is positively associated with the IMOM use (Thies 2001; 
Carroll & Cox 2012; Dong Hun and Loewenberg 2005). However, this 
dissertation demonstrates that ideologically diverse cabinets are likely to use 
IMOMs less intensely. This finding does not contradict the findings of previous 
studies, but rather demonstrates that the relationship between the ideological 
distance and IMOM use is more complex than considered previously.  
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PART I: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1: (Inter-party) Delegation and  
Accountability in Coalition cabinets 
Making coalition cabinet work is hard. It is so because it involves finding a 
tough balance between simply leaving each minister to freely pursue his/her 
policy priorities (abdication) and trying to find some common ground in order 
for the cabinet to act more cohesively. Such attempts would, however, involve 
making some difficult compromises (controlled delegation), which would be 
hard to keep. Abdication would allow each minister to freely manage his/her 
respective policy field, but would produce sub-optimal policy outcomes. Con-
trolled delegation, on the other hand, would involve finding a compromise 
between the different policy preferences of coalition partners but would also 
entail the risk of the ministers shirking from the agreed compromise in favor of 
their own party interests. Existing research has demonstrated that coalitions 
often choose the latter option and try to mitigate the inherit risks by putting in 
place oversight mechanisms that would allow coalition partners to keep tabs on 
each other’s actions, limit the potential for agency shirking, and do all of this 
away from the public eye. In order to understand these processes well, we must 
first take a closer look at the institutional environment in which they take place. 
 
 
Inter-party delegation 
This dissertation approaches the relations between coalition partners as an in-
stance of inter-party delegation, when MPs from different party groups which 
make-up a coalition in parliament delegate to a cabinet of ministers which is 
composed of the representatives from multiple parties. The term inter-party 
delegation implies that parallel to the broader delegation from parliament to 
cabinet there is another delegation process taking place where MPs from one 
party group delegate the authority to cabinet members from another party (Thies 
2001). Martin and Vanberg (2004) have also called this process ‘delegation 
within cabinet’ and Moury (2010) ‘double-delegation’. Overall this approach is 
nested in the rational-choice approach to new institutionalism which is em-
ployed in the works of Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller and others (Strøm 1990, 
Müller and Strøm 1999; Strøm and Müller 2003; Strøm, Müller and Bergman 
2008; Strøm, Müller and Smith 2010).  
Coalition cabinets mostly occur in parliamentary and semi-presidential 
regimes, where the cabinet of ministers originates from the parliament. Such 
system can be perceived as a chain of delegation and accountability running 
from the ultimate sovereign – the people – to the bureaucracy and state’s 
administrative apparatus (Strøm and Müller 2003). The main features of this 
chain are: (a) it involves multiple steps of delegation (from voters to MPs, from 
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MPs to the cabinet, from the cabinet to bureaucracy), (b) it is indirect because 
each agent is directly held accountable to its own principal (e.g. a civil servant 
is accountable to the head of the ministry and not directly to parliament), (c) it is 
singular because each link of the chain features a single principal and most 
often a single agent, and (d) it is hierarchical because rather than the Madiso-
nian system of checks and balances which involves multiple government 
agencies checking each other’s power, in the parliamentary systems all of them 
are subordinated to the parliament (Strøm, Müller and Smith 2010).  
This study focuses exclusively on the second step of the delegation chain: 
when MPs delegate tasks of preparing draft legislation and enacting approved 
bills to the cabinet of ministers. This step is problematic because, due to the 
characteristics mentioned above of the power delegation process in parlia-
mentary systems, parliaments are the only actors holding cabinet members to 
account.  
Problems arise because in the cabinet, each minister enjoys substantial 
power and autonomy to act in his/her policy field. For the moment let us not 
consider how different decision making rules in a coalition cabinet might limit 
ministerial power (this discussion is presented in greater detail later in this 
chapter), because even in cabinets where ministerial autonomy is limited by 
collegial decision making rules (e.g. decisions in cabinet are made unanimous-
ly), ministers still have power to be sole proposers of draft legislation. After all, 
it is hard to imagine the prime minister or education minister preparing an 
agriculture bill. Furthermore, ministers are specialists in their respective policy 
fields and command a team of civil servants who assist them with their duties. 
All of this gives ministers a substantial informational advantage over the MPs 
who delegated power to him/her or over other members of the cabinet. This 
advantage (or information asymmetry) then possibly allows the minister to 
pursue goals different from those that the parliament entrusted him/her to 
pursue. This can take many forms: (a) leisure-shirking – when a minister takes 
more time to enact a policy then needed, (b) rent-seeking – when minister asks 
for more resources than are needed to enact a policy, and (c) policy drift – when 
a minister pursues different policy goals than originally intended. 
Preventing agency shirking and the information asymmetry that allows it to 
occur is difficult enough in single party cabinets. However, in such scenarios, 
party institutions play a mitigating role. In order to be appointed to a cabinet 
position, a person has to prove his/her loyalty to the party program multiple 
times throughout his/her career. Furthermore, since a party effectively controls 
the resources needed to run a re-election campaign, candidates willing to 
continue on with their careers have a strong incentive not to upset the party.  
In coalition situations delegation becomes more complex. As Figure 1 
demonstrates, first there is coalition in parliament (MPs from different party 
groups which form the coalition) delegating to the cabinet coalition. However, 
simultaneously this also involves MPs from one party delegating on the one 
hand to ministers from their own party, whom they can (sort of) trust and 
control, and on the other – ministers from other parties who are more difficult to 
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trust and control. At the same time each of the cabinet members is accountable 
to his/her own party and simultaneously to the coalition as a whole. Further 
down the chain of delegation and accountability, the coalition as a whole is held 
accountable for its actions to the voters.  
 
 
Figure 1: The web of delegation and accountability in coalition governments 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter the delegation that occurs in coa-
lition cabinets has been given many names in the scholarly literature. This dis-
sertation uses term ‘inter-party delegation’ proposed by Thies (2001) because in 
the author’s opinion it captures the nuances of delegation in coalition cabinets 
best. Martin and Vanberg (2004) use the term ‘delegation within cabinet’, and 
while this phrase correctly captures the dynamic that some delegation occurs 
within a cabinet of ministers when each minister is delegated a power to be the 
main proposer of policy within a given policy field, it ignores another aspect of 
delegation in coalition cabinets that is between different groups of the coalition 
in parliament and different ministers in the cabinet. Moury (2010) has instead 
proposed the term ‘double delegation’, for she distinguishes delegation between 
one coalition party group and its own ministers from delegation to the ministers 
of another party, as they follow two different dynamics and different sets of 
expectations about possible agency loss. However, this term implies that there is 
a simple dichotomy between two sets of expectations: delegating within the 
party and delegating outside, which might not always be the case, especially in 
bigger coalitions. In such circumstances parties might have different expecta-
20 
tions to tried-and-tested coalition partners from the past and, for example, some 
new party group which just entered parliament.  
Inter-party delegation is difficult because parties might encourage their 
ministers to pursue their party’s interests at the expense of those of the coa-
lition. In addition to this danger of agency shirking, coalitions have difficulties 
holding cabinet members to account. Since coalitions are made-up of multiple 
parties, it impossible to employ party-level disciplinary mechanisms to all the 
coalition members. Also, there is always a chance that the other parties will 
reward instead of sanctioning ministers who advanced their party’s interests at 
the expense of those of the coalition. Furthermore, coalitions cannot really use 
official/ formal scrutiny instruments (such as MP questions or interpellations to 
the cabinet members) because such behavior would attract media attention, and 
because it might turn into a larger scandal and seriously damage or even break-
up the coalition. Additionally, parties which are perceived as having broken a 
coalition are less likely to be included in future coalitions (Tavits 2008).  
Third, coalitions cannot overcome delegation problems by simply making 
slight alterations to the way a cabinet makes decisions. Though there are many 
ways to alter decision making rules in the cabinet, none of them can cure the 
problems of coalition governance. For instance, granting PM a more prominent 
role might help the PM party to ensure that all the ministers follow the coalition 
line, but this would most likely require to compensate the coalition partners for 
the loss of autonomy of cabinet members by giving them more / more valuable 
cabinet positions. This would, in turn, create new opportunities for power 
delegation problems to occur. Similarly, if cabinets decided to grant gate-
keeping powers to the minister of finance, coalition partners would ask to be 
compensated in very much the same way (Martin and Vanberg 2001).   
 
 
Choice between abdication and regulated delegation 
Given such difficulties inherent to coalition governance, partners in a coalition 
face a tough choice between: a. abdicating and allowing each minister to pursue 
his/her preferred policy; and b. trying come up with the compromise policy that 
would be suitable for all coalition partners. None of these options is perfect and 
the choice is often difficult. 
An example of abdication or ministerial government was proposed by Laver 
and Shepsle (1990). In that scenario, all the power in a given policy-sphere is 
delegated to the minister and he/she is allowed to pursue his/her ideal policy. In 
such a scenario, parties choose between all possible combinations of different 
parties taking different portfolios. Consider an example in Figure 2, which 
shows two policy spheres: welfare and defense, and two parties (A and B) 
trying to divide them between themselves. Altogether four combinations are 
possible: AA with party A controlling both portfolios, BB with party B 
controlling both portfolios and AB or BA with parties taking one portfolio each. 
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Figure 2: Policy decisions under ministerial government 
Figure prepared based in Thies (2001) 
 
 
Combination AB would involve spending party A’s ideal point on defense and 
party B’s ideal point on welfare; point BA – vice-versa. Hence, there is a fun-
damental difference between combinations AB and BA, though both entail 
forming a coalition between parties A and B. In such a situation parties would 
accept a party-portfolio combination that is the closest to their ideal point. Once 
that is done, parties would move on to the governing phase and begin imple-
menting their policy. Such a mode of governance has the advantage that parties 
need not worry about policy drift or agency shirking because each minister is 
given free rein to enact his/her ideal policy anyways. However, it also has a 
major drawback: neither the point BA nor AB is Pareto optimal, as neither of 
these points are located in the win-set overlap of the two parties. Finally, such a 
mode of governance suffers from the drawback of being extremely inflexible. 
For instance, it might be acceptable to the coalition parties so long as the eco-
nomic situation is stable, however, if it turns for the worse and some quick ad-
justments are needed, such a coalition would have a tough time finding a new 
agreement or equilibrium.  
For both parties it would be much more optimal to agree on a policy position 
somewhere near the point X, which marks the overlapping win-set for both 
parties. Doing this, would produce a more Pareto-optimal results compared to 
the possible alternatives. Additionally, if parties coordinate their policies to 
accommodate each other’s preferences, it would stand to reason that such 
coalitions would also be more capable of responding to critical events, such as 
economic crises or other outside shocks (Martin and Vanberg 2004).  
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However, this approach is also risky. Since in such situations ministers are 
not allowed to propose or enact their preferred policy and instead have to pursue 
coalition compromise which might be far from their ideal point, there is always 
a danger that they will abuse their informational advantage and will try to shirk 
from the coalition compromise by moving closer to their party’s ideal point. In 
other words, compared to the abdication scenario, policy-coordination can be 
best described as high-risk-high-reward situation in which coalition partners 
accept the possible risks of ministerial shirking in hopes that such coalition 
arrangement would yield higher rewards than an abdication scenario (Falco-
Gimeno 2014).     
Existing research demonstrates that coalitions tend to pursue higher rewards 
by coordinating their policies (Thies 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004; Moury 
2010; Strøm, Müller and Smith 2010; Carroll and Cox 2012). At the same time, 
they also seek ways to minimize the risks associated with agency shirking. 
Mostly, it is done by creating special institutions that would allow coalition 
partners to effectively oversee each other under above-specified constraints and, 
thus, disincentive ministerial shirking. In this dissertation these institutions are 
called informal mutual oversight mechanisms (IMOMs). 
 
 
IMOMs 
As Thies (2001) pointed out, coalition cabinets choosing to coordinate their 
policies need to either reduce a minister’s incentive to shirk or the ability to do 
so. The former can be achieved by creating effective sanctions against minis-
terial shirking, while the latter can be accomplished by taking measures to re-
duce minister’s informational advantage. In other words, creating oversight 
institutions which would meet two essential criteria for effectiveness: would be 
able to obtain all the information in their domain and would be able to punish 
defecting agents (North 1990). However, due to the fact that coalitions gener-
ally prefer to keep such oversight measures and mutual scrutiny away from the 
public eye, these institutions in the coalitions must meet one final requirement – 
informality. In other words, these oversight mechanisms must be able to func-
tion in a way that would not draw much attention.  
This is most often done by adding mutual oversight function on top of 
already existing institutions, which formally have a different set of tasks. In this 
dissertation IMOMs are understood as various measures taken by the cabinet 
coalitions such as appointments, agreements and/or meetings that, in addition to 
their formal or primary functions, also serve as means for coalition partners to 
informally ‘keep tabs’ on each other’s activities.  
There are many ways how these mechanisms can be classified. Following 
Thies’ (2001) typology, they can be divided into two major groups: ex-ante and 
ex-post. Ex-ante IMOMs are measures taken prior to the governance phase and 
involve steps to reduce mutual uncertainty between coalition partners by, for 
example, creating agreements about future coalition’s policy. Ex-post IMOMs 
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can be further divided into two groups: ones aimed at reducing agents’ infor-
mational advantage and another aimed at issuing sanctions for adverse behavior.  
Exiting literature has identified a number of such mechanisms and four of 
them that are most widely used are the subject of this study: 1. appointing the 
chairs of parliamentary committees to shadow ministers, 2. appointing Junior 
Minister to keep tabs on ministerial activities, 3. creating Coalition Agreements 
and, finally, (iv) functioning of the Coalition Committees.  
 
 
IMOMs as a system of oversight  
This dissertation builds on a number of previous studies, which have analyzed 
the various methods how parties in coalition cabinets ‘keep-tabs’ on their coali-
tion partners and seek to solve power delegation problems. Though, to the 
author’s best knowledge, this dissertation is the first to use “Informal Mutual 
Oversight Mechanisms” as an overarching term to describe the system of mu-
tual oversight in coalition cabinets, many authors have analyzed (some of the) 
IMOMs as separate instruments or drew attention how they can be applied to-
gether in coalition cabinets. Later chapters in this dissertation analyzing the use 
of the individual IMOMs, each have a section presenting earlier research on a 
particular IMOM in greater detail, but it is nonetheless important to devote 
some attention how the study of IMOMs in general has evolved through time. 
This section does precisely that: it presents a general overview of the previous 
research efforts, simultaneously highlighting which elements of the previous 
research are included in the approach to the study of IMOMs used in this dis-
sertation as well as the main shortcomings of the previous approaches, which 
this dissertation seeks to address.  
Arguably, the first article on the topic was Thies (2001) study on how Junior 
Ministers can be employed to oversee the activities of the coalition partners. In 
this study, Thies offered two major contributions: first, he outlined the general 
logic of the delegation problems plaguing coalition cabinets and the difficulties 
with coming-up and implementing policies which would simultaneously meet 
the preferences of the coalition partners and produce Pareto-optimal policy 
outcomes. This general logic without major adjustments was also picked-up by 
later studies of various IMOMs, including this dissertation and is presented in 
greater detail in previous sections of Chapter One.  
Second, Thies also identified a number of factors that could influence the 
IMOM use. These are: Institutional checks, portfolio salience, ideological dis-
tance, and capacities to monitor ministerial actions (Thies 2001: 585–586). This 
contribution was a bit less enduring and only preference divergence among 
coalition partners was included in most of the subsequent studies. The reasons 
for this are discussed in greater detail in the theoretical sections of the Chapter 
Four and the Chapter Five of this dissertation.  
However, most importantly, Thies (2001) work succeeded in drawing the 
attention to power-delegation in coalition cabinets, previously understudied 
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topic and IMOMs as means to manage this process. Many other authors built on 
Thies (2001) argument an insights. The remainder of the section bellow presents 
by no means exhaustive list of subsequent contributions to the field.  
In their 2004 article, Martin and Vanberg further explored the topic of 
power-delegation in coalition cabinets and means of addressing them. Their 
central argument was that the parliament is one of the most important arenas 
where the coalition partners scrutinize cabinet policy and seek to ‘police the 
bargain’, i.e. seek to prevent deviations from the Coalition Agreement. Additio-
nally, the authors propose that one of the cabinet parties might be inclined to 
use existing parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms against the minister from 
another coalition party to this end (Martin and Vanberg 2004). Though in their 
work they did not explicitly state that the parliamentary Committee Chairs have 
a role in this process, their approach definitively helped to shift the general 
thinking in that direction. Furthermore, and just as importantly, Martin and 
Vanberg (2004) outlined that the Coalition Agreements are used as a tool to 
bind the coalition partners to certain concrete policy actions and that these 
mutual promises are taken seriously and, if needed, ‘policed’ using other 
IMOMs.  
The next step in the study of IMOMs was taken by various authors, with 
especially valuable contributions regarding the use of the Committee Chairs as 
IMOMs coming from Kim and Loewenberg (2005) and Carroll and Cox (2012). 
These authors not only explicitly outlined how the Committee Chairs play a role 
in addressing the delegation problems in the coalition cabinets, but, more 
importantly, attempted to establish a model linking how the use of the Com-
mittee Chairs interacts with the use of other IMOMs: Junior Ministers (Carroll 
and Cox 2012) and Coalition Agreements (Kim and Lowenberg 2005). Addi-
tionally, and particularly relevant for this dissertation were the extensions of the 
analytical model used in the Carroll and Cox (2012) study, which, among other 
things, demonstrated that: a. new democracies are different from the older ones 
in their IMOM use and have a tendency to use them more intensely; b. the use 
of IMOMs does not affect all coalition partners equally with smaller coalition 
partners being overseen more intensely than the larger ones (Carroll and Cox 
2012: 229). These aspects are analyzed in greater depth in the empirical sections 
of Chapter Four (different oversight modalities of smaller and bigger coalition 
partners) and Chapter Five (different IMOM use in older and newer demo-
cracies).  
Simultaneously, other authors (Müller and Strøm 1999, Moury 2010; Moury 
and Timmermans 2006; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013) have devoted their 
attention to the analysis of the Coalition Agreements. Their collective works 
have demonstrated that Coalition Agreements are not just empty declarations, 
but serve as powerful tools to translate the outcomes of the coalition bargaining 
into policy outcomes (Moury 2010). Additionally, they help to contain the 
conflicts among the coalition partners that arise due to power delegation 
problems and diverging preferences and to foster cabinet stability and longevity 
(Moury and Timmermans 2006). Finally, it was also demonstrated that making 
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the best possible use of the Coalition Agreements involves a certain learning-
curve and coalition partners with time learn how to craft longer, more 
comprehensive Coalition Agreements which have positive impacts on policy 
outputs and cabinet longevity (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013; Moury and 
Timmermans 2006). A more detailed overview of the research on Coalition 
Agreements is presented in the theoretical section of the Chapter Six. However, 
it is important to draw attention here to a couple of aspects, which are parti-
cularly important for this dissertation: first, the established relationship between 
the experience using the Coalition Agreements and their length and compre-
hensiveness. This demonstrates that using IMOMs requires certain skill and 
experience, which lead to the inclusion of coalition experience as a variable in 
the analytical model used in this dissertation (see Chapter Two). Second, the 
establishment of the notion that IMOM use might potentially have con-
sequences on cabinet longevity, which is explored in more detail in Chapter 
Nine.  
It is also important to mention the only study of how IMOMs are used in the 
Baltic states by Clark and Jurgelevičiūtė (2008). In their article, they showed 
that in Lithuania cabinet ministers are sometimes ‘double-tapped’ and overseen 
by both Junior Ministers and the Committee Chairs. Though the authors did not 
delve deep into the theoretical implications of this finding, it served as a 
valuable example that sometimes IMOMs can be used in layers, with one 
IMOM complementing the use of another. The issue of ‘double-tapping’ is 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Five of the dissertation.  
The most comprehensive review of way various IMOMs are used is an 
article written by Strøm, Müller and Smith in 2010. They collected the existing 
knowledge from separate studies and put forth an argument that these mecha-
nisms ought to be analyzed and studies together (Strøm, Müller and Smith 
2010). It was the first instance where IMOMs analyzed in this dissertation: 
Committee Chairs, Junior Ministers, Coalition Agreements, and Coalition Com-
mittees were discussed together. This study stated that all these mechanisms: 1. 
are needed because of the same reason – delegation problems in coalition 
cabinets; 2. serve the same function – mutual oversight between the coalition 
partners; 3. work towards the same goal – ensure more Pareto-optimal policy 
outcomes and smoother co-governance among the coalition partners. The 
authors, however, stopped short of stating that these mechanisms form a single 
system of oversight and analyzing them as such. 
Finally, it is important to note that this dissertation does not cover the full 
range of IMOMs identified in the previous studies. Strøm, Müller and Smith 
(2010) also included candidate selection/candidate screening as another IMOM. 
In this process, the coalition partners analyze the available information on the 
potential ministerial candidates in order to get a sense if the proposed candidate 
is up for the job and, potentially, ask the coalition partners to reconsider the 
nominees that raised some ‘red-flags’. Additionally, Fernandes, Meinfelder and 
Moury (2016) presented the argument that coalition partners allocate the cabinet 
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portfolios in a strategic manner and seek to prevent any one partner from 
monopolizing the control of a particular policy sphere.  
These two IMOMs, however, will not be analyzed in this dissertation for two 
simple reasons: first, there is no variance in the sample regarding how they are 
used. During the interviews conducted for this dissertation, interviewees from 
all three Baltic states affirmed that candidate screening is carried out when the 
composition of the cabinet is decided and certain strategic considerations play a 
role during the portfolio allocation phase (Masiulis 2014, Smiltens 2016, Lang 
2016). In other words, in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, these mechanisms are 
employed in all the coalitions exactly in the manner consistent with the insights 
from the previous research and there is no cross-cabinet or cross-country 
variation that could be analyzed further.  
Second, these are informal procedures which play a part in a greater port-
folio allocation game and, therefore, no tangible data exist about how these 
measures were carried out. The portfolio allocation phase of the coalition 
formation is always rather secretive, as the coalition partners meet behind 
closed doors and do not keep the minutes of these meetings. This makes it 
almost impossible to study these mechanisms in a systematic manner. Instead, 
this dissertation focuses on the four mechanisms which are used most com-
monly: appointing Committee Chairs or Junior Ministers to ‘shadow’ minister 
from a different coalition party, drafting Coalition Agreements laying out what 
ought to be done in each policy sphere and creating special Coalition Com-
mittees for coalition partners to hash-out their differences and sanction the 
misbehaving members.  
Collectively, these contributions extended and deepened the understanding 
of how the power delegation in coalition cabinets works, what problems plague 
the partners in the coalition cabinets, and what measures they take to address 
them. However, the topic of mutual oversight in coalition cabinets is by no 
means exhausted and there are still many outstanding issues present in the 
existing studies. As mentioned, existing studies made efforts to move from 
studying individual IMOMs to analyzing them as a group. However, in no 
previous studies they were analyzed as a unified system, in which separate 
IMOMs are integral parts.  
This is a serious shortcoming because even though all IMOMs are used as a 
means to address power delegation problems in coalition cabinets, by them-
selves none of these mechanisms is perfect. Though they all satisfy the 
informality criteria and allow coalition partners to scrutinize each other without 
‘rocking the boat’, none of them can individually satisfy the other two criteria 
for effective oversight institutions outlined in the previous section. Coalition 
Agreements help coalition partners to agree on major policy decisions in all 
policy areas and ensure that no action upsetting one or more coalition partners is 
taken. However, they cannot help to overcome information asymmetries or 
issue any sort of sanction against agency shirking. Junior Ministers can use their 
privileged access to information in a ministry to which they are appointed to 
overcome information asymmetries, but they cannot punish the minister in case 
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he/she decides to act against the interests of the coalition. Coalition Committees 
can use various means at their disposal to discipline the misbehaving person, 
but they do not have means to overcome informational asymmetries. Finally, 
though Committee Chairs in theory have capabilities to both gather information 
and issue sanctions, their actions are limited by the rest of the committee. 
Furthermore, if a coalition is made up of more than two parties, there simply are 
not enough Committee Chairs to go around.  
Because of this, IMOMs are always used together to form a system of 
mutual oversight. Of course, it is not necessary for all four mechanisms to be 
used simultaneously, but it is rare that a coalition would use only one of them. 
After all, it is hard to believe that coalition partners would go through all the 
trouble assigning Committee Chairs or Junior Ministers to ‘shadow’ coalition 
partners without any written or oral Coalition Agreement in place. Or that 
coalition partners would prepare a Coalition Agreement and then would not 
organize meetings, as their time in office progresses, to see how its imple-
mentation is going.  
Hence, it is only natural that IMOMs that are used interactively as a system 
should be analyzed as such. Therefore, one of the key contributions of this 
dissertation is a more holistic approach to IMOM use. IMOMs are analyzed 
here not as individual instruments, but rather as parts of a broader system of 
oversight between coalition partners. In such a system, each instrument has its 
own function, benefit, and cost. Though some IMOMs might share certain 
similarities or overlaps in their functions, one IMOM can never fully be used 
interchangeably with another. This holistic approach to IMOM is reflected by 
the fact that the main dependent variable of this dissertation is the overall 
intensity and pattern of IMOM use, and not that of the individual mechanisms. 
In the next chapter, which presents an overview of the research on factors that 
influence the intensity of IMOM use, each hypothesis is formulated for the 
overall levels of oversight rather than for specific IMOMs.  
On a more practical side, this approach provides a different interpretation of 
some important findings of the previous research. For instance, it considers that 
inverse correlations which were found between the uses of different IMOMs, 
especially Committee Chairs and Junior Ministers (Dong Hun & Loewenberg 
2005) are caused by certain environmental effects (more on this in Chapter 
Two) rather than characteristics innate to the very nature of these IMOMs. In 
the view of this dissertation IMOMs emerge as an answer to the delegation 
problems in coalition cabinets and are used to an extent needed to mitigate these 
problems. Hence, a situation when coalition partners ‘double-tap’ and keep tabs 
on particularly troublesome ministers using Committee Chairs and Junior 
Ministers is also rather likely. Furthermore, the logic that Committee Chairs and 
Junior Ministers can be used as practical replacements for each other runs into 
substantial difficulties in instances where governmental coalitions are composed 
of more than two parties and using only Committee Chairs for keeping tabs 
simply cannot meet the oversight needs of all the coalition partners.  
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Additionally, another novel contribution of this dissertation is the develop-
ment of the analytical model which seeks to identify the factors that account for 
the use of the four IMOMs collectively, which was not attempted by the earlier 
studies. Finally, this dissertation offers a more nuanced approach to the under-
standing of IMOM use by supplementing the model with the factors associated 
with the costs of using IMOMs (see Chapter Two), which was done only in a 
very small number of previous studies (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). 
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Chapter 2: Factors influencing IMOM usage 
Most existing research on IMOMs can be divided into two groups: 1. research 
focusing on determining if various IMOMs were indeed used in coalition cabi-
nets to monitor coalition partners (Strøm, Müller and Smith 2010; Clark and 
Jurgelevičiūtė 2008; Manow and Zorn 2004; Dong Hun and Loewenberg 2005, 
etc.) and 2. research seeking to explain what factors account for the use of cer-
tain IMOMs (Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin and Vanberg 2004; Lipsmeyer and 
Pierce 2013). In turn, the latter strand of research has focused almost exten-
sively on the demand side of IMOM use. Their general argument has linked the 
intensity of IMOM use with the amount of uncertainty in a coalition – the more 
a coalition party was uncertain about the intentions of their coalition partners, 
the more it would be inclined to use IMOMs to monitor their actions (Thies 
2001). However, recently some authors started emphasizing that there is another 
side to IMOM use – IMOMs create certain costs to the coalition partners, which 
in turn limit the extent of IMOM use (Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). This 
chapter provides a brief overview of this existing research and presents addi-
tional factors that are studied in this dissertation. Finally, the chapter presents 
the list of hypotheses that are tested in this dissertation and its overall theoreti-
cal model. 
 
 
IMOMs and uncertainty in a coalition 
In his path-breaking study Thies (2001) identified three factors which could 
explain the use of shadow Junior Ministers, but also could just as easily be ex-
tended to IMOMs as a whole: lack of institutional checks on ministerial 
autonomy, portfolio salience, and the ideological distance between coalition 
partners. All of these four factors relate to the demand side of IMOM use, that is 
to say that each of these factors contributes to the demand that coalition partners 
might have for IMOMs. For instance, if possibilities are lacking to monitor 
ministerial activities through parliamentary committees or other institutional 
instruments, then, naturally, the level of uncertainty in a coalition rises and 
creates demand for more intensive IMOM use. In a similar way, demand for 
IMOM use relates to ministerial portfolio salience: coalition partners are more 
sensitive to the potential losses from ministerial abdication in salient policy 
areas and, therefore, might feel the need to monitor these areas more closely. 
Similarly, greater ideological distance between the coalition partners increases 
the incentives to shirk away from the coalition compromise, thus creating addi-
tional demand for oversight.  
The three Baltic countries do not, however, vary along the first two of those 
factors or there is no reliable data to test their influence. Thies (2001) tied the 
degree of ministerial autonomy with the following: first, structure of the state – 
ministers have more autonomy in unitary states compared to their federal 
counterparts. Second, decision making rules in the cabinet – ministers have 
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more autonomy in cabinets which do not require unanimity in making decisions 
and where the PM does not have a strong leadership role. Finally, in states with 
weaker parliaments (and weaker parliamentary committees) the ministers have 
more autonomy compared to states with strong legislatures.  
All three Baltic states are unitary and their parliaments have very similar levels 
of power compared to the executive, therefore, there is no variance between the 
Baltic states along the first and third factors. As for the second factor, decision 
making rules in the cabinet, there is little to no variation between the Baltic states. 
In all three countries decisions in the cabinet are made either unanimously or via 
qualified majority vote. That is to say that each ministerial initiative has to be 
approved by the cabinet before it goes to the plenary stage.  
Furthermore, there are no reliable portfolio salience measures which would 
allow the comparison between the Baltic countries. In his study Thies (2001) 
relied on the dataset compiled in 1992 by Laver and Hunt, which does not cover 
the Baltic states. The only existing measure in which the Baltic states are in-
cluded is composed by Druckman and Roberts (2008). But even it is deeply 
flawed, as the coverage on the Baltic states ends in year 2000. This makes this 
data not suitable because, for instance in Latvia in 1999 there were 22 cabinet 
positions (including deputy cabinet members), while by 2012 the number of 
these positions has decreased to 14, thus impacting the salience of each ministry 
in a significant manner. As the number of cabinet positions can change signifi-
cantly over time and the data does not cover more than half of the years in the 
sample, this data is not usable. It is hard even to attempt to replicate the salience 
measurement attempts and acquire evidence through interviews, as the en-
vironment in the Baltic states is very dynamic and rapidly changing, which 
means that portfolio salience varies substantially between one cabinet and the 
next. Interviewees often struggled to remember what the most salient cabinet 
positions have been 20 years ago or how they have evolved through time. Fi-
nally, even if some of them can put together their version of portfolio salience, 
that version is often conflicting with other similar accounts.  
Instead this dissertation focuses on the last factor identified by Thies (2001) – 
ideological distance between coalition partners. There are two main reasons for 
this: 1. unlike with the other two, there is substantial variation both within and 
between the Baltic states with respect to coalitions’ ideological diversity, and 2. 
this factor was demonstrated to have a significant influence on IMOM use by 
various other studies (Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin and Vanberg 2004; Dong 
Hun and Loewenberg 2005). Like other factors from Thies’ study, ideological 
distance affects the intensity of IMOM use by contributing to the uncertainty in 
a coalition.  
Figure 3 shows the ideological positions of parties A, B and C on a uni-
dimensional ideological spectrum. When ideological distance is increased, the 
area of credible compromise diminishes (compare win-sets A-B and A-C) and 
makes coalition policy both more difficult to achieve and costly to maintain. 
Based on the veto player approach, a credible win-set cannot increase as the 
distance between the partners grows (Tsebelis 1999).  
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    Figure 3: Coalition partners and credible policy space on one-dimensional spectrum 
Adapted from Tsebelis 1999 
 
 
Since an increase in ideological diversity of a coalition increases the probability 
of ministerial shirking, it also creates the need for more oversight using 
IMOMs. Furthermore, it would be logical that in such situations it is more likely 
that more than one IMOM would be used to combat possible agency shirking. 
For instance, if a coalition is made up of three parties A, B and C, it could be 
that a minister from party A would be in some form shadowed by represen-
tatives from both parties B and C, because otherwise at least one coalition 
partner would be left in the dark regarding the actions of that minister. As 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, such an arrangement is sometimes used 
in Lithuanian coalitions, when a minister is shadowed by multiple Junior 
Ministers from different coalition partners. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
H1: As the ideological distance between coalition partners increases, IMOM 
usage increases.  
 
In addition to those already mentioned, there is one more factor that can signifi-
cantly contribute to the overall uncertainty in a coalition and consequentially to 
greater IMOM usage. As Figure 3 indicates, a substantial win-set reduction can 
occur not only due to increasing ideological distance between coalition partners, 
but also due to the increase in coalition size. As the number of coalition partners 
grows and the credible win-set shrinks, it becomes more and more likely that a 
particular minister will be forced to implement policy which is very different 
from his/her ideal point. This, in turn, increases the incentives for that minister 
to shirk from the Coalition Agreement by either refusing to implement it or 
openly rebelling against it. Second, as the number of coalition partners grows, 
so do the incentives for them to ‘break ranks’ to pursue electoral benefits 
(Mitchell 1999). This leads to the second hypothesis:  
H2: As the number of coalition partners increases, IMOM usage increases. 
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Costs and benefits of using IMOMs for oversight 
The previous part of the chapter discussed the factors relating to the demand of 
IMOM use. These factors mostly contributed to the amount of uncertainty in a 
coalition and in this way created demand for more intensive reliance on 
IMOMs. However, the varying levels of demand cannot fully account for 
IMOM use. At least they cannot explain why coalition partners simply do not 
‘go to town’ with IMOMs and employ every single mechanism possible to their 
fullest extent. This part of the chapter addresses this issue by analyzing the costs 
and benefits of using IMOMs as well as factors that could alter the cost-benefit 
calculation in a given coalition: 1. national institutional contexts that influence 
the utility of specific IMOMs; 2. whether the cabinet coalition is backed by a 
minority or a majority; and 3. whether coalition partners have a past history of 
governing together. 
Using IMOMs involves certain costs for two major reasons. First, a willing-
ness to use IMOMs could be interpreted as a sign of distrust between coalition 
partners that could negatively affect the relationship between them and the lon-
gevity of the coalition. Furthermore, these costs could have a tendency to in-
crease with the intensity of IMOM usage: while some amount of oversight mea-
sures are likely to be accepted without much resistance, an extensive use of such 
mechanisms would imply a desire to extensively scrutinize or micro-manage the 
actions of others.  
A second source of costs involves the limited recruiting pool within each 
coalition partner and the trade-offs of using certain people for certain oversight 
mechanisms. Each of the people appointed to shadow a minister has to have 
substantial policy expertise and a considerable amount of loyalty to his/her 
party. Needless to say, such people are in limited supply in any political party 
and appointing them to shadow a minister means that they cannot be appointed 
anywhere else, which creates considerable costs of using IMOMs. Similarly, 
extensive reliance on Coalition Committees requires cabinet members to devote 
a significant amount of their time to these meetings, which is costly as well. 
Finally, even Coalition Agreements have opportunity costs, as each new pro-
vision in the agreement limits ministerial autonomy, which can be negatively 
perceived by the coalition partners.  
Each additional IMOM increases the total cost of oversight, while providing 
diminishing marginal utility. As each IMOM is piled on, it contributes towards 
an atmosphere of distrust and requires coalition partners to contribute resources 
that could be used for other means. As IMOM usage intensifies, these costs 
would grow, since both resources and personnel in each political party are in 
limited supply, and it gets harder to allocate them for oversight purposes. 
Meanwhile, as the use of oversight mechanisms intensifies, their utility di-
minishes, because even the most basic mutual oversight arrangements are suffi-
cient to prevent the most audacious forms of ministerial shirking, but detecting 
and deterring more delicate instances of agency loss requires disproportionally 
intensive use of IMOMs. 
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In other words, IMOM usage is characterized by increasing marginal costs 
and decreasing marginal gains, as presented in Figure 4 below. Assuming that 
partners in a coalition are rational actors who would prefer to minimize the un-
certainty of coalition governance by employing IMOMs, it stands to reason that 
they would employ IMOMs to the degree that marginal costs of oversight 
would not exceed marginal gains and that IMOM intensity and utility would be 
in an equilibrium.  
 
 
Figure 4: Marginal gains and costs of using IMOMs 
 
 
However, certain factors can alter cost-benefit calculations of using individual 
IMOMs or even the overall intensity of oversight and cause the equilibrium 
point to move as depicted in Figure 4. 
It was pointed out that IMOM use is influenced not only be demand for 
oversight but also by the level of costs associated with IMOM use. Analyzing 
Coalition Agreements, Indridason and Kristinsson (2013) discovered that these 
have a tendency to get longer and more detailed over time. Their findings 
seemed to go against the prevailing logic that coalitions made up of parties with 
extensive experience of working together should have used IMOMs less, and 
thus their Coalition Agreements ought to have been shorter and resemble more 
of an informal gentlemen’s agreement. However, it turned out that the expe-
rience of working together affects IMOM use in the opposite direction: rather 
than relying more on mutual trust, coalition partners instead use the existing 
trust to maximize policy output. Longer and more detailed Coalition Agree-
ments have a better chance to be actually implemented than those containing 
more abstract pledges (Moury 2010). In other words, it demonstrates that coali-
tion experience has allowed coalition partners to lower the costs of using 
IMOMs by teaching them a practical lesson that close coordination of policies 
makes all the parties in a coalition better off. In turn, reduced costs allow coali-
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tion partners to use more IMOMs, which then ought to result in better policy. 
This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: Coalitions made-up of parties with more coalition experience use IMOMs 
more extensively. 
 
Another factor that could significantly alter the costs of IMOM use is whether a 
governing coalition is backed by a parliamentary majority or not. Being a mi-
nority coalition should increase the costs of oversight, which would, in turn, 
translate into a lower level of IMOM usage. Being a minority coalition means 
that coalition partners have to constantly make deals with some opposition par-
ties in order to get any legislation through. Usually it involves assigning oppo-
sition parties some powerful positions in parliament, such as seats on parlia-
mentary boards or chairmanships of important committees. (Hansen 2014) 
Furthermore, in some cases such practices can extend beyond parliament and 
people from opposition parties can also be appointed to Junior Ministerial posi-
tions (or at least appointment of Junior Ministers can be coordinated with the 
opposition parties). This reduces the opportunities for coalition partners to over-
see each other via cross-appointments, and this makes oversight more difficult 
and costly. Furthermore, being a minority coalition also makes the use of Coa-
lition Agreements and committees more difficult, because moving forward with 
anything requires coordination with opposition parties and often involves fine-
tuning legislative proposals to their preferences. This leads to the next hypo-
thesis: 
H4: Minority coalitions use IMOMs to a lesser extent than majority-backed 
coalitions.  
 
Finally, the costs of using IMOMs are affected by the institutional contexts of 
each state. National institutional contexts mostly affect the usage of individual 
IMOMs by making them more or less attractive tools for oversight. In different 
countries similar political institutions have slightly different powers, responsi-
bilities and respond to different rules, thus, altering their utility as IMOMs.  
For instance, using Committee Chairs for oversight would depend on a num-
ber of factors such as committee strength within the legislative system or pro-
portionality rules that may exist when assigning positions among party groups. 
The more power that is vested in parliamentary committees, the more attractive 
they are as tools for mutual oversight. In countries where committees can 
merely advise the plenary and request information from the executive in a non-
binding manner, Committee Chairs would be less appealing as oversight tools, 
as their powers to acquire information and scrutinize the actions of the execu-
tive would be limited. Meanwhile, in countries with more powerful committee 
systems, Committee Chairs would be more powerful oversight tools because 
they simply can do more. Another possible factor influencing the attractiveness 
of using Committee Chairs for oversight is proportionality rules: in some 
countries these positions are allocated proportionally to all parliamentary party 
groups, whereas in others their allocation strongly favors governmental parties 
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(Fernandes 2013). Naturally, in systems where governmental parties control 
more Committee Chair positions, they are better suited to be used for oversight 
purposes than in highly proportional systems, simply because the smaller avail-
ability of Committee Chairs could mean that using them to shadow a particular 
minister is simply impossible.  
Such national institutional particularities could mean that certain countries 
would have a strong preference for certain IMOMs over others. Furthermore, in 
certain institutional or cultural contexts certain oversight tools as, for instance, 
appointment of Junior Ministers, could be perceived as being too intrusive and 
not be used altogether. However, in such situations coalitions would still be 
facing persisting demand for IMOM use. Therefore, it is only natural that in 
such cases coalition partners would go avoid certain IMOMs that are perceived 
as being too intrusive, but instead would compensate by using other IMOMs to 
a larger extent. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
H5a: Specific features of the national institutional contexts in different 
countries do not affect the overall IMOM use. 
H5b: However, the specific features of national institutional contexts in dif-
ferent countries affect the popularity of individual IMOMs.  
 
 
The Model 
As discussed in the previous chapter, to resolve the challenges associated with 
inter-party delegation, coalition cabinets need mechanisms to ‘keep tabs’ on 
each other that would satisfy three criteria: 1. being able to overcome infor-
mation asymmetries, 2. being able to veto agents’ actions and 3. be informal. To 
this end, coalition cabinets employ a range of mechanisms that in addition to 
their formal functions allow for such ‘keeping tabs’. Existing literature has 
identified a number of such measures four of which: 1. cross-appointments of 
Junior Ministers and 2. parliamentary Committee Chairs, 3. Coalition Commit-
tees, and 3. Coalition Agreements are analyzed here. However, using IMOMs 
can be problematic, as no single mechanism can fully meet the three above-
mentioned criteria for oversight mechanisms in coalition cabinets. Therefore, 
IMOMs can only be used in groups as comprehensive systems of oversight in 
coalition cabinets. This dissertation differs from earlier work on IMOM use in a 
way that it analyzes IMOMs in exactly such manner – not individually, but as a 
part of a broader system. Figure 5 below presents the model used in this 
dissertation.  
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Factors contributing to the 
uncertainty in a coalition:
  
1. Ideological distance between 
coalition partners. + 
  
2. Number of coalition 
partners. + 
 Overall 
IMOM use   Factors influencing costs of 
IMOM use:
 
1. Experience of governing in a 
coalition. + 
  
2. Minority cabinet. -   
3. National institutional 
contexts. /  
  
 
Figure 5: The Model 
 
 
Two sets of factors are considered in this dissertation that could affect the usage 
of IMOMs: factors contributing to the amount of uncertainty and delegation 
problems in a coalition and factors influencing the costs and benefits of mutual 
oversight. Factors that belong in the first set are the number of parties in a coa-
lition cabinet and the policy distance between the coalition partners. Both these 
factors positively contribute to the delegation problems in coalition cabinets 
and, therefore, increase the demand for oversight.  
The second set of factors includes national institutional contexts, minority 
coalitions and learning effects. National institutional contexts can increase or 
decrease the usefulness of particular IMOMs and have a significant impact on 
the usage of such IMOMs. However, it should not affect the overall level of 
IMOMs used. Minority coalitions have to constantly broker deals with 
opposition parties in order to pass any legislation, and to them mutual oversight 
is more difficult. Hence, we can expect the levels of IMOM usage to be lower in 
such scenarios. Finally, we can expect that the experience of governing in a 
coalition would affect the IMOM usage in a positive way, because with 
increased experience we can expect coalition partners to start perceiving 
IMOMs not as signals of mistrust, but rather as means of preserving peace 
among the coalition partners. 
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PART II: IMOMS IN THE BALTIC STATES 
Chapter 3: Coalitions in the Baltic states 
This part is dedicated to the usage of informal mutual oversight mechanisms in 
the Baltic states. It begins with an overview of coalition cabinets in the Baltic 
states between 1992 and 2012, the rationale for the case selection and the key 
descriptive statistics regarding Baltic coalition governments. It also briefly pre-
sents the main variables and their operationalization as well as methods used in 
the dissertation. Chapters Four to Seven are dedicated to the use of individual 
IMOMs in the Baltic states. Each chapter follows a similar template: the first 
part describes the IMOM in question, the second part discusses the costs and 
benefits of using it, the third part presents an overview of its use in the Baltic 
states and the effect of national institutional contexts and finally the fourth part 
explores its relation with the factors identified in the previous part.    
 
 
Case selection 
This dissertation analyses IMOM use and the factors affecting it in the three 
Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania between 1992 and 2012. The year 
1992 was chosen as a starting point, since by then all three Baltic states had put 
in place definitive constitutional frameworks and had held their first parliamen-
tary elections after the restoration of their independence. From then on, this 
dissertation maps out how the coalition cabinets functioned in these states over 
the span of two decades until 2012. The year 2012 was chosen as the end-point 
for the two reasons: first, it allows to capture two equally-long, distinct periods 
in the Baltic states: institution building and democratic consolidation which 
lasted until roughly 2003–4 and then another ten years of stable democracy. 
Second, 2012 was chosen as the end point because it is much more difficult to 
collect data on incumbent cabinets, as high-ranking cabinet members: ministers 
and committee chairs usually do not agree to do interviews and share infor-
mation on the incumbent coalition. Therefore, this dissertation looks at the coa-
lition cabinets which were formed in the Baltic states between 1992 and 2012. 
That means that that rather than having the same strict cut-off points for the 
three Baltic states, the period of analysis slightly differs for each of the Baltic 
states. For instance, since in Lithuania the first coalition cabinet was formed in 
1996 and there was a parliamentary election held in 2012, the actual period 
analyzed is between 4th December, 1996 and 26th November, 2012, while in 
Estonia it covers the period between 21st October, 1992 when the first coalition 
cabinet after 1992 took office and 26th March, 2014, when the last coalition 
cabinet formed prior to 2012 left office.  
The three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were chosen for 
variety of reasons. First, they offer a very good opportunity to study how 
IMOMs developed in newly democratized countries. Many other post-socialist 
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countries in Central and Eastern Europe already had many of their political 
institutions in place when they went through democratic and market transitions 
in the 1990s and had no reason to immediately overhaul these institutions. 
Meanwhile, the Baltic states upon re-establishing their independence had to 
create their institutions virtually from scratch. This allowed them to adopt many 
new institutional innovations and best practices (such as a ‘working parliament’ 
format with a strong parliamentary committee system). Analyzing the Baltic 
states and the functioning of their political systems since the restoration of 
independence offers an interesting insight into how these innovations func-
tioned and helped to shape the institutional environment around them.   
Second, the Baltic states are an interesting sample for political scientists 
because they offer substantial variation but at the same time they share many 
key characteristics. Since the histories of the Baltic states has followed similar 
trajectories since 1795, when their territories became part of the Russian 
Empire, the Baltic states share a number of cultural and societal characteristics, 
which gives political scientists a chance to carry out comparative analysis with-
out worrying too much about the issue of environmental effects or externalities. 
In other words, they offer a very good sample for most-similar-systems design. 
Naturally, this does not mean that they are identical, but at the same time, 
comparing them is a bit less problematic than, for instance, the United King-
dom, France, and Germany, where such historical and cultural differences are 
paramount.  
Despite sharing many background characteristics, the Baltic states demonst-
rate substantial variation in areas which are of interest to this dissertation. First, 
they differ in terms of average size of coalition governments: in Estonia on 
average a governmental coalition is made-up of 2.4 parties, in Lithuania 2.75, 
and in Latvia 3.8. In addition, the Baltic states also vary in terms of the 
ideological distance between the coalition partners. In Lithuania and Latvia 
governmental coalitions are usually formed by the parties on the same side of 
the ideological spectrum, whereas in Estonia it is not at all uncommon to form 
‘rainbow’ coalitions between left and right of center parties. It is also important 
to stress here that while cabinets in Lithuania and Estonia usually alternate 
between those leaning more to right and those leaning more to the left, in Latvia 
all the cabinets were formed by center-right wing parties. 
Finally, Latvia and Estonia are parliamentary democracies, whereas Lithua-
nia is semi-presidential. This means that the president in Lithuania has more 
power and influence during the government formation process than in the other 
two states, where president’s role in this process is mostly ceremonial. In 
Lithuania a cabinet can only assume office if it is in corpore nominated by the 
president and passes the vote of investiture in the parliament. Therefore, a 
president, though not at liberty to determine the composition of the cabinet, can 
have substantial influence over which politicians are nominated for a cabinet 
39 
position1. Such influence of an external actor could potentially alter the dyna-
mics inside a cabinet and thusly influence the way IMOMs are used.   
 
 
Coalition cabinets in the Baltic states  
During the two decades (1992–2012) analyzed in this dissertation an absolute 
majority of cabinets in the Baltic states were coalitions. The only exceptions 
were the Lubys, Stankevičius and Šleževičius cabinets in Lithuania, which were 
made up of non-partisan technocrats and members of a single party – the Demo-
cratic Labor Party (LDDP). These cabinets were in power in the early 1990s and 
from 1996 onwards all cabinets in Lithuania were coalitions. During these two 
decades a total of 46 cabinets were in office in the Baltic states: 13 in Estonia, 
21 in Latvia and 12 in Lithuania. 
Of course, these numbers are a bit arbitrary, as there is no universal defini-
tion of what constitutes a cabinet change. One approach to this would be to 
simply count the number of times when a prime minister has been sworn into 
office, but this measure is too crude and cannot really capture more sensitive 
dynamics of coalition cabinets. This is bad because constitutional provisions in 
the Baltic states allow for a significant number of ministers to change without 
the need for cabinet to pass through the vote of investiture anew. In some 
extreme cases, this allows for a junior coalition partner to be removed from 
cabinet or replaced without the formal investiture vote (Pettai, Auers, Ra-
monaitė 2011). Therefore, this dissertation takes a more nuanced approach to 
counting cabinets, by adopting the definition of cabinet change used in the 
ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016). It counts a new cabinet, if a parti-
san composition of a coalition changes or a PM changes. That means that the 
cabinet change is registered when: 1. a coalition partner is thrown out/ replaced; 
2. a new PM takes office; or 3. the cabinet has to pass through the vote of in-
vestiture anew. The same applies if a coalition parliamentary party group (PPG) 
splits and some members leave the coalition. However, if an individual minister 
is replaced for any reason by a member of the same party, then it does not count 
as a cabinet change. Additional advantage of using ParlGov definition of cabi-
net change is that it allows to integrate the IMOM data collected by the author 
with the ParlGov database containing descriptive statistics of parties in parlia-
ment and the make-up of coalition cabinets.  
Out of cabinets that governed the Baltic states in this period between one-
third and half of the cabinets were terminated due to the end of the legislative 
term (7 in Latvia, 6 in Lithuania, and 5 in Estonia) and the rest collapsed due to 
some sort of internal tensions or scandals in the coalition. It is worth noting that 
                                                 
1  For instance, it is not uncommon for a president to ask the potential PM to replace certain 
ministerial candidates with others before the president presents the full cabinet to the parlia-
ment for the investiture vote. Similarly, such things can also happen when a single cabinet 
member is being replaced mid-term. Lietuvos Rytas 2015 05 10 <http://lietuvosdiena. 
lrytas.lt/aktualijos/politiku-kadrilis-apie-svietimo-ir-mokslo-ministro-kede.htm> 
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the relatively high number of legislative periods in Latvia occurred due to two 
major reasons: first, originally, the length of the parliamentary term was set at 
three years before it was later expanded to four (this means that more elections 
took place during the two decades under question), and, second, in 2011 the 
Latvian parliament was dismissed early by president Valdis Zatlers barely a 
year after the previous parliamentary election.  
The most important descriptive statistics of the cabinets in the Baltic states 
are presented in the Table 2 below. 
 
 
Table 2: Baltic coalition cabinets – descriptive statistics 
Country Number of 
cabinets  
1992–2012 
Cabinets per 
legislative  
period 
Av. number  
of parties in  
a coalition*  
Av. measure  
for coalition 
diversity**  
Estonia 13 2.16 2.4 1.19 
Latvia  21 2.65 3.8 1.02 
Lithuania 12 2.4 2.75 .98 
*This measure counts electoral alliances as a single party. 
** The measure was computed based on Comparative Manifesto Project data. It 
measures the mean distance between the coalition formateur and coalition partners. See 
section “Main variables and operationalization” for more information on how this 
measure was computed. 
 
 
Data coverage  
Table 3 presents a list of data collected for this dissertation. In some cases, 
missing data is a result of happenstance. For instance, parts of the Coalition 
Agreement of the Paksas II cabinet are simply missing. Party members think 
that these documents were lost when party headquarters were moved. The fact 
that both parties which formed that cabinet (the Liberal Movement of Lithuania 
and the New Union) have ceased to exist, makes tracking down the original 
documents nearly impossible. Additionally, some of the data on Junior Minis-
ters could not be collected either because government institutions did not 
respond to requests to provide data (e.g. Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithua-
nia) or because they were in the process of digitalizing their archives and simply 
could not locate the required data (e.g. Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 
Lithuania). Finally, sometimes cabinets that were in office for a brief period of 
time, especially ‘caretaker’ cabinets which are tasked with keeping order until a 
parliamentary election (e.g. Šķēle III in Latvia) present another challenge: they 
are often omitted from parliamentary websites or other publicly available offi-
cial data sources. Because of this, information on the appointments of Commit-
tee Chairs, Junior Ministers, and evidence of Coalition Agreements had to be 
pieced together from a variety of different sources, and was often incomplete.  
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Main variables and their operationalization 
There are five dependent variables used in this dissertation: four for individual 
IMOMs and one aggregate measure for IMOM use. The measure for Committee 
Chairs shadowing ministers is designed to range between zero and one. A mi-
nister is considered shadowed by a Committee Chair if the main parliamentary 
committee dealing with that minister’s policy sphere is chaired by a person from 
a different coalition party. The main measure used in this dissertation for this 
IMOM is the share of Committee Chairs shadowing ministers, which is ob-
tained by dividing the number of the instances of shadowing by the total 
number of potential showing occurrences (see Chapter Four). Data coverage for 
this variable is quite good, covering 38 out of 46 cabinets. Data is mostly mis-
sing for some of the earliest cabinets (e.g. Godmanis I) or cabinets that were in 
office very briefly (Šķēle III).   
Similarly, the main measure for Junior Ministers shadowing ministers is the 
share of ministers shadowed by a Junior Minister. It is computed by dividing 
the number of ministers who have a Junior Minister (vice-minister in Lithuania 
and parliamentary secretary in Latvia) from a different coalition party working 
under them by the total number of cabinet members. Data coverage for this 
variable is also quite good with data on 44 of 46 cabinets. In some cases data is 
not complete because some ministries (e.g. Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
Lithuania) refused to share the data and in the case of Estonia this IMOM was 
simply not used in the majority of the cabinets.  
The measure for Coalition Agreements is computed by multiplying two 
lower level measures: length and precision. Length is measured in pages, while 
precision measure was hand coded on an ordinal scale. It could acquire one of 
five values: 0 – totally abstract pledge; .25 – pledge involving general policy 
steps; .5 – pledge outlying policy measures; .75 – pledge outlying step-by-step 
policy plan; 1 – very concrete policy program with the tangible steps and 
estimated costs and benefits. More precise coding scheme and examples can be 
found in Chapter Six dedicated to the topic of Coalition Agreements.  
Due to their inherit secrecy and preference to meet behind closed doors, it is 
impossible to obtain the data on the activities of the Coalition Committees for 
each individual cabinet. For this reason, a different approach was taken and 
instead the same score was assigned to all the cabinets from the same country. 
Like with Coalition Agreements, activity of Coalition Committees was coded 
on an ordinal scale with five possible values: 0 – coalition committee does not 
exist; .25 – Coalition Committee just coordinates the passage of bills; .5 – 
Coalition Committee coordinates bills and helps to turn abstract pledges in the 
Coalition Agreement into policy; .75 – Coalition Committee coordinates bills, 
turns pledges into policy, and leads the response to ad hoc challenges; 1 – 
Coalition Committee can effectively sanction misbehaving members without 
breaking up the coalition. More detailed coding scheme and examples can be 
found in Chapter Seven dealing with Coalition Committees.  
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The final measure on the dependent variable side is the aggregate measure 
for IMOM use, which is acquired by adding up the values of the four individual 
measures for IMOMs. More measures of IMOM use such as ‘shadow’ JMs or 
CCs per coalition partner are used in the chapters dedicated to the use of indi-
vidual IMOMs. Their operationalization is discussed there.  
On the independent variable side, the measures are relatively straightfor-
ward. The number of the coalition partners is computed by counting the number 
of parties which have their members in the cabinet. Parties are counted based on 
the number of parliamentary party groups. That means that if two parties have 
separate extra-parliamentary organizations, but form a single parliamentary 
party group, then they are counted as a single party. Whether the coalition is 
backed by a minority or a majority is determined by the size of all the coalition 
parliamentary party groups (PPGs). If they control less than 50% of seats in the 
plenary (51 – in Estonia and Latvia; 71 – in Lithuania) a cabinet is considered a 
minority cabinet. Country effects are measured by including country dummies 
in the regression models.  
Coalition experience is computed in two steps: first, for each coalition 
partner we count the number of instances when the party was a member of a 
coalition. Second, we compute a mean score for coalition experience from all 
coalition partners’ scores. Hence, for instance the coalition experience score for 
Kubilius I cabinet in Lithuania is 2. This is because each of the coalition 
partners prior to Kubilius I cabinet were part of two coalition cabinets: Vag-
norius and Paksas I.  
This measure was based on an assumption that being in a coalition gives a 
party experience which is transferable. That is to say, a party can apply lessons-
learned from being in a coalition with one party to a coalition with another. The 
mean is computed so that coalitions made up of more parties would not auto-
matically receive larger experience score. Similarly, this also works to adequa-
tely reflect the situations when one coalition partner is experienced and another 
is not.  
This approach was chosen because it combines simplicity and robustness. 
One possible alternative to counting coalition experience would be to count 
dyadic experience scores for each pair of coalition partners. However, such a 
measure would arguably better reflect the situation when parties which have a 
lot of experience working together form a cabinet and would allow to differen-
tiate that from a coalition of parties which accumulated their coalition expe-
rience separately. However, such a measure would become increasingly compli-
cated in larger coalitions composed of three or more partners. In turn, when 
such complexity is involved, there is no certain way to ensure the validity of the 
measure. Since such coalitions are a fairly common occurrence in the Baltic 
states, it was deemed more appropriate to use a simpler measure.  
Finally, the amount of ideological diversity in a coalition is measured using 
the RILE measure from the Manifesto project database (Lehamn et al. 2016). It 
uses uni-dimensional left right scale with the qualities of social-progressivism 
and regulated economy attributed to the left, and social-conservatism and free-
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market associated to the right (Budge 2013). This measure was chosen because 
it offers better coverage of the Baltic states throughout the two decades ana-
lyzed. By contrast the closest comparable measure – Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(Bakker et al 2015) – does not cover the first half of the 1990s. However, using 
RILE has certain setbacks, since according to some it captures poorly left-wing 
parties in post-socialist countries (Mölder 2013). Therefore, the index is 
“anchored” in the national contexts of the Baltic states by looking at not the 
position itself, but by measuring the distance between a coalition party and the 
coalition formateur. This individual level measure is used in some of the 
chapters addressing issues at the party level. For the most part this dissertation 
uses cabinet level measure computed by summing all these distances together. 
 
 
Methods 
This dissertation employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. Infor-
mation about the use of three out of the four IMOMs (CCs, JM, Coal_A) comes 
from analyzing official records. More specifically, information about the 
identity and partisan affiliation of the Committee Chairs comes from analyzing 
publicly available parliamentary committee records. Similarly, information 
about Junior Ministers is obtained by analyzing personnel data from various 
ministries. Finally, data on Coalition Agreements was obtained by contacting 
the political parties directly.  
The main method for analyzing quantitative data used in this dissertation is 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This method was chosen because most 
of the independent and dependent variables are interval. The rest are dummy 
variables which can also be fitted to OLS models.  
Information on how Coalition Committees function as well as more infor-
mation about the use of IMOMs in Baltic coalition cabinets was obtained via 
insider interviews with former or present high-ranking coalition members, 
mostly either former ministers, Junior Ministers or Committee Chairs. Another 
function of these interviews was to get a more general narrative about the use of 
IMOMs in Baltic coalition cabinets to further elaborate the links between the 
dependent and independent variables used in this dissertation. Interviews were 
done in a semi-structured format with a pre-prepared list of questions, but also 
allowing respondents to talk relatively freely and to bring up any topic they 
considered relevant. This interview format was chosen because it allowed each 
interviewee to be asked all the relevant questions, while also being able to 
explore and engage their insider knowledge.  
In total nine interviews were performed for this dissertation: four in 
Lithuania, two in Estonia, and three in Latvia. Though the number of interviews 
is small, their coverage is quite significant. Interviewees were chosen for their 
vast experience in high ranking positions as well as their capacity to comment 
on the inside developments in multiple coalition cabinets. For instance, one of 
the interviewees – Andrius Kubilius, served as the PM in three cabinets and as 
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the deputy speaker in parliament for two terms. Overall, taken together, the 
interviewees had good insider knowledge of the internal dynamics of more than 
twenty coalition cabinets in the Baltic states.  
Furthermore, interview data also helped to acquire real-life stories how the 
IMOMs actually functioned in practice in the Baltic states. These stories are 
presented in the four boxes alongside the quantitative evidence in the empirical 
chapters below. The first box is dedicated to how shadow committee chairs 
function in Estonia and draws on the experience of Ansip IV cabinet. The 
second box showcases the difficulties of using shadow junior ministers in 
Latvia and is based on the experience of Straujuma cabinet. Finally, boxes three 
and four are dedicated to the functioning of coalition agreements and coalition 
committees respectively and draw on the experience from Kubilius II and III 
cabinets.  
 
Triangulation of data 
Data in the main dataset is structured taking coalition-cabinet as the main unit 
of analysis. Cabinet level measures were computed by the author. The N of the 
final dataset is 46 – the number of coalition cabinets that were in office between 
1992 and 2012. Arguably, this number is smaller than some recommendations 
for OLS regression suggest. However, two main arguments could be made that 
this method is still suitable for cabinet level analysis. 
First, the main reasons why it is recommended to have at least about a 
hundred observations for OLS analysis is that: 1. otherwise the risk of Type I 
(false positive) errors is too great; 2. large factor to observation ratio tends to 
inflate the standard errors. However, in this analysis the risk of Type I errors is 
minimized by analyzing the full population or making conclusions only about 
the data that is fed into the analysis. The risk of Type I errors increases if there 
is a part of the population not included in the sample which could alter the end 
results. Since this analysis takes all the cabinets in the Baltic states that were in 
power at the time, omission or sampling bias poses no threat.  
Second, another problem with small sample sizes is that in such cases stan-
dard errors by default become large and statistical significance of factors be-
comes hard to estimate. This problem is addressed in two ways. First, reasonab-
ly relaxed threshold for statistical significance (p≤0.15) is maintained. Second, 
main findings are triangulated between the different data-sources and levels of 
analysis. An insight or a finding from the statistical analysis of the cabinet-level 
data is considered significant only if it is supported by statistical analysis of 
individual level parliament-party data (where the problem with the number of 
observations does not occur) and analysis of insider interviews. The triangu-
lation of data is one of the most powerful techniques to minimize the concerns 
about the validity and reliability of findings, when an individual data source is 
imperfect (Lauri 2011). In turn, triangulation allows to tolerate reasonably low 
threshold for statistical significance, as the validity of the findings from the 
statistical analysis is always cross-checked with findings from the other sources.  
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Chapter 4: Shadowing Committee Chairs 
A Theoretical Overview 
This part discusses usage of Committee Chairs as IMOMs from a theoretical 
perspective. First, we discuss the rationale of using Committee Chairs for 
‘keeping-tabs’ on cabinet members from the other coalition parties, then we 
move to providing an overview of the costs and benefits of using Committee 
Chairs for oversight and finally summarize existing research on how using 
Committee Chairs for oversight relates to previously identified factors.  
One of the reasons why parliamentary committees are created is that through 
specialization in a particular policy area MPs can overcome information asym-
metries between the legislature and the executive (Döring 1995; Strøm 1995). 
Another reason is that through such systems which allow for simultaneous 
deliberation of multiple legislative proposals parliaments greatly enhance their 
efficiency (Strøm 1998). Therefore, it is natural that in many European 
democracies Committee Chairs are perceived as a ‘counterweight’ to the mi-
nister or a check to ministerial power. The Baltic states in this regard are no 
exception (Šimašius 2014; Spolitis 2014; Holsmer 2016). Hence, it is only 
logical to start our analysis of the individual IMOMs from the mechanism that 
is the most obviously suited for such end. 
In many European states with stronger committee systems (the Baltic states 
among them) parliamentary committees have all the means to overcome power-
delegation problems. First, as mentioned previously, committees encourage MPs 
to specialize and become experts in their respective fields. Second, committees 
have the power to command the executive branch to present all the documents 
and other information that a committee might need to make a decision. Third, 
committees can bind representatives from the executive branch to appear before 
the committee to provide information. Fourth, if a committee considers that the 
proposed legislation is not in parliament’s best interests, it has a vast array of 
instruments to either amend the proposal or to dismiss it all together. Standing at 
the helm of the committee its chairperson can make use of these powers because, 
as many MPs pointed out, they wield substantial influence over committee’s 
work2. In addition to all of this, Committee Chairs have additional powers to 
suggest draft agenda to the committee. This basically means that the chair can 
have a sizable influence over when particular legislative proposals are deliberated, 
if they clear the committee stage swiftly or meet excessive scrutiny. As Martin 
and Vanberg (2004) pointed out, Committee Chairs often use these powers to 
either reward or punish ministers for their behavior.  
Because of this, Committee Chairs are in a unique position to monitor the 
actions of a particular minister and to scrutinize the draft bills produced in that 
particular ministry. Using Committee Chairs to such end has many benefits: 
first, Committee Chairs can not only sift through, detect, but also to stop 
                                                 
2  Interviews with R. Šimašius, Remo Holsmer, Rein Lang, Edgars Smiltens.  
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adverse draft bills or initiatives at an early stage. Furthermore, using Committee 
Chairs to shadow ministers is a way to balance out and share power in a way 
which is perceived as less intrusive compared to other IMOMs. Some of the 
high-ranking coalition members interviewed for this dissertation have expressed 
their distaste for using e.g. Junior Ministers for oversight as to them this seems 
overly intrusive and signals lack of trust towards a minister (Šimašius 2014). At 
the same time, such negative sentiments were never expressed towards the 
chairs of parliamentary committees.   
However, due to their unique advantages using Committee Chairs for over-
sight has some unique costs as well. First, since in most of the cases a single 
minister can be overseen by only a single Committee Chair, oversight using only 
Committee Chairs becomes problematic in bigger coalitions composed of more 
than two parties. Second, as mentioned previously, Committee Chairmanship is 
usually given to people with large amounts of sectorial expertise and overseeing 
minister from a different party requires significant loyalty to chair’s own party. 
That is often quite hard to achieve even in larger countries where political parties 
with substantially larger recruitment pools. Needless to say, parties in the Baltic 
states often struggle to find people meeting both of these criteria and often have to 
strike a compromise between partisan loyalty and sectorial expertise.  
Previous studies have identified a number of factors that can influence how 
Committee Chairs are used for shadowing ministers. They have demonstrated that 
levels of ministerial autonomy, parliamentary committee power, number of 
coalition partners, coalition’s ideological diversity, and learning effects can 
influence the intensity of shadowing using Committee Chairs in a given coalition. 
Naturally, the utility of using Committee Chairs for oversight heavily depends 
on the powers vested in the parliamentary committees. If the committees are weak, 
then it simply means that there is less that a Committee Chair can do in terms of 
information acquisition and, potentially, sanctioning a misbehaving minister. If that 
is the case, then parties might not be willing to pay the costs associated with using 
Committee Chairs to that end they will rely on other measures. If, however, 
committees are strong, then the benefits would outweigh the costs and using 
Committee Chairs in such manner would increase (Carroll & Cox 2012).    
Furthermore, demand for oversight mechanisms will be smaller where the 
capacity of individual minister to act autonomously is limited. In other words, if 
in a certain cabinet each policy proposal must be approved by the other partners 
in a coalition, then the need for oversight diminishes. Meanwhile, if each mi-
nister can prepare draft legislation independently and submit it to the parliament 
on his/her own, then there is a more substantive need to use Committee Chairs 
for oversight. However, this dissertation will not look into the effect of these 
factors, because the Baltic states do not vary along these lines: all three Baltic 
states can be categorized as having strong committee systems (based on Strøm 
1998 criteria)3 and as having limited ministerial autonomy (in all three Baltic 
                                                 
3  Based in Strøm 1998, criteria for strong committees include: i. Right to independently 
select own chair; ii. Ability to hold closed meetings; iii. Committee stage being included before 
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states cabinet has to approve a legislative proposal by either unanimous vote or 
qualified majority before it is submitted to the parliament).  
As for factors which are analyzed in this dissertation, it has been demon-
strated that, if policy distance between coalition partners is small, they will be 
less inclined to monitor each other this way. Similar policy positions among 
coalition partners minimizes the chance that one partner’s interests would be 
damaged by the other partner enacting its preferred policy and, hence, the de-
mand for oversight decreases. However, if policy distance is substantial, then, 
automatically, such demand increases and Committee Chairs are more likely to 
be employed to monitor partners’ actions (Martin & Vanberg 2004).  
In addition, using Committee Chairs for oversight might be most rewarding 
for small coalitions composed of two parties. In such cases Committee Chairs 
would provide means for partners to share power in all policy spheres. In bigger 
coalitions Committee Chairs might be less useful, as some partners in the coali-
tion would still be left out of power and influence in certain policy spheres. 
Finally, Dong Hun and Loevenberg (2005) have noted that heavier reliance 
on using Committee Chairs for oversight goes often hand in hand with using 
longer Coalition Agreements. As discussed in Chapter Two, the main reason 
that allows the Coalition Agreements to increase in length and level of detail is 
that with time coalition parties gain experience and learn to tolerate such Coali-
tion Agreements, as they are a necessary evil – they limit ministerial antinomy, 
but reduce the amount of conflicts in the coalition and increase its longevity. It 
could be argued that the same principle applies to the shadow Committee Chairs 
as well. With time coalition partners build tolerance to Committee Chairs play-
ing a role as oversight mechanisms and see them as a ‘necessary evil’, which 
results in more intense use of them from coalition to coalition.  
 
 
Shadow Committee Chairs: Definition and operationalization 
There have been many studies which have analyzed how Committee Chairs are 
used to ‘keep tabs’ on coalition partners (Strøm et al 2010, Martin & Vanberg 
2004; Dong Hun & Loewenberg 2005; Carroll & Cox 2012; Clark & Jurgele-
vičiūtė 2008). However, in none of them is the precise nature of this relation-
ship between the Committee Chairs and ministers defined and none of them 
gives clear and precise criteria for operationalization (or any note how their 
main variables were computed). At the first glance, it might appear that there is 
no need for this, as the meaning of ‘using Committee Chairs to shadow minis-
ters’ is pretty straightforward. However, this is not true. In this dissertation 
Committee Chairs shadowing ministers is understood as chairs of parliamentary 
committees who are tasked with overseeing the activities of the cabinet minister 
                                                                                                                       
plenary deliberation; iv. Right to initiate legislation; v. Right to rewrite bills; vi. Ability to set 
own timetable; vii. Right to independently gather information by compelling documents or 
witnesses.  Baltic states satisfy all these criteria for strong parliamentary committees.  
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from another coalition party whose portfolio mirrors that of the parliamentary 
committee. Yet, operationalizing this concept is quite tricky, as not all parlia-
mentary committees correspond to cabinet portfolios and quite often multiple 
ministries are matched with a single committee or vice-versa. Figure 6 shows an 
example of this problematic relationship in the 2010 Latvian Saeima.  
Democratic parliaments greatly differ in the extent to which the structure of 
their parliamentary committee system corresponds to that of the cabinet. 
Though in the Baltic states such correspondence is quite high, it is never per-
fect. Some of the parliamentary committees (such as i.e. ‘ethics’ or ‘mandates’) 
are created to deal with the internal matters of the parliament and do not really 
play a role in scrutinizing the executive. Others, (such as i.e. ‘legal affairs’ or 
‘European affairs’) mostly scrutinize a particular aspect of incoming policy 
proposals (in this case their conformity to other legal acts and the Constitution 
and their European dimension) and do not correspond to any of the ministries. 
Others still are preoccupied with scrutiny of the executive branch as a whole 
rather than particular ministries (i.e. ‘audit committees’). What is left, are secto-
rial committees dealing with a particular policy dimension, but even among 
them correspondence is not absolute. 
In some cases, multiple ministries correspond to a single parliamentary com-
mittee. For instance, in all three Baltic states matters relating to both education and 
culture until 2016 were dealt with in a single parliamentary committee, but in two 
separate ministries. A bit less common is a situation where a single ministry is 
matched with multiple parliamentary committees. For instance, in Latvia activities 
carried out by the ministry of defense are dealt with in two parliamentary 
committees: 1. National security, and 2. Defense, internal affairs and corruption 
prevention committee. In some cases, a ministry does not even have a clear 
corresponding parliamentary committee (e.g. transportation) and its legislative 
proposals are deliberated in multiple sectorial committees. Given all this correspon-
dence between ministries and committees, shadowing becomes quite problematic. 
In this dissertation the main measure for shadowing using Committee Chairs 
is what share of Committee Chairs was shadowing cabinet ministers. This 
operationalization is grounded in the understanding that Committee Chair posi-
tions are strategic resources controlled by the parties (Carroll, Cox, Pachon 
2006). Parties can choose the degree to which they allocate their resources:  
either to match-up their Committee Chairs with their ministers to maximize 
policy output in a specific policy sphere or to use the Committee Chair to 
shadow a minister from a different coalition party. In that way, looking at what 
share of Committee Chairs is dedicated to shadow ministers better captures the 
choices parties have to make and the alternative costs of these choices better 
than the other metrics, such as share of shadowed ministers.  
If, as shown in Figure 6, a single parliamentary committee corresponds to mul-
tiple ministries, then all possible minister – Committee Chair matchups are 
counted. So, taking the situation in Figure 6 as an example, there were 16 com-
mittees in Saeima in 2010. Out of them, six were working on matters unrelated to 
a particular policy sphere (Legal affairs, ethics, government review, public 
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expenditure, administrative and European affairs) and are not included in the 
analysis. The remaining 10 sectorial committees corresponded to the activities of 
15 ministries and that resulted in a total of 17 match-ups between Committee 
Chairs and ministers in Latvia in 2010. This dissertation looks into what share out 
of the maximum possible minister and Committee Chair relationships a minister 
was shadowed by the Committee Chair from a coalition partner’s party. 
Correspondence between the ministries and the parliamentary committees was 
determined by looking into: a) which parliamentary committee deliberates 
legislative proposals from a ministry and b) to which committee representatives 
from that ministry are summoned to provide information. This information is 
obtained from committee agendas.   
  
 
Figure 6. Correspondence between the cabinet positions and parliamentary committees 
in Saeima in 2010 
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Shadowing in the Baltic states 
This section of the chapter is dedicated to providing basic descriptive statistics 
on using Committee Chairs for oversight purposes in the Baltic states. Between 
1992 and 2012 on average 52% of Committee Chairs were shadowing ministers 
from other parties in a coalition. As shown in Figure 7, on average the intensity 
of using Committee Chairs for shadowing was similar in the three Baltic states 
being slightly higher in Lithuania (58%) and slightly lower in Estonia (41%). 
 
 
Figure 7: Intensity of Shadowing in the Baltic States 
 
 
Table 4: Shares of shadowed ministers in European democracies and the Baltic states 
Austria 61% Iceland 25% Estonia  30% 
Belgium  36% Italy 63% Latvia  34% 
Bulgaria 56% Netherlands 56% Lithuania  44% 
Czech Republic 60% Norway 79%   
Denmark  35% Poland 41%   
Finland  33% Slovakia 60%   
Germany 64% Slovenia 50%   
Hungary 62% Sweden  53%   
Source: Carroll and Cox (2012), pp. 225, for the period between 2001 and 2007. 
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Compared to other European democracies (Table 4) levels of shadowing in the 
Baltic states are more or less average. Data in Table 4 on the Baltic states differs 
slightly from the figures above and below, because it uses shares of shadowed 
ministers rather than shadowing Committee Chairs. This was done in order to 
make data on the Baltic states comparable to that on the other countries col-
lected by Carroll and Cox (2012). However, a closer look at the intensity of 
shadowing in different cabinets (Figures 8–10) reveals a bit more nuanced pic-
ture. The intensity of shadowing ministers using Committee Chairs varies great-
ly between cabinets of a single country. For instance, during the Dombrovskis II 
cabinet in Latvia just 15% of Committee Chairs were shadowing ministers 
compared with 90% in Šķēle I (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 8: Levels of Shadowing by Cabinet in Estonia 
 
 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile noting that in all three countries a significant 
portion of Committee Chairs is matched up with ministers from their own 
parties. In all three states this figure hovers around 20% (21% in Estonia, 26% 
in Lithuania, 20% in Latvia). Yet, as Figures 8–10 show this figure also varies 
substantially between different cabinets in a single country. For instance, in the 
Kirkilas cabinet in Lithuania this figure was around 10% but in the succeeding 
Kubilius II cabinet it was over 40%.  
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Figure 9: Levels of Shadowing by Cabinet in Lithuania 
 
 
Naturally shares of Committee Chair positions given to opposition parties vary 
as well. However, it is clear that on average much higher shares of Committee 
Chair positions are given to the opposition parties in such instances when the 
cabinet is backed by parliamentary minority. It could be argued that in doing so 
minority cabinets trade valuable resources – powerful parliamentary positions – 
to the opposition parties in exchange for their support on certain issues.  
 
 
Figure 10: Levels of Shadowing by Cabinet in Latvia 
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As Box 1 illustrates, using Committee Chairs to shadow ministers has gained a 
wide acceptance as a reliable tool to share power in a certain sphere between the 
coalition partners. It is seen as benign and a beneficial mutual oversight instru-
ment, which can actually improve the capacity of the coalition to work together. 
This can be starkly contrasted to the negative image of the Junior Ministers and 
negative experiences from using them for oversight (see the next chapter and 
Box 2). 
 
 
Box 1. Case study of Ansip IV cabinet 
Using Committee Chairs for oversight is a common practice in Estonia, and has acce-
lerated over time. One of the interviewees, who was in the finance committee during 
Ansip IV cabinet commented that using Committee Chairs for oversight between the 
coalition partners is a very good thing, and that it has been acknowledged and valued 
by all the parties that were in coalition cabinets for the bigger part of the indepen-
dence period.  In fact, having a Committee Chair from a coalition party to shadow a 
minister was even considered to be ”natural” and “normal” (Holsmer 2016). 
Using Committee Chairs for oversight not only allows coalition partners to share 
power and prevents one party from monopolizing a particular issue area, it also has 
many additional benefits. Holmer expressed that there exists higher degree of trust 
between the members of the same party and, therefore, even without an explicit intent 
Committee Chairs tend to go easy on the ministers from their own party and just to 
assume that the ministers have their best interests at heart. Meanwhile, another 
interviewee confirmed that there exists very little trust between even ideologically 
close partners in the coalition, such as Refrom Party (RE) and Res Publica Pro Patria 
Union (IRL) or between RE and Social Democrats (SDE). This lack of trust results 
from the fact that these parties agree on many issues in principle, but disagree on 
details (Lang 2016).  
Therefore, in order to avoid conflicts, coalition partners have to communicate very 
explicitly and clearly. For instance, Holsmer recalls that Sven Sester from IRL who 
chaired the Riigikogu Finance Committee during the Ansip IV cabinet always asked 
very thorough and detailed questions from the Finance Minister Jürgen Ligi. Such a 
dynamic between the committee chair and the minister not only allowed for effective 
communication between the coalition partners but also ensured a good relationship 
between the executive branch and the parliament, as all committee members benefited 
from the thorough scrutiny by the committee chair. According to Holsmer, such a 
relationship between the CC and the minister could not have existed if they were from 
a same party.  
Therefore, having a shadow Committee Chair not only helped to share power and 
foster communication between the coalition partners, but also between the executive 
and legislative branches in general.  
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Shadowing using Committee Chairs and its determinants  
In this part of the chapter, we look at how the factors identified in Chapter Two 
relate to the use of Committee Chairs as IMOMs and which of them affect the 
use of Committee Chairs for oversight in a significant way. There are four 
regression models: Model 1 including demand side factors, Model 2 including 
factors relating to the factors influencing the costs of using IMOMs for over-
sight, Model 3 combining the two sets of factors together, and Model 4 which 
uses z-standardized variables.  
The results of the analysis are presented below in Table 5. They demonstrate 
that one factor – number of coalition partners has a significant positive effect in 
all models. Minority cabinet variable has a significant negative effect in Model 
2. Country variables have significant effects in Models 3 and 4. Finally, ideolo-
gical distance variable is also significant in Models 3 and 4, but its value is 
negative – the effect goes in a different direction than expected. Though Model 
4 which features z-standardized versions of the factors show that the effect of 
this variable is the weakest, the fact that the effect goes in the opposite direction 
than expected merits further analysis.  
 
 
Table 5: Shadowing using Committee Chairs analysis’ results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ideological diversity  -.04(.06)  -.11* (.06) -.07* (.04) 
Number of coalition 
partners 
.11*** (.03)  .14*** (.03) .24*** (.05) 
Coalition experience  .01 (.02) .011 (.018) -.01(.02) 
Minority cabinet  -.2*** (.1) -.1 (.07) -.1 (.07) 
LT  .002 (.15) .2**(.1) .2**(.1) 
EST  -.04 (.1) .19** (.09) .19** (.09) 
Const. .15* (.08) .51*** (.1) .02 (.14) .4***(.07) 
N. 46 46 46 46 
R2 .29 .12 .35 .35 
p values: * p≤0.15; ** p≤0.1; *** p≤0.05  
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Ideological position and Committee Chairs 
In this part we go down to the level of individual parties and see how the ideo-
logical position of a party and the size of its group in parliament affect the over-
all shares of Committee Chairmanships a party receives, and how that relates to 
mutual oversight between coalition partners4. This section shows that parties 
ideologically more distant from the coalition formateur receive fewer Commit-
tee Chairmanships than ideologically closer parties of the same size. Further-
more, the size of the parliamentary party group (PPG) also matters, as bigger 
parties often choose to pair up their ministers with friendly Committee Chairs 
from the same party, while ministers from smaller parties are more likely to be 
overseen by a shadow Committee Chair, just as well as Committee Chairs from 
smaller parties are more likely to shadow a minister from a different party.  
 
 
Table 6: Effects of size and ideology on shares of Committee Chair positions 
 Model 1 Model 2 
PPG size 1.2*** (.09) 1.4*** (.11) 
Ideological position -.17** (.06) .1 (.1) 
Size*Position  -1.96** (.67) 
Minority cabinet -.01 (.02) -.004 (.02) 
LT  -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) 
EST -.02 (.02) -.03 (.02) 
Const. .02 (.02) -.01 (.03) 
N 260 252 
R2 .44 .46 
p values: * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p=0.00 
 
 
Data in Table 6 shows how the size of a PPG and its ideological position affect 
the shares of Committee Chair positions a party receives. Even when control-
ling for minority cabinets and country effects, both factors for party’s ideologi-
cal position in Model 1and the interaction term in Model 2 were significant, 
which can be interpreted as more ideologically distant parties receiving fewer 
Committee Chair positions than their ideologically more moderate peers.  
                                                 
4  An earlier version of this analysis was published in 2016 (Pukelis 2016). Certain 
differences between the results published in the article and those presented here mostly result 
from the fact that the article uses Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) data on 
parties’ ideological position and here Manifesto Project Data (Lehman et al 2016) is used for 
the same variable. As explained in the previous chapter, this choice was primarily motivated 
by the fact that Manifesto project offers better data coverage for the Baltic states than the 
Chapel Hill Survey. 
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This is significant because it demonstrates that the parties’ ideology does 
affect the way mutual oversight functions in coalition cabinets in the Baltic 
states, but the effect of party’s ideological position is not as straight-forward as 
in Western European cabinets, where ministers from ideologically distant 
parties are simply more likely to be overseen by a shadow Committee Chair 
(Carroll & Cox 2012; Dong Hun & Lowenberg 2005). In the Baltic states 
instead of simply being overseen more, ideologically more distant parties are 
suppressed during the portfolio allocation phase, which, in turn, means that 
these parties will have fewer instruments to affect coalition policy than their 
bigger and/or ideologically more moderate counterparts.  
 
 
What determines who oversees whom? 
In the previous section of the chapter, we analyzed cabinet-level features. In 
other words, in what kind of coalition cabinets Committee Chairs are shadow-
ing ministers more intensely. In this part, we delve into party-level factors, in 
order to see, if certain cabinet parties are shadowed more intensely than others. 
In this section, in order to get a complete picture, we look into three dependent 
variables: 1. share of party’s Committee Chairs shadowing ministers; 2. share of 
party’s ministers shadowed by Committee Chairs; and 3. share of party’s Com-
mittee Chairs matched with the ministers from the same party.  
The aim of this exercise is to see how different coalition partners are using 
IMOMs and whether IMOMs are used more intensely on certain type of coali-
tion parties than on others. To this end, we run regression models on all three 
above identified dependent variables, using the size of coalition PPG, its ideolo-
gical distance from the formateur, and country dummies as factors. Results of 
the analysis are presented in Tables 7–9 below. 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of PPG size on share of Committee Chairs shadowing ministers 
 Model 1 Model 2 
PPG size -1.23** (.34) -1.44*** (.35) 
Ideological position .03 (.22) .03 (.23) 
Minority cabinet  -.09 (.08) 
LT   .19* (.08) 
EST  .14 (.08) 
Const. .94*** (.09) .92*** (.09) 
N 103 103 
R2 .12 .17 
p values: * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p=0.00 
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Table 8: Effect of PPG size on share of ministers shadowed by Committee Chairs 
 Model 1 Model 2 
PPG size -.68* (.3) -.78* (.3) 
Ideological position .06 (.21) .06 (.2) 
Minority cabinet  -.11 (.07) 
LT   .18* (.07) 
EST  -.01 (.07) 
Const. .58*** (.07) .58*** (.08) 
N 111 111 
R2 .04 .11 
p values: * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p=0.00 
 
 
Table 9: Effect of PPG size on share of minister + CC combinations 
 Model 1 Model 2 
PPG size 1.54*** (.31) 1.95*** (.3) 
Ideological position -.32 (.23) -.34 (.22) 
Minority cabinet  .01 (.06) 
LT   -.31*** (.08) 
EST  -.22** (.07) 
Const. .03 (.08) .08 (.08) 
N 95 91 
R2 .27 .39 
p values: * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p=0.00 
 
 
The results of the regression analysis indicate that the ideological position of a 
coalition party does not have any influence on how intensely the ministers from 
that party are overseen or on what portion of party’s Committee Chairs are 
shadowing ministers. On the contrary – the main factor determining how inten-
sively party’s ministers are overseen is its size. Similarly, the size of the PPG is 
the most influential factor in explaining what portion of party’s Committee 
Chairs were shadowing ministers or matched up with members of their own 
party.  
The size of the PPG is negatively associated with the share of a party’s 
ministers that were shadowed by coalition partner’s Committee Chairs and the 
share of Committee Chairs that were shadowing ministers. It is positively 
associated with the share of minister + Committee Chair combinations. These 
results can be understood as evidence that not all coalition partners are equally 
interested in oversight. Bigger parties in a coalition prefer to have more minister 
+ Committee Chair combinations or, in other words, pair up their ministers with 
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friendly Committee Chairs. Meanwhile, smaller parties mostly use their Com-
mittee Chairs for oversight and they mostly oversee ministers from other small 
parties in a coalition.  
This indicates that senior partners in the coalition are inclined to use their 
Committee Chairs to help their ministers to ‘push’ desired legislation through 
parliament, while delegating the oversight duties to the junior partners in the 
coalition, who then often are tasked to oversee each other. Interviewees af-
firmed that such strategic placement of the Committee Chairs does indeed occur 
and that senior partners in a coalition strategically pursue minister + Committee 
Chair combinations during the portfolio allocation phase (Smiltens 2016; 
Holsmer 2016; Kubilius 2014).  
Quantitative evidence suggesting that ministers from bigger parties in a 
coalition are significantly less likely to be shadowed by a coalition partner have 
been observed in previous studies (Carroll and Cox 2012). However, previously 
this point was only mentioned in passing and the authors did not pursue it any 
further. There are a number of reasons for this: first, this observation was only a 
side – finding in articles dedicated to determining whether oversight between 
coalition partners is carried out by appointing watchdog Junior Ministers or 
Committee Chairs at all. Second, the authors collected only quantitative evi-
dence to test their hypotheses and, therefore, could not explore such new 
findings in greater depth (Carroll and Cox 2012). One of the most valuable 
contributions of this dissertation is that it demonstrates that senior and junior 
coalition partners use committee chairs for different ends and in different ways. 
Particularly valuable are the insights gained from the insider interviews 
demonstrating that bigger parties in the coalition attach more value to being able 
to ‘push’ desired legislation through with the help of a minister and a Com-
mittee Chair in a particular policy area than to overseeing the activities of junior 
coalition partners. Meanwhile, the junior coalition partners are mainly respon-
sible for mutual oversight using CCs and they are mostly tasked with over-
seeing each other.  
 
 
Summary 
This chapter has analyzed how the chairs of parliamentary committees can be 
used as IMOMs and how they have been used in this capacity in the Baltic 
states between 1992 and 2012. Committee Chairs make useful IMOMs because 
in parliamentary democracies with strong committee systems (such as in the 
Baltic states) a Committee Chair is a natural counterweight to the minister and 
has all the means to check ministerial power. Chairs preside over committees 
which can request relevant information from the corresponding ministries and 
summon any witnesses needed to carry out committee functions. Furthermore, 
committees can terminate draft legislation or amend it to their liking, if they 
think that is needed. All this means that committees have tools at their disposal 
to combat the power delegation problems - information asymmetry and possible 
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agency shirking. In addition to this, Committee Chairs also have substantial 
control over committee’s agenda, which allows the chair to grant certain bills 
easier passage through the committee stage, while scrutinizing other bills more 
carefully.  
However, with all its utility this IMOM is also quite costly. On the one hand, 
there are all the costs associated with the use of any IMOM: signaling the lack 
of trust, creating friction among coalition partners, etc. Yet with Committee 
Chairs there are some unique costs as well. These costs arise from the fact that 
being a Committee Chair requires two things: substantial sectorial expertise and 
party loyalty. Even in bigger countries in Western Europe parties at times 
struggle to find people who would possess these two qualities and in smaller 
Baltic states this task becomes even more difficult. Though, using Committee 
Chairs to ‘keep tabs’ on ministers allows two parties to share power in a given 
policy sphere. However, in bigger coalitions composed of three or more parties 
using this IMOM becomes problematic as some parties are simply left out.  
Nonetheless this IMOM is quite popular in the Baltic states. Overall, slightly 
more than half of all Committee Chairs that took office between 1992 and 2012 
were shadowing ministers from coalition partner’s parties. Analysis has shown 
that out of the previously identified factors cabinet type, the number of coalition 
partners, and country effects have a significant effect on overall intensity of 
shadowing using Committee Chairs at the cabinet level.  
That does not mean that ideological distance, which was significant only in 
some of the models does not come into play at all, rather its effect is indirect. 
The last section of this chapter demonstrated that ideologically more distant 
parties usually receive fewer Committee Chairmanships than more moderate 
parties of the same size and, thus, their abilities to use Committee Chairs for 
oversight (or indeed any purpose) are severely constrained. Finally, this chapter 
has demonstrated that not all coalition parties are equally interested in using 
Committee Chairs for oversight. Senior coalition partners are more likely to 
acquire minister + CC combinations to ensure that their ministers could get 
draft legislation through the committee state more easily. Meanwhile, junior 
coalition partners are more likely to use their Committee Chairs to shadow 
ministers and have their ministers shadowed by Committee Chair. This could be 
interpreted in a way that oversight duties are outsourced to junior coalition 
partners.  
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Chapter 5: Shadowing Junior Ministers  
In this chapter we discuss another well-studied IMOM, the use of Junior Minis-
ters to keep tabs on coalition partners. As explained previously, Thies’ (2001) 
study of Junior Ministers was one of the earliest attempts to tackle the issue of 
mutual oversight in coalition cabinets, and since then the use of this particular 
IMOM has been quite systematically researched. This is not surprising because 
Junior Ministers (JM) are some of the most effective oversight vehicles. JMs 
can use their position inside a ministry to get access to privileged information, 
and issues arising from existing regulation or the implementation of reforms. 
They are also able to keep an eye on ministerial activities to ensure that the 
minister respects the Coalition Agreement. In other words, though Junior Minis-
ters lack the capacity to sanction the misbehaving actors by him/herself, the 
unique informational advantages associated with this position make it one of the 
most attractive IMOMs. 
However, this general logic does not appear to hold true in the Baltic states. 
The main finding of this dissertation is that, although all three states have 
experimented with using Junior Ministers, their use has been mired in contro-
versy and using them for oversight has never fully taken root. In Estonia this 
position was used for barely two years (and never for overseeing coalition 
partners) before eventually being abolished, and in Latvia and Lithuania using 
Junior Ministers for oversight has been sporadic at best. The main reason for 
this appears to be that the coalition partners perceive the costs of using Junior 
Ministers for oversight to be too high. This occurs due to a negative public 
perception of this position formed by the media and because another IMOM 
with similar functions – Committee Chairs – can be used at a low cost. How-
ever, this should not be interpreted as evidence supporting the thesis that 
IMOMs are used interchangeably, because in those instances when Junior 
Ministers are appointed to oversee the ministers, they are most often employed 
in tandem with Committee Chairs. 
 
 
A Theoretical Overview 
Since the use of the Junior Ministers has been one of the first IMOMs to be 
described and analyzed by political scientists, this research helped in many 
ways to shape and develop literature on the broader mutual oversight topic. For 
instance, research on the use of Committee Chairs mostly developed by taking 
insights from the earlier studies on Junior Ministers and testing them in other 
empirical contexts. When studying IMOMs, attention was drawn to Junior 
Ministers first because in many ways they embodied the very idea of informal 
mutual oversight between coalition partners. On the one hand, they have a near-
perfect access to information inside the ministry and, on the other, most of the 
time they manage to keep out of the public eye and not to draw much attention 
to themselves.   
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As discussed in Chapter One dedicated to delegation and accountability in 
coalition cabinets, each minister enjoys a substantial informational advantage 
over his/her cabinet colleagues.  It creates favorable conditions for a minister to 
abuse power, because due to information asymmetry such abuses might slip 
‘under the radar’ of the coalition partners.  Junior Ministers, in turn, are a per-
fect tool to combat this danger of hidden action; they are placed in the executive 
branch and have the same access to information as the minister. This allows for 
other coalition partners to stay ‘in the loop’ and rest assured that nothing is 
being done behind their backs.  
Junior Ministers also serve as institutions which facilitate communication 
between the coalition partners. In this sense, they act rather similarly to parlia-
mentary Committee Chairs, whose role was outlined in the previous chapter. 
However, Junior Ministers also bring some unique capabilities to the overall 
scheme of mutual oversight in coalition governments. Due to their placement 
between the minister and civil servants, Junior Ministers are privy to some 
information which is not passed on to parliament on a routine basis (Carroll and 
Cox 2012). Because of this, they are uniquely suited to raise ‘red flags’ and jolt 
Committee Chairs or Coalition Committees into action. 
Furthermore, Junior Ministers are more in-tune with the attitudes within a 
particular ministry and the moods of civil servants. They can then use this 
knowledge to inform Coalition Committees or their own party leaders why 
certain reforms or policies are more or less successfully implemented by the 
bureaucratic apparatus. In addition, working alongside a particular minister 
provides Junior Ministers with more awareness and intimate knowledge about 
the moods, attitudes and goals of that minister. This information is of great 
value to the other coalition partners, as it reduces uncertainty among them and 
can contribute either to building trust or serving as an early warning mechanism 
(Thies 2001).  
Finally, Junior Ministers are better suited for bigger governmental coalitions. 
Since one minister is usually matched up with a single Committee Chair, in 
bigger coalitions composed of three or more parties this causes problems as 
only one of the coalition partners can oversee the minister using Committee 
Chairs, while others are left out. However, multiple Junior Ministers from 
multiple coalition parties can be employed to ‘shadow’ a particular minister, 
thus, giving all partners in a coalition a tool for oversight.  
However, using Junior Ministers for oversight also has costs. They are, for 
the most part, very similar to those of any other IMOM. Coalition parties might 
feel like using Junior Ministers signals a lack of trust between the coalition 
partners. Moreover, parties might be more sensitive to this particular mecha-
nism of oversight than to others, because Junior Ministers are appointed to work 
very closely with the minister and that might seem a bit too intrusive.  
Furthermore, just like with Committee Chairs, parties in a coalition face a 
serious challenge of finding suitable candidates for these positions and using 
Junior Ministers for oversight can seriously strain human resources within the 
party (Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011). This occurs for the same reason as with 
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Committee Chairs – Junior Ministers have to strike a perfect balance between 
technical expertise in that issue area and party loyalty. A person of high loyalty 
to the party, but with limited expertise is basically of no use as Junior Minister, 
because he/she will not be able in most cases to detect instances of shirking, as 
usually the devil will hide in the details and a substantial amount of experience 
will be needed to detect the cases of ministerial wrong-doing. If, however, a 
technocrat with weak party loyalty is chosen for the position, the benefits for the 
appointing party will be limited as well. In such instances there is always a 
danger that a ‘watchdog’ will turn into a ‘lapdog’ and a Junior Minister will 
start serving the interests of the minister rather than the appointing party (Müller 
and Meyer 2010).   
Moving on to the previously identified factors that could influence the use of 
Junior Ministers for oversight purposes, these are: 1. the amount of ministerial 
autonomy; 2. issue salience; 3. policy distance between coalition partners; and 
4. electoral volatility. Ministerial autonomy is positively associated with the use 
of Junior Ministers as IMOMs because if a minister is constrained by a strong 
prime minister, collegial decision-making rules in cabinet or the existence of 
strong parliamentary scrutiny, then the possibility of adverse ministerial action 
is small and, thus, the demand for oversight is low. However, if a minister can 
act autonomously, then the danger of adverse action (and the demand for over-
sight) increases. Similarly, a higher demand for oversight exists in policy 
spheres that are deemed particularly salient, as there the consequences of adver-
se action could be particularly dire (Thies 2001). However, this dissertation 
does not investigate the influence of these two factors. As mentioned previous-
ly, the amount of ministerial autonomy does not vary much across or within the 
Baltic states and, as of yet, no reliable data exists that would allow to compare 
portfolio salience in these countries.  
As Carroll and Cox (2012) have pointed out, policy distance between the 
coalition partners is positively associated with the use of Committee Chairs or 
Junior Ministers to shadow cabinet members. In ideologically diverse coalitions 
each minister has more incentives to deviate from the Coalition Agreement to 
serve the interests of his/her own party than in ideologically close coalitions. 
Such potential for ministerial shirking, in turn, creates more need for oversight.  
It has also been pointed out that in the countries with higher levels of 
electoral volatility and in instances when there is credible opposition in the 
parliament, Junior Ministers are more likely to be used (Strøm et al 2008; 
Verzichelli 2008). It mostly occurs because both of these factors contribute to 
increased uncertainty and mistrust among coalition partners. In cases of high 
electoral volatility governmental parties might try to go against the coalition 
interests and engage in populist policies to alleviate the effects of electoral 
punishment. In cases of credible opposition in the parliament, a partner in a 
coalition might be incentivized to pursue party interests, because the stakes of 
breaking-up the coalition would not be that high. 
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Shadow Junior Ministers: Definition and operationalization  
Just like with Committee Chairs, there are substantial difficulties when trying to 
operationalize the concept of shadowing Junior Ministers, though on the surface 
it looks like a relatively straight-forward task. Verzichelli (2008) pointed out 
that the title “junior minister” is rather generic and is used to cover a wide 
variation of positions that exist in many Western European countries. For 
instance, in Italy a position that would fit the description of Junior Minister is an 
undersecretary (sottosegretario). They are usually tasked with assisting the 
minister with the incoming documents and communication. Meanwhile, in Ger-
many a position that fits the description is parliamentary secretary (parlamenta-
rischer Staatssekretär). Their duties are more specific. They are tasked with 
ensuring smooth and efficient communication between the ministry and the 
Bundestag as well as parliamentary party groups and committees. 
Existing literature employs a rather loose definition of a Junior Minister, 
which in most cases states that Junior Ministers are members of the cabinet, 
who do not have the full rights of a minister (e.g. such as voting in cabinet 
meetings), but are appointed by a cabinet party to help the minister to execute 
certain tasks. In Western Europe these positions began to appear after the 
Second World War as a result of the increased scope and complexity of legis-
lation. At first, ministers were at liberty to choose who occupies these positions 
and helps them to deal with the substantial workload. However, quite soon 
coalition parties started appointing people to these positions to keep tabs on the 
minister, and now in many countries a vast majority of Junior Ministers are 
appointed to shadow the minister. 
In the Baltic states positions that would match this description are: vice-
ministers (viceministrai) in Lithuania; parliamentary secretaries (parlamentārais 
sekretārs) in Latvia, and assistant ministers (abiminister) in Estonia. In all three 
countries people occupying these positions assist and advise ministers in a 
specific field and in some cases represent the ministry in the parliament. How-
ever, as the title suggests, the function of representing the ministry and the minis-
ter in parliament has been more pronounced in Latvia, whereas in Lithuania and 
Estonia, Junior Ministers worked in a more advisory capacity. Yet, despite this 
difference, both in Lithuania and in Latvia Junior Ministers have functioned as 
IMOMs; at times they have been consciously appointed by coalition partners to 
shadow ministers from other parties (Masiulis 2014; Smiltens 2016).  
Even though it is quite clear who could be called a “junior minister” in the 
Baltic states, it is much less clear what exactly constitutes shadowing. With 
Committee Chairs, the biggest problem was the imperfect correspondence 
between parliamentary committees and ministries. It does not exist here, be-
cause all Junior Ministers are appointed in the same ministry. The main source 
of uncertainty is how to interpret the different levels of partisan loyalties one 
encounters when studying these positions. For instance, when analyzing Junior 
Ministerial appointments in Lithuania, Clark and Jurgelevičiūtė (2008) counted 
that a minister is shadowed when a minister and Junior Minister did not come 
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from the same party. Though this approach is attractive in its simplicity, it 
returns somewhat inflated results. For instance, in such a coding scheme if a 
party appoints a partisan vice-minister to a particular ministry and offers the 
position of the minister to a non-partisan expert, that would be counted as an 
instance of shadowing. Undoubtedly, in such situation a vice-minister would be 
asked to keep an eye in the non-partisan minister, but that would hardly qualify 
as a case of mutual oversight between coalition partners. Furthermore, some-
times a coalition party might appoint a non-partisan expert to accompany a 
minister from another party. This could be promoted by a consideration that a 
minister might lack sectorial expertise in a particular issue area rather than fears 
that a minister in question might shirk from the Coalition Agreement.   
Therefore, this dissertation adopts a more conservative approach to coding 
Junior Ministers that shadow cabinet members. A minister is considered 
shadowed by a Junior Minister if a person occupying a Junior-Ministerial 
position is appointed by coalition party other than the minister and is a member 
of that party. The main measure for the use of this IMOM at the cabinet level in 
this dissertation is the share of cabinet ministers that were shadowed by Junior 
Ministers. At the party level, we look into what share of ministers from a 
specific party were shadowed using Junior Ministers.  
 
 
Shadowing with Junior Minister in the Baltic States 
In many Western European countries junior ministers are probably the most 
common mechanism for mutual oversight between coalition partners. The level 
of shadowing using Junior Ministers varies from country to country, but mostly 
lies somewhere between 50% and 80% (Verzichelli 2008; Thies 2001; Carroll 
and Cox 2012). By contrast, in the Baltic states these levels are much lower – 
below 10%. Furthermore, quite often coalition cabinets make an explicit com-
mitment not to appoint Junior Ministers from another party, so this figure 
mostly represents sporadic experiments with this IMOM, rather than its con-
sistent use. Table 10 presents a comparison on the share of ministers shadowed 
using JMs between the Baltic states and a few other democracies analyzed in 
Thies’ 2001 article. 
It is important to point out that the topic of using Junior Ministers for over-
sight in CEE countries has previously not been explored in great depth. There 
are no papers or monographs dealing exclusively with this topic. Carroll and 
Cox (2012) included eight CEE countries in their sample, but they analyzed 
oversight using both JMs and CCs and did not devote much attention to JM 
appointment intricacies in the CEE states. Clark and Jurgelevičiūtė (2008) 
analyzed appointments of JMs and CCs in Lithuania, but did not include other 
countries in their analysis or comment on wider regional patterns. Other 
scholars, like Zubek (2008) and Blondel (2001) who analyzed the structures of 
the executive in Poland and other CEE states (respectively) mentioned JMs, but 
did not devote attention to the oversight functions they perform. 
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Table 10: Shadowing with Junior Ministers in the Baltic states and selected other 
countries 
Country Share of shadowed 
ministers 
Country Share of shadowed 
ministers 
Italy 98% Estonia - 
Japan 86% Latvia  5% 
Germany 36% Lithuania 9% 
Data on Baltic states collected by author; data on Italy, Germany, Japan from Thies (2001) 
 
 
In Latvia the parliamentary secretaries were introduced shortly after the resto-
ration of independence and have been used ever since. Unlike in Estonia or 
Lithuania, where these positions have aroused some controversy and the 
mandate of these positions has changed over time, in Latvia Junior Ministers’ 
tenure has been marked by stability.  
In Estonia, these positions were introduced under the 2003–2005 Parts cabi-
net, and assistant ministers were supposed to be political appointees with a 
mandate to assist and advise the minister. However, from its introduction this 
position was subjected to wide criticism because it was perceived that political 
parties were seeking to needlessly create “jobs for the boys” or in other words 
stack the ministries with their party buddies. This position did not fit in with the 
general spirit of Estonian civil service and government organization, which has 
emphasized leanness and efficiency. For instance, even MPs in Estonia do not 
receive funding from the state to hire secretaries or assistants5. Because of this, 
tasks often performed by Junior Ministers in other countries have been divided 
between career bureaucrats (ministerial secretaries general) and the ministers 
themselves. Post 2005, ministers were still allowed to hire Junior Ministers, if 
they needed additional help, but this practice was not wide-spread. Furthermore, 
when ministers were appointed, they were either non-partisan experts or 
members of the minister’s party. The matches between minister from one 
cabinet party with a Junior Minister from another, which are the focus of this 
chapter, never occurred in Estonia. Due to these reasons, vice ministers in 
Estonia are not analyzed any further in this study. Indeed, the possibility of 
appointing Junior Ministers in Estonia came to an end in 2014, when this 
position was totally abolished.  
Similarly, Junior Ministers stirred up some controversy in Lithuania as well. 
Here these positions were introduced a bit earlier – in the late 1990s. At the time 
multiple Junior Ministers were appointed to each ministry to act as ministerial 
department heads and to direct the ministry’s policy in a specific issue area. 
However, as it quickly became apparent, the position of vice-minister in Lithua-
nia required substantial technical expertise and often cabinet parties did not 
                                                 
5  Interview with Marko Mihkelson, MP, Estonia. Tallinn, August 20th, 2012. Interview 
carried out for author’s MA thesis research. 
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have adequately skilled personnel to perform such duties (usually all the people 
with relevant expertise already occupied more prestigious positions in the 
cabinet or in the parliament). For this reason, a trend emerged to hire non-
partisan expert technocrats for these duties. That meant that the division of 
Junior Minister positions was still done during the coalition negotiation phase, 
and it was up to the cabinet parties to nominate the candidates for the Junior 
Minister positions, but very often those parties chose to promote people from 
the civil service (often mid-level civil servants from the same ministry) or hire 
non-partisan experts from other spheres of life.  
Eventually, this practice led to the abolition of the vice-minister’s position 
altogether. The Kirkilas cabinet, in office from 2006 to 2008, considered that it 
would be best to expand the personnel and powers of the ministerial chancellery 
made up of career bureaucrats at the expense of politically appointed vice-
ministers. After this reform, the vice-ministers’ mandate was dramatically 
reduced and only one vice-minister position remained in each ministry. These 
vice-ministers acted more as a minister’s personal assistant rather than directors 
of a certain policy sphere as they did before. However, this practice did not last 
long. The Kubilius II cabinet restored the mandate of vice-ministers to what it 
was prior to Kirkilas’ reform. This move was motivated by the fact that minis-
ters needed a bigger team of well-trusted associates to cope with the challenges 
of the economic crisis.   
However, as in Latvia, in Lithuania a great majority of Junior Ministers were 
not used to keep tabs on a minister from a different coalition party, as seen in 
Figure 11. In Latvia a significant portion of Junior Ministers were members of 
the same party assisting the minister with his/her duties, and in Lithuania they 
were mostly non-partisan experts.  
 
 
Figure 11. Junior Ministers in the Baltic states 
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In Figures 12–13 we can see that at times Junior Ministers were used quite 
intensely to shadow ministers, however, after these sporadic attempts this 
practice did not catch on. High-ranking coalition members from Latvia and 
Lithuania have expressed their dissatisfaction with how this IMOM has worked 
in practice. Some of them emphasized that appointing shadow Junior Ministers 
reduces the overall effectiveness of a minister because in such a scenario they 
do not have liberty to assemble their own team. Rather the team is assembled 
for them by their coalition partners (Šimašius 2014). Others have said that they 
can hardly imagine how a minister can be effective in such an environment 
where he cannot feel trusted by the other coalition partners (Masiulis 2014).   
 
 
Figure 12: JM shadowing by cabinet in Lithuania 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 12, in Lithuania cross-appointing Junior Ministers 
to shadow ministers from other parties was practiced until Kirkilas cabinet. 
Such shadow Junior Ministers were appointed to shadow between 10% and 
20% of the cabinet ministers. In other words, out of 14 cabinet members, 2–3 
ministers were shadowed in such way. As mentioned before, during the Kirkilas 
cabinet in 2006 the vice-minister office was reduced and reformed, and instead 
of a team of vice-minsters who helped to manage policy a minister could only 
appoint one personal assistant. Though this practice did not last long, it still 
affected how the role of the vice-ministers was perceived in the Kubilius 
cabinets. Though their powers were restored, they were still perceived as 
ministers’ assistants appointed solely at the discretion of a minister.  
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Box 2. Case Study of Straujuma II cabinet 
Junior ministers were employed to shadow ministers in Lithuania and Latvia only 
sporadically. Also, the relationship between the minister and the shadowing junior 
minister, no matter how complicated, was usually kept private, as the coalition 
partners did not want to have their relationship complicated even more by media 
involvement. However, one of the interviewees shared a very telling story about the 
difficulties of using junior ministers for oversight, which occurred during the Strau-
juma II cabinet in Latvia (5 November 2014 – 11 February 2016).  
This cabinet was composed of three parties Unity (center-right), Union of Greens 
and Farmers (center-left), and National Alliance (NA) (right). From the beginning 
there were significant tensions both between and within the coalition partner parties. 
There were internal tensions in Unity over who should lead the party, while the 
remaining coalition partners were not satisfied that Unity acquired all the key foreign 
policy positions in government (Minister, and chairs of Foreign and European Affairs 
committees in the parliament). Due to these tensions, it was decided to use shadowing 
junior ministers to provide more oversight.  
One of these junior ministers was Rihards Kohls from National Alliance (who was 
interviewed for this research). He was assigned as parliamentary secretary to the 
Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma. Being in a close proximity to the PM he noticed 
that the Unity party was conducting foreign policy based on their own political 
positions and not taking the positions of its coalition partners (especially NA) into 
account. Particularly divisive was the issue of refugee quotas. The Unity party was 
inclined to accept the quota system and take in refugees, while NA opposed the 
mandatory quota system in principle. When it became clear that the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was going to back the quotas, despite knowing the opposition from 
the NA on this issue, Kohls decided to act and backed a motion organized by 
opposition parties to have an extraordinary parliamentary session on the topic, which 
shift the debate and the final decision from the cabinet to the plenary. 
In other words, Kohls was a good example of how junior ministers can act as 
oversight mechanisms – he used his position in the PM’s environment to acquire 
information how the ministers are going to behave on certain salient matters. He then 
relayed the information to his party leadership and the matter was brought before the 
coalition committee. However, his case is also a bit unique, because he also 
personally acted on this information to draw public attention to the issue.  
The motion eventually did not gather enough signatures, but served to expose 
internal divisions in the coalition and helped to solidify NA’s hardliner stance on 
immigration. Even though, the Coalition Committee eventually dismissed Kohls from 
his position, the internal tensions in the cabinet did not go away and the cabinet 
collapsed within five months. The coalition partners perceived Kohls actions as 
unbecoming and reckless. The next cabinet did not use shadow junior ministers.  
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Finally, in Latvia, parliamentary secretaries have been appointed to shadow 
ministers sporadically. As mentioned before, there were no significant reforms 
or controversies surrounding this position in contrast to neighboring Lithuania 
and Estonia. A lack of controversy associated with the position allowed coali-
tions in Latvia to experiment with using parliamentary secretaries as oversight 
mechanism. One Latvian MP indicated that the issue of cross-appointing JMs to 
shadow ministers would come up in coalition negotiations every few years. 
Coalition partners would acknowledge that the coalition would benefit from 
more oversight, and that parliamentary secretaries could perform this function. 
However, most of the time, such experimentation would lead to disappointing 
results as placing a person from a different party with often different opinions 
and attitudes so close to a minister, would prove counterproductive. Consequen-
tially, the idea would be eventually abandoned, but after a couple years intro-
duced anew (Smiltens 2016). See Box 2 for more detailed account.   
 
 
Figure 13: JM shadowing in Latvia 
 
 
The fact that Junior Ministers never gained popularity as a tool for mutual over-
sight, clearly sets the Baltic states apart from some Western European countries, 
where it is, arguably, the most intensely used IMOM. In the following sections 
of this chapter, we explore what factors could explain the decision to shadow 
ministers using JMs and why this IMOM was used so sporadically. 
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Shadowing using JMs and its determinants in the Baltic states  
Like in the previous chapter, in this part we analyze how the factors identified 
in Chapter Two relate to the use of JMs as IMOMs. Also, there are four 
regression models with intensity of JM shadowing at the cabinet level as the 
dependent variable and coalition make-up factors in Model 1, oversight cost 
altering factors in Model 2, all the factors in Model 3, and all the z-standardized 
versions of all the factors in Model 4 as the independent variables. Results of 
the regression analysis are presented in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 11: Shadowing using Junior Ministers analysis’ results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ideological diversity  -.01 (.05)  -.08* (.05) -.05* (.03) 
Number of coalition partners .01** (.01)  .03*** (.01) .06***(.03) 
Coalition experience  -.00 (.00) .00 (.02) -.00 (.02) 
Minority cabinet  -.01 (.04) .00 (.04) .00 (.04) 
LT  .07* (.04) .12*** (.05) .12*** (.05) 
Const. .05 (.04) .05 (.05) -.02 (.06) .01 (.03) 
N. 33 33 33 33 
R2 .02 .12 .24 .24 
p values: * p≤0.15; ** p≤0.1; *** p≤0.05 
 
 
The results demonstrate that only country dummy for Lithuania is significant in 
all the models. The variables for coalition size and ideological diversity are 
significant in Models 3 and 4. This means that shadowing using Junior Minis-
ters was more popular in larger coalitions and more intense in Lithuania com-
pared to Latvia. Estonia is not included in the analysis here, as there were no 
instances of JM shadowing in Estonia. The ideological diversity of the coalition 
cabinet had a rather weak effect in all the models. The effect, contrary to expec-
tations, was negative, meaning that Junior Ministers were used less frequently 
in diverse coalitions.  
If we move down from the cabinet level to the cabinet party level, and run 
similar models to those in the previous chapter, we can see that none of the 
factors, except the size of a cabinet PPG, is statistically significant. This indi-
cates that bigger coalition partners are more likely to appoint shadow JMs.  
However, despite the statistical significance, the effect size and R-squares 
are very low. These results indicate that in the Baltic states unlike in many 
Western European countries, more ideologically extreme or distant from the 
formateur parties are not subjected to greater oversight. Taken together with the 
results of the previous cabinet-level regression models and the fact that Junior 
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Ministers were used for oversight purposes not very intensely and not regularly, 
it is possible to draw a conclusion that shadowing using Junior Ministers was 
used not as a precaution against certain types of coalition partners, but rather in 
certain types of coalitions. Analysis results are presented in Table 12 below. 
 
 
Table 12: JM shadowing: what share of JMs appointed by a party shadowed ministers? 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Relative size of a PPG  .51*** (.14)  .52*** (.14) 
Distance from the coalition formateur -.03 (.09)  -.01 (.1) 
Coalition experience  .01* (.00) .01 (.01) 
Minority cabinet  -.05 (.03) -.04 (.05) 
LT  .06 (.03) .04 (.03) 
Const. .09**(.03) .13*** (.02) .05 (.04) 
N. 113 113 113 
R2 .12 .04 .13 
p values: * p≤0.05; ** p≤0.01; *** p=0.00 
 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, keeping tabs on coalition partners is more 
difficult in larger coalitions. While one coalition partner controls the ministerial 
portfolio, a second coalition partner might use the Committee Chairmanship to 
shadow that minister. However, if a coalition is made-up of more than two 
parties, then other coalition partners need to find other ways to keep an eye on 
that particular policy sphere. It is possible that that Junior Ministers can be 
employed for that purpose: since multiple JMs can be appointed to shadow a 
single minister, this IMOM provides an opportunity for all partners in larger 
coalitions to closely oversee a certain policy sphere. The next section explores 
how Junior Ministers can be used in tandem with Committee Chairs.  
 
 
Junior Ministers and Committee Chairs 
Previous research has generated mixed results regarding how the use of one sort 
of IMOMs is affected by the use of other IMOMs. More specifically, how using 
Committee Chairs affects the use of Junior Ministers for oversight purposes. 
Dong Hun and Lowenberg (2005) have argued that the use of Committee Chairs 
and Junior Ministers is negatively correlated. Or, more specifically, that parties 
in coalition cabinets often opt to assign a shadow Committee Chair when they 
are unable to appoint a Junior Minister to oversee that particular minister. This 
notion was challenged by Clark and Jurgelevičiūtė (2008) who presented 
evidence from the analysis of Committee Chair and Junior ministerial appoint-
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ments in Lithuania that such a relationship does not exist and, on the contrary, 
at times coalitions in Lithuania tend to ‘double-tap’ and shadow a minister with 
both Committee Chairs and Junior Ministers. 
Figure 14 presents the modes of oversight in the three Baltic states. The 
evidence demonstrates that in those instances when Junior Ministers were used 
for oversight in Lithuania and Latvia, most of the time a minister overseen by a 
JM was also overseen by a coalition-partner Committee Chair. Instances when a 
minister was overseen solely by a Junior Minister were quite rare.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: JM & CC shadowing in the Baltic states 
 
 
Overall, in Lithuania and Latvia the use of Committee Chairs and Junior Minis-
ters as IMOMs is correlated in a positive and significant way, though the corre-
lation is rather weak (.14**). This indicates that when shadow Junior Ministers 
were appointed, they were usually shadowing a minister who was also sha-
dowed by a Committee Chair. These two IMOMs complimented rather than 
substituted each other. Figures 15–17 indicate that JMs were appointed to the 
cabinets that were already quite intensely employing other IMOMs. In those 
cabinets JMs constituted an additional layer of oversight for the instances when 
relying solely on CCs was not enough to meet the demand for oversight in a 
coalition. 
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Figure 15: CC shadowing in Estonia 
 
 
Figure 16: JM & CC shadowing in Latvia 
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Figure 17: JM & CC shadowing in Lithuania 
 
 
Since the previous section of this chapter has established the ideological 
position of a cabinet party has no effect on the share of party’s ministers that are 
shadowed using JMs, we can conclude that shadowing using JMs is not 
associated with the specific features of a coalition party, but rather the features 
of coalition cabinet as a whole. Since the number of parties in a coalition 
cabinet and the levels of shadowing using CCs are positively associated with 
the intensity of JM shadowing, we can draw a conclusion that JM shadowing is 
endemic to coalition cabinets made up of larger number of parties and in which 
other IMOMs are quite intensely used.  
In the previous chapter, we discussed certain constraints of using Committee 
Chairs for oversight, one of them being that in larger coalitions such oversight 
presents a problem – while one partner oversees the activities of another, other 
coalition partners are left in the dark. However, the findings of this chapter 
indicate that in such circumstances coalitions in Lithuania and Latvia can fall 
back on using JMs for shadowing, so that all coalition partners can keep tabs of 
particularly salient policy spheres, even if they cannot use CCs for such an end.  
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Why only a fallback?  
In Western European states a majority of shadowed ministers are overseen by 
Junior Ministers, whereas oversight using Committee Chairs is more compli-
cated and takes place when a coalition partner could not get a Junior Minister 
position to oversee a particular minister (Carroll and Cox 2012; Dong Hun and 
Loewenberg 2005). In other words, in Western Europe the default means for 
oversight involves Junior Ministers, while Committee Chairs are the ‘fallback’ 
option. By contrast, data from the Baltic states suggest that the opposite is true: 
Committee Chairs are the main vehicles for oversight, while Junior Ministers 
are perceived as a ‘fallback’ option.  This begs the question, why are the roles 
of Committee Chairs and Junior Ministers as IMOMs reversed in the Baltic 
states compared to Western Europe? 
While it is not possible to carry out full comparative analysis within the 
confines of this chapter, the most plausible explanation of the preference to rely 
on a particular oversight tool relates to the availability of a particular IMOM. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Committee Chairs have certain advantages 
over Junior Ministers: 1. they are somewhat removed from the immediate vici-
nity of the minister and, therefore, seem less intrusive; 2. contrary to the Junior 
Ministers, they have some power to delay or amend a bill they do not like. 
However, this instrument is not very much available to be used as IMOM in 
many Western and Northern European countries.  
The issue is that in Western and Northern European parliaments, the rules 
specifying the allocation of Committee Chairmanships are very strict and do not 
allow substantial disproportionalities to occur. Fernandes (2013) gathered an 
original dataset of 12 Western European democracies (the precise countries and 
years are not indicated), including four legislative periods per country. This data 
indicates that disproportionalities between the share of plenary seats and 
Committee Chair positions (share of CCs – share in plenary) exist in the 
Western European countries, but are quite small. In 80% of the cases, they do 
not exceed 10%. Meanwhile, analysis of the situation in the Baltic states 
suggests that there situation is a bit different and disproportionalities between 
the shares of plenary seats and Committee Chair positions are more common 
and more sizable. In the Baltic states only roughly 70% of disproportionalities 
fall within 10% range and can sometimes reach up to 40%. 
Figure 18 shows the histogram of disproportionalities between the party’s 
plenary seat shares and share of Committee Chair positions in the Baltic states. 
The X axis corresponds to the magnitude of the disproportionality, while the Y 
axis shows its frequency- how common are the disproportionalities of a certain 
magnitude. The figure contains histograms for all parliamentary parties (left) 
and cabinet parties (right). The red lines indicate a 10% range where most of the 
disproportionalities in the Western European countries occur. Results indicate 
that compared to the Western European countries the disproportionalities 
between the size in the plenary and the share of Committee Chair positions are 
both more common and more sizable in the Baltic states than in the Western 
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overseeing party and alleviates the sense of intrusion that an overseen minister 
might feel.  
In Western/Northern European coalitions, Junior Ministers represent a less 
attractive option compared to CCs, but more attractive than not overseeing a 
particular minister at all. Hence the coalition partners agree to use Junior 
Ministers though it causes their ministers some discomfort. If for some reason a 
coalition partner cannot get a junior-ministerial position to shadow a minister in 
a particular policy field, then arrangements are made to ensure that they can 
oversee that minister using a Committee Chair. However, given the strictness of 
the proportionality rules, this can be a rather difficult task, involving immense 
coordination with coalition partners. All these burdens associated with using 
CCs for shadowing ministers make them more of the ‘fallback’ option in 
Western/Northern European countries, while JMs are the default oversight 
instrument. 
 
Summary 
In many Western European states Junior Ministers are one of the main tools for 
mutual oversight in coalition cabinets. In this regard, the three Baltic states 
differ sharply from their Western counterparts: in Lithuania and Latvia JMs are 
used to shadow ministers to a much smaller degree, and in Estonia this 
institution has practically been non-existent. Most of the time in Lithuania and 
Latvia Junior Ministers are either non-partisan advisors to the minister or a 
minister’s colleague from the same party. During interviews conducted for this 
dissertation, many former cabinet ministers expressed their discontent with 
using Junior Ministers for oversight. To them this IMOM seemed too intrusive 
and signaled a lack of trust from the coalition partners to a particular minister.  
In the regression models presented in this chapter, the main factor that had a 
significant effect on the intensity of using Junior Ministers for oversight was the 
number of coalition partners. This together with the fact that in the Baltic states 
usage of shadow JMs and CCs are positively correlated suggests that JMs are 
used as a means to provide additional oversight in situations where the demand 
for oversight from the coalition partners is greater than their ability to ensure it 
using Committee Chairs. Naturally, such situations tend to occur mostly in 
larger coalitions (because there are simply not enough Committee Chairman-
ships to go around). 
Committee Chairs and not Junior Ministers have become the preferred 
means for oversight in the Baltic states for a couple of reasons: first, coalition 
partners do not like using this IMOM because it seemed too intrusive; second, 
in the Baltic states, compared to Western European countries, the parliamentary 
rules regulating the distribution of Committee Chair positions between the 
PPGs are much more relaxed and, consequentially, cabinet parties can get more 
of these positions compared to their Western European counterparts. This, in 
turn, makes using CCs for oversight purposes simply more appealing and 
available.   
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Chapter 6: Coalition Agreements  
This chapter focusses on a third IMOM – Coalition Agreements. Compared to 
the two IMOMs discussed in the previous chapters, Coalition Agreements have 
not been analyzed so systematically, partly because studying Coalition Agree-
ments is much more difficult. First, analyzing the appointments of the Commit-
tee Chairs or Junior Ministers requires simple access to parliamentary records, 
while comparing Coalition Agreements is much more complex. Such analysis 
requires either an impressive knowledge of languages or a sizable research net-
work that could operate across linguistic barriers. Second, Coalition Agree-
ments, compared to other IMOMs, are, probably, the most prone to be influen-
ced by national institutional and cultural contexts. Some countries might 
traditionally favor very long, detailed, and comprehensive documents covering 
all policy spheres, while others might emphasize brevity and being to the point. 
Consequentially, little is known about these IMOMs except that two parallel 
trends are taking place in Western European countries: 1. Coalition Agreements 
are getting longer and more comprehensive, and 2. cabinets with longer Coali-
tion Agreements tend to last longer and be more productive (Timmermans and 
Moury 2006; Moury and Timmermans 2013; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013).    
Generally, similar developments also took place in the Baltic states between 
1992 and 2012. After some experimentation with the design and format of the 
Coalition Agreements, coalitions in the Baltic states have settled on a stable 
form and structure of the Coalition Agreements. In Lithuania and Estonia, there 
was also an observable trend for Coalition Agreements to grow in length and 
complexity over time, whereas in Latvia they have remained more stable. 
Furthermore, as parties have gained experience in coalition governance, they 
tend to favor longer and more precise agreements. The number of parties in a 
coalition or its ideological diversity does not seem to affect Coalition Agree-
ments in a significant way. Though some variation exists, Coalition Agreements 
tend to focus mostly on the most salient policy spheres, regardless of which 
coalition partner controls them. Cabinets in Lithuania seem to be favoring more 
technical and detailed Coalition Agreements with specific policy plans for every 
single policy area, while agreements in Latvia and Estonia tend to place more 
emphasis on the most important policy reforms for a particular legislative term.  
 
 
A Theoretical Overview 
Coalition Agreements serve three main purposes: 1. they outline how coalition 
partners allocate ministerial portfolios and other mega-seats among themselves; 
2. they specify what policy goals the coalition cabinet seeks to achieve during 
its term and the means to achieve them; 3. they specify procedures regulating 
the daily work of the coalition, its reaction to various ad hoc challenges, and  
for the resolution of disagreements between coalition partners should they arise 
(Strøm and Müller 1999). The agreements themselves can take various forms 
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ranging from an oral ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to comprehensive written docu-
ments. Written documents in turn can be kept for a coalition’s internal use or be 
made partially or fully public. In recent years in many Western European 
democracies a trend has emerged for Coalition Agreements to be formalized, 
public, and increasingly comprehensive (Timmermans and Moury 2006; Moury 
and Timmermans 2013; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). 
Furthermore, Coalition Agreements also have a variety of secondary func-
tions. In addition to specifying a cabinet’s policy plans, they also serve to 
finalize the outcomes of inter-party bargaining that took place prior to the 
coalition formation. If they are made public, they additionally help the cabinet 
to publicly announce its agenda and inform the public of the government’s 
plans. Finally, they act as pledges with which coalition partners publicly com-
mit or promise not to pursue certain policies. This function is particularly salient 
in ideologically diverse coalitions, because it outlines how the partners’ will 
cooperate in certain policy areas and which policy pledges from partners 
electoral manifestos will be reflected in cabinet’s agenda and which will not.  
The fact that coalition partners have agreed on certain policy positions and 
made promises to pursue them during their term, has a certain enforcement 
value of its own. Parties usually do not like breaking explicit agreements and 
choose to do so only in difficult situations. This is especially true, if a Coalition 
Agreement has been made public, because in such a situation any deviation has 
to be justified in front of the voters (Strøm and Müller 1999; Laver and Shepsle 
1996). However, often such symbolic enforcement power is not enough and 
coalitions have to rely on other IMOMs for the enforcement of the provisions in 
a Coalition Agreement.  
Coalition Agreements help to ensure both intra and inter party communi-
cation and information exchange. They help to relay the outcomes of the coali-
tion negotiations from the party leadership to their backbenchers and to ensure 
the symmetry of expectations among the different parties in a coalition. How-
ever, for the enforcement of these agreements coalition partners have to use 
IMOMs that actually can issue sanctions to the misbehaving actors, such as 
Coalition Committees or to a certain extent – Committee Chairs. 
Even though long and comprehensive Coalition Agreements tend to lead to 
increased cabinet longevity and can help to enact policy ledges more effectively 
Timmermans and Moury 2006; Moury and Timmermans 2013; Indridason and 
Kristinsson 2013), there are reasons why coalition partners might not want to 
write such an agreement. These agreements can be characterized as ‘incomplete 
contracts’ (Strøm and Müller 1999), because all signatories of the agreement do 
not have full information. Coalition Agreements require parties to make com-
mitments to each other (and to the public), but these commitments hinge on 
certain assumptions about the health of the economy and the general political 
situation in a country which may or may not come true. Because of this lack of 
information, coalition partners might not want to make extensive commitments 
to one another, so they cannot be accused of breaking the agreement, if some-
thing unforeseen comes up.    
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Another factor that limits the comprehensiveness of Coalition Agreements is 
that each of the parties has an inherit interest to maintain their autonomy over 
the policy sphere they control. In other words, each minister would naturally 
prefer to implement policy closest to his/her personal preferences, to do so at 
their own pace and with the amount of resources they deem necessary. How-
ever, as outlined in the first chapter, such a mode of coalition governance would 
lead to collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Instead, each of the actors has to 
accept certain limitations to his/her authority and autonomy, and grant certain 
concessions in the policy spheres they control for the coalition partners. How-
ever, though each minister agrees to make some concessions to the coalition 
partners, it is still in a minister’s interest to make as few of these concessions as 
possible. Therefore, a Coalition Agreement reflects a balance between the inte-
rests of an individual minister, who seeks to maintain as much autonomy as 
possible and the interests of other coalition partners, who seek to minimize the 
uncertainty regarding the actions of each minister. In other words, each minister 
would seek to have as little regulation in his/her policy sphere as possible, 
whereas other partners would push a minister to commit to as lengthy and 
detailed agreements as possible. 
However, despite the prevailing lack of information about the future events 
and push from the individual minsters to maintain their autonomy, over time in 
Western and Northern European countries Coalition Agreements have increased 
in size and comprehensiveness. Existing scholarship suggests that this is due to 
two major reasons: parties with time learn to make a better use of Coalition 
Agreements as a tool; and Coalition Agreements appear to have tangible bene-
fits for the coalitions (Moury and Timmermans 2013).  
As mentioned before, the quality of coalition policy outcomes is related to 
the amount of policy coordination and compromise between coalition partners. 
Policy coordination is a difficult task, which requires each coalition partner to 
move the policy away from their ideal-point and towards the coalition mean. 
However, if partners are willing to accept these costs, they can collectively 
produce better policy. Therefore, it stands to reason that with time coalition 
partners gain more experience in coalition governance and willingness to make 
compromises to achieve more optimal policy outcomes. To this end, one could 
assume they would be willing to tolerate more comprehensive Coalition Agree-
ments which spell out the details of these compromises.  
A second reason why coalitions are committing to longer and more 
comprehensive agreements is that they make the life of the coalition partners 
easier. Timmermans and Moury (2006) have demonstrated that coalitions with 
more detailed agreements tend to last longer in office. The reason behind this is 
that, if a coalition takes time and makes an effort to negotiate difficult policies 
prior to taking office, they are less likely to be torn apart by an inter-party 
conflict during the term. Absence of conflict also means that cabinet does not 
grind to a halt and can accomplish more during its time in office.  
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Coalition Agreements: Definition and operationalization 
Just like with Junior Ministers, there is no international benchmark of what 
constitutes a Coalition Agreement. As mentioned previously, under this umb-
rella term, lies a very wide variety of agreements that can be written or oral, 
publicly available or meant only for coalition’s private use. Furthermore, there 
is no clear methodology in place how these agreements should be analyzed or 
how their overall comprehensiveness should be measured. 
Fortunately, Baltic states are rather similar in what constitutes a Coalition 
Agreement. In all three Baltic states coalition cabinet upon taking office issues 
two documents: 1. policy agenda; and 2. rules of coalition governance. The 
policy part of these agreements is always made public and presented at the 
parliament. These documents present the most important tasks for the cabinet of 
ministers during their term, major reforms to be done, and broader goals and 
values guiding the daily activities of the cabinet. The second document of the 
Coalition Agreements, sometimes is made publicly available, though it is not 
the norm. These documents specify the portfolio and other mega-seat allocation 
between the coalition partners, their rights and obligations, and dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms in a coalition cabinet. If these documents are not made public-
ly available, then they are only kept in the archives of the political parties. 
Because of this, there is a number of anecdotal situations when some of these 
agreements were simply lost when signatory parties split or merged with other 
parties. In this dissertation we analyze only the Coalition Agreements with both 
of their parts surviving and obtainable. 
Another challenge in analyzing Coalition Agreements is that there is no 
gold-standard how they should be operationalized and measured. For instance, 
Indridason and Kristinsson (2013) measured only the length of Coalition 
Agreements (in thousands of words). They acknowledged that the length alone 
is an imperfect measure, but it has the potential to act as a proxy to how well 
these agreements tie the hands of ministers: short agreements, spanning just a 
few pages could not possibly contain a detailed outline of what a particular 
minister ought to do, whereas detailed plans for a particular policy sphere 
usually found in longer Coalition Agreements serves precisely such function. 
Meanwhile, Timmermans and Moury (2006) ignored the length altogether and 
looked at the portion of policy spheres covered by the Coalition Agreement 
from all policy spheres in which government is active (completeness), and how 
precise the pledges are (precision). The latter aspect was measured on an ordinal 
scale with three categories: rhetorical pledge – very abstract; definite pledge – a 
concrete and tangible pledge; a difficult pledge – more precise than purely 
rhetorical, but less precise than definite pledge.  
In this dissertation, a synthesis of both approaches is used, which includes a 
measure for the length (in pages) of the Coalition Agreement and a measure for 
its comprehensiveness. Additionally, the length (measured as share of the over-
all agreement) is computed both for the agreement overall and for each of the 
policy spheres it covers separately. Length is measured in pages rather than 
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words, because it is a more valid measure6. Like most of the Indo-European 
languages Lithuanian and Latvian use prepositions, while in Estonian the 
function of prepositions is performed by suffixes which are written at the end of 
the word. Consequentially, texts of similar length in Lithuanian and Latvian will 
almost always have more words than in Estonian. Naturally, measuring the 
length of Coalition Agreements in pages has its own drawbacks, such as the 
need to account for the document formatting styles used (single or double 
spaced; font-size; etc.). This issue was addressed by measuring each Coalition 
Agreement by pasting it into a Word-file with the same format (size 12 ‘Times 
New Roman’ font, 1.5 line spacing and standard margins).  
A relative measure for each policy sphere was chosen because the aim is 
separate the individual dynamics of each policy sphere from the more general 
changes in the overall length and style of the Coalition Agreement.   
The precision of pledges was hand-coded using an ordinal scale. Since the 
author of the dissertation is a Lithuanian native-speaker and has some under-
standing of Latvian and Estonian, where possible, coding relied in author’s 
language skills. Where it was not possible, the texts of the coalition agreements 
were machine-translated using “Google Translate” service. The coding scale 
used ranged from zero (an abstract declaration) to one (a tangible policy 
pledge).  
0 –  abstract goal. E.g. “Cabinet promises to increase the welfare of the 
citizens”. 
.25 –  goal with broad policy measures indicated. E.g. “Increasing the welfare 
of citizens by alleviating the tax burden.” 
.5 –  goal with more specific policy steps indicated. E.g. “Increasing welfare 
by reducing the taxation on income.” 
.75 –  goal with concrete policy measures indicated. E.g. “Increasing welfare by 
reducing the personal income tax.” 
1 –  goal with concrete policy steps and numeric value attached. E.g. 
“Increasing welfare by cutting the personal income tax by 10%.” 
In the subsequent analysis a single measure for comprehensiveness of Coalition 
Agreements is used which is obtained by multiplying the length and precision 
measures.  
 
  
                                                 
6  The decision to use pages rather than words to measure the length of coalition agree-
ments was made after conducting an experiment in order to find the most valid measure. The 
same piece of text (approx. 20 pages) in English was machine-translated to: Estonian, 
Latvian, and Lithuanian. Then the length of the translated texts was measured in words, 
pages and characters. Analysis demonstrated that the length of the text in words varied the 
most between different versions of the text, while measurements in pages were the most 
consistent. Therefore, it was decided to use pages as a unit of measurement, because it best 
captures the “true” length of the text and is the least sensitive to grammatical and lexical 
language particularities.    
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Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states 
Between 1992 and 2012 Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states went through 
a period of institutionalization. Over time they have become longer and more 
structured. After the initial experimentation phase, they acquired a stable 
structure and typical structural features of the Coalition Agreements seen in 
Western and Northern European countries, such as division of the agreement 
into policy, procedural, and portfolio allocation parts. Concerning the overall 
length of the Coalition Agreements, as seen in Table 13, the figure for the Baltic 
states is very close to the Western/Northern European average (based on Strøm 
and Müller 1999) with Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states being slightly 
longer.  
 
 
Table 13: Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states and Western Europe 
Country: Average length 
(pages): 
Standard 
deviation: 
Min. length 
(pages) 
Max. length 
(pages) 
Estonia 16.5 13.31 4 41 
Latvia  23.87 7.25 14 36 
Lithuania 46.04 32.44 22 120 
Western 
Europe* 
21.28 13.27 1.5 106 
*Data from Strøm & Müller (1999). As the authors used the number of words in their 
analysis as the main measure, their data is converted here to pages for comparability 
purposes. The conversion was done by dividing the number of words by 375 (roughly 
an average number of words per page in an English text).  
  
 
Of the three Baltic states Coalition Agreements in Latvia and  Estonia are rather 
similar in length, while in Lithuania they are slightly longer (See Figure 19). A 
substantial difference between the average lengths of Coalition Agreements in 
Lithuania, and Latvia and Estonia is mostly driven by the unusually long Coali-
tion Agreement of the Kubilius II and III cabinets, which lasted over 120 pages. 
Though at the time such a lengthy Coalition Agreement marked a clear devia-
tion from the norm, now it does not seem so unusual, as the Skvernelis cabinet 
(started December 2016) also adopted a Coalition Agreement stretching over a 
hundred pages. Regarding the precision of the Coalition Agreements, it is 
higher in Estonia and Lithuania (.6) and lower in Latvia (.40). The difference 
between countries, though significant, is not substantial.  
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Figure 19: Length and precision of Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states 
 
 
However, just like with previous IMOMs, these figures hide a rather substantial 
variation across cabinets. Figures 19–21 show how the length and precision of 
Coalition Agreements varied over cabinets in the Baltic states. In Estonia, there 
is an overall trend that Coalition Agreements increase in length and precision 
over time. Two notable exceptions from this trend were the Kallas and Ansip I 
cabinets. Both of these cabinets performed care-taker functions until the next 
parliamentary elections and were made up of two main partners: the Reform 
Party and the Center Party, which were also the main ideological rivals of the 
Estonian political system.  
Ansip I cabinet came to power after the collapse of the previous Parts cabi-
net, which meant that a coalition of two right-wing parties was not possible, due 
to previous disagreements among former coalition partners. Furthermore, the 
opposition parties did not want to remain in opposition and let a minority 
cabinet be formed. Therefore, the only way out the crisis was to form a coalition 
between two parties, who were the main rivals in the Estonian party system: 
Ansip’s Reform party and the Center Party of Estonia. Additionally, a smaller 
People’s Union party also joined in order to form a majority coalition. 
Needless to say, both major partners struggled to work together, as a great 
part of their electoral campaigns and party identities were set up in opposition to 
each other. Therefore, the coalition partners decided not to embark on any 
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ambitious projects and instead contented themselves with making small, incre-
mental common-sense improvements to the existing policies.  
This attitude was reflected in the Coalition Agreement which spanned only 
nine pages and contained a list of 94 bullet-points with concrete policy 
measures that the cabinet planned to enact (for example, to reduce the rate of 
the income tax from 23% to 20%). Contrary to the other Coalition Agreements, 
no space was dedicated to a shared vision or the goals of the cabinet parties.  
The Kallas and Ansip I cabinets serve to illustrate another trend that was 
identified in the earlier chapters – ideological distance between the coalition 
partners often leads to less rather than more oversight. Instead of trying their 
best to make controlled delegation work by using many IMOMs, coalition 
partners in such situations often just opt to do as little as possible and to work 
only on the areas where some common ground exists.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Length and precision of Coalition Agreements by cabinet in Estonia 
 
 
In Latvia, it appears that the trend runs in the opposite direction. Over time Coa-
lition Agreements have decreased both in length and precision. Of course, this 
trend should not be overstated, as Table 13 demonstrates, average length of 
Coalition Agreement in Latvia is only slightly smaller than in Estonia, and 
standard deviation of the mean is smallest in Latvia, which means that the 
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length of the Coalition Agreements in Latvia has been the most stable. Nonethe-
less, the trend indicates that coalition agreements are used to a lesser extent in 
Latvia than in the other two Baltic states, especially given the fact that the level 
of precision of these Coalition Agreements is relatively low compared to the 
other two countries.   
 
 
Figure 21: Length and precision of Coalition Agreements by cabinet in Latvia 
 
 
Finally, in Lithuania we can observe a similar trend as in Estonia – over time 
Coalition Agreements have become lengthier and more precise. However, com-
pared to Estonia, this process in Lithuania was less incremental and instead 
featured more radical experiments. For instance, in 2004 Brazauskas II broke 
the tradition of writing medium-length-medium-precision Coalition Agreements 
and instead opted for a shorter but more precise Coalition Agreement. As 
mentioned, Kubilius II cabinet also departed from earlier practices by preparing 
exceedingly long and precise Coalition Agreement. Such decision was 
motivated in part by the onset of the financial crisis which coincided with the 
beginning of Kubilius II term. Coalition members sought to outline as many 
policies as possible in great detail prior to taking office, so they could move at a 
faster pace once the new cabinet was sworn in. A more detailed account of 
Kubilius II Cabinet is in Box 3 below.  
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Box 3. Case Study of Kubilius II & III cabinets 
The Kubilius II and III cabinets (which shared the same Coalition Agreement) stand 
out from the other cabinets both in Lithuania and the other Baltic states both in length 
and precision. There are multiple reasons why this occurred. First, the prime 
ministerial party in the cabinet, the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Conservatives (TS-
LK), saw that the financial crisis was approaching and that Lithuania would feel its 
consequences severely. Therefore, even before the elections they started working on a 
plan to stabilize public finances during the ensuing credit crunch and retain the state’s 
financial solvency.  
However, they did not limit themselves to the economic sector and state finances, 
but rather prepared detailed plans for structural reforms in several sectors (energy, 
education, and security). These plans served as the blueprint for the Coalition Agree-
ment and some of their sections were included in the Coalition Agreement verbatim.  
The second reason why the Kubilius cabinet opted for a detailed and long 
Coalition Agreement was that it was made up of mostly ideologically similar parties, 
a majority of which had worked together before. The notable exception was National 
Resurrection Party (TPP) founded just before the elections, but it received only few 
minor cabinet positions. The bulk of the cabinet members came from the TS-LK and 
two liberal parties: Liberal Movement (LRLS) and Liberal-Center Union (LiCS). 
Members of the liberal parties and the TS-LK were mostly involved in the TS-LK’s 
predecessor (the Sąjūdis movement) around the time of the restoration of 
independence and knew each other well. Some of the members of the liberal parties 
were even members of TS-LK initially, but later split off.  
Precisely this understanding that the coalition partners share the main principles 
and have the same general idea of how the planned reforms should look, but differ in 
their detailed approach, pushed the partners to negotiate and draft a very extensive 
Coalition Agreement and to negotiate as many details as possible prior to taking 
office. Though in some cases this was not possible due to a lack of information and 
certain issues had to be negotiated on the go (see Box 4), the general approach was to 
reach as comprehensive and detailed an agreement as possible.  
More broadly, the agreement served two main purposes. It served as a public 
commitment by the coalition partners to enact certain policy measures, most notably 
very unpopular austerity policies. Second, it served to cement the compromise 
between the coalition partners on contested policy issues. For instance, TS-LK sought 
to return conscription to the armed forces, but the liberal parties strictly opposed this 
notion. The coalition agreed that TS-LK would appoint the minister of defense, but in 
turn would abandon all efforts to reintroduce conscription. This was reflected in the 
final Coalition Agreement which did not mention conscription even as a distant 
possibility.  
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Figure 22: Length and precision of Coalition Agreements by cabinet in Lithuania 
 
 
Comprehensiveness of Coalition Agreements and  
its determinants in the Baltic states 
This part analyzes to what extent the variation of the length and precision of the 
Coalition Agreements can be explained by a set of factors identified in Chapter 
Two. The regression models use the comprehensiveness measure which is ob-
tained by multiplying the length and precision measures. The measure is 
standardized to range between 0 and 1. Just like in the previous chapters there 
are four models: Model 1 – coalition make-up factors; Model 2 – factors 
affecting the costs of using IMOMs, Model 3 – all the factors together, and 
Model 4 – z-standardized versions of the factors to determine the size of their 
impact in relation to one another. Model results are depicted in Table 14.  
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Table 14: Coalition Agreements analysis results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ideological diversity  .01 (.05)  .04 (.05) .03 (.04) 
Number of coalition partners .01 (.02)  .02 (.03) .04 (.04) 
Coalition experience  .03*** (.015) .03** (.015) .06** (.03) 
Minority cabinet  -.04 (.05) -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06) 
LT  .29*** (.08) .32*** (.08) .32*** (.08) 
EST  .11*(.07) .16** (.08) .16** (.08) 
Const. .14* (.07) -.05 (.07) -.11 (.12) .01 (.05) 
N. 46 46 46 46 
R2 .01 .21 .29 .29 
p values: * p≤0.15; ** p≤0.1; *** p≤0.5 
 
 
The models show that none of the coalition make-up factors has any significant 
impact on Coalition Agreements. Out of the factors influencing the costs of 
IMOM use, three maintain a significant effect on the comprehensiveness of 
Coalition Agreements in all the models: coalition experience and country 
variables for Lithuania and Estonia. This reflects broader trends discussed in the 
previous parts. On average, Coalition Agreements in Latvia are shorter than in 
the other two Baltic states, and Coalition Agreements have become more 
comprehensive over time, as parties gain experience of governing in a coalition 
together.  
Naturally, it also stands to reason that Coalition Agreements are highly 
susceptible to pressures from national institutional environments. Because at 
least the policy part of Coalition Agreements is always made public, coalition 
partners might feel inclined to follow the example of their predecessors and 
style their documents in a similar manner. For instance, in Lithuania longer and 
broader Coalition Agreements are favored, which rarely fall shorter than 30 
pages. It partly occurs due to a Lithuanian tradition to include policy plans for 
every single policy sphere, even if these plans amount to nothing else than 
simple continuation of existing policies. In those policy spheres a coalition 
agreement just reaffirms the cabinet’s commitment to existing policy measures. 
Meanwhile, in Estonia and Latvia Coalition Agreements follow a more concise 
template where attention is paid only to the policy spheres for which cabinet is 
planning some reform.  
 
 
Coalition Agreements by policy sphere 
If we take a closer look at the Coalition Agreements, a clear pattern emerges. In 
each country, with only minor variations, the same policy spheres receive the 
most attention from one cabinet to another, regardless of what kind of party 
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controls that specific policy sphere. In other words, the length of regulation for 
a specific policy sphere in the Coalition Agreements reflects not the will of the 
coalition partners to constrain the actions of a specific minister, but rather the 
salience of that particular policy sphere. That is to say, Coalition Agreements 
reflect the controlled delegation process: coalition partners try to come up with 
unified policy program and write their commitments down in the agreement. 
The length of regulation of each policy sphere reflects how much emphasis is 
placed on that issue area.   
In many ways this illustrates the general logic behind the Coalition Agree-
ment. When political parties get together during the cabinet formation phase and 
try to agree on a set of policy priorities, they discuss the most salient matters in 
the greatest detail. Each coalition partner is affected by the cabinet agenda in 
highly salient policy spheres (e.g. social policy) and want their preferences 
reflected in the Coalition Agreement. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that we 
would find lengthy and detailed instructions for a minister directing a policy 
sphere with low salience (even if that minister is from an ideologically distant 
or a newcomer party), but it is very likely that we would find a detailed policy 
plan for a highly salient policy sphere even if a coalition is ideologically close 
and cohesive.  
Figures 23–25 present the analysis of the Coalition Agreements by policy 
sphere in the three Baltic states. For the sake of comparability, different policy 
spheres are aggregated to six more general dimensions: 1. foreign and security 
policy; 2. justice and internal affairs; 3. environment, regions and agriculture; 4. 
culture and education; 5. healthcare and social affairs; 6. economy and finance.  
The figures use box plots: the line in the middle represents a median value, the 
box itself the range between the first and third quartiles. The dots represent 
outlier cases.  
In all three Baltic states, each of these themes received a similar amount of 
attention with the differences between the median values not exceeding 7% of 
the Coalition Agreement. However, the attention devoted to certain themes like 
culture and education did not fluctuate much between different Coalition Agree-
ments and between countries; meanwhile, other spheres like economy and 
finance varied more substantially. This is hardly surprising, as multiple econo-
mic crises and periods of structural reforms occurred in the Baltic states 
between 1992 and 2012, which pushed issues related to economy and finance 
high up the cabinet agenda. Overall, relative attention to different policy spheres 
varied most in Lithuania and least in Latvia.  
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Figure 23: Coalition Agreements by policy sphere in Estonia 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Coalition Agreements by policy sphere in Latvia 
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In Estonia, sizable deviations from the general trend did not occur. Meanwhile 
in Latvia, a notable exception is the Emsis Coalition Agreement which dedi-
cated roughly one-sixth of its policy part to the matters coordinated by the 
Ministry of Children and Families. This was mostly influenced by the fact that 
the conservative Latvia’s First Party (LPP) was included into the coalition. 
Devoting so much attention for this policy sphere was seen as a way for LPP to 
bring more visibility to their electoral manifesto, which emphasized traditional 
family values.  
In Lithuania the most notable exception was the Kubilius II cabinet, which 
dedicated one third of the Coalition Agreement (which in itself was longer than 
a hundred pages) to economic policy. As mentioned, this cabinet assumed office 
during the onset of the financial crisis of 2008. Most of the economic policy 
measures were outlined in a “Plan to Mitigate the Effects of Financial Crisis”, 
which drafted policy measures to overhaul public finances and impose strict 
austerity measures. 
 
 
Figure 25: Coalition Agreements by policy sphere in Lithuania 
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Summary 
Coalition Agreements serve a variety of purposes: they: 1. outline cabinet’s 
policy goals and measures to achieve them; 2. specify how ministerial portfolios 
and other mega-seats are allocated between the coalition partners; and 3. es-
tablish procedures how coalition partners resolve their disagreements and react 
to unforeseen challenges. Coalition Agreements serve to reduce uncertainty 
among the coalition partners and to prevent disagreements over policy during 
the cabinet’s term. Coalition Agreements by themselves constitute only symbo-
lic means to deter coalition partners from shirking (especially, if they are made 
public) and have to rely on other IMOMs to enforce their provisions. However, 
by specifying the exact agreement between coalition partners, they allow other 
IMOMs such as Committee Chairs or Coalition Committees to be used more 
effectively. 
In Western European countries, Coalition Agreements have become more 
formal and extensive over time. That, in turn, has contributed to increased 
cabinet duration and stability. In the Baltic states, Coalition Agreements have 
undergone a period of institutionalization, acquiring stable structural features 
and increasing in length and precision over time. The average length of the 
Coalition Agreements in the Baltic states is quite close to Western European 
average, though especially in Lithuania lengthier and more detailed agreements 
are favored.  
The analysis revealed that the overall comprehensiveness of Baltic Coalition 
Agreements depends mostly on the amount of coalition experience partners 
have had and national particularities with shorter agreements favored in Latvia 
and longer in Lithuania. Though there were some fluctuations over time, the 
relative attention paid to each separate policy sphere has been rather stable and 
has mostly reflected the relative salience of different policy spheres.   
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Chapter 7: Coalition Committees 
This chapter is dedicated to the fourth IMOM – the Coalition Committees. 
These committees are often some of the most important institutions allowing the 
coalition partners to exchange information and to make plans for the future. 
However, as these institutions are established to allow coalition party leaders to 
meet and discuss matters in an informal setting without any strict procedures or 
rules or media presence, very little is known about how these institutions 
function in practice.  
This lack of information also means that the coalition committees are the 
least studied IMOMs of the four analyzed in this dissertation. This is hardly 
surprising, as studying these institutions is quite difficult. First, Coalition Com-
mittees meet behind closed doors, where they can conduct their activities in 
private. This means that the only people who know what happens in Coalition 
Committee meetings are the Coalition Committee members themselves. 
Second, Coalition Committees produce no official documents and their mee-
tings are not protocolled. Therefore, there are no documentary evidence which 
could be analyzed.  
 To the author’s best knowledge, only a couple of works devote some 
attention to how these coalition committees work as an IMOM and in none of 
them the coalition committees are the main topic of analysis. Strøm, Müller and 
Smith (2010) in their overview how parliamentary control coalition cabinets is 
carried out mentioned coalition committees as a mean for coalition partners to 
effectively communicate with each other and resolve their differences or 
conflicts. However, due to the lack of information, they did not go into more 
detail or provide lengthier analysis of the activities of the coalition committees. 
Meanwhile, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) in their study of conflict 
management in coalition cabinets also addressed the activities of Coalition 
Committees in passing. However, as the main focus of their study was to 
present an overview of the various ways how coalition partners resolve their 
conflicts as well as the venues in which the conflict resolution takes place, their 
work is the most comprehensive analysis of the coalition committees to date.  
In their approach, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) divided the arenas for 
conflict resolution in coalition cabinets into three types: internal – involving 
only the representatives of the coalition who hold a cabinet position; mixed – 
involving representatives of the coalition parties in cabinet, representatives of 
coalition in parliament; and external – involving some representatives of 
coalition partners (usually the coalition party leaders) from outside the 
executive and legislative branches. They observed that ordinary disagreements 
between the coalition partners are usually resolved in the internal arenas, while 
the resolution of more serious conflicts is usually moved to mixed or external 
arenas. Furthermore, they noted that the existence of the comprehensive and 
detailed coalition agreements tends to impact the activities of the coalition com-
mittees – a detailed coalition agreement serves as an ex ante tool for conflict 
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prevention and thus reduces the need to rely on mixed or external conflict 
resolution arenas (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008).  
This analysis provided valuable insights into how and where the coalition 
cabinets resolve their conflicts and what place the coalition committees occupy 
in the overall conflict resolution architecture of the coalition cabinets. However, 
the study also reaffirmed that lack of information seriously inhibits the study of 
coalition committees and the internal dynamics of coalition cabinets in general.   
Given this lack of information, any attempt to study coalition committees is 
challenging. However, the Baltic states offer a very good opportunity to analyze 
these institutions. First, due to the fact that the Baltic states restored their 
independence fairly recently, some of the politicians who were active in some 
of the earliest Coalition Committees, are still around today and can offer a 
unique perspective how these institutions have changed and evolved over time. 
Second, due to the relatively small size of the political community, it is harder 
to ‘insulate’ these institutions from the outside. In contrast to larger demo-
cracies, where the distance between the ‘inner-circle’ and backbenchers is great, 
in the Baltic states most coalition MPs have a good understanding of what 
happens in a Coalition Committee and have taken part in Coalition Committee 
meetings at one time or another.  
 
 
Tasks and Functions of Coalition Committees 
Since there are no written records of the activities of Coalition Committees, the 
data and insights into the functioning of the coalition committees comes from 
the insider interviews. The people interviewed were either permanent members 
of the Coalition Committees or have taken part in its activities multiple times 
when they were invited on the ad hoc basis. Based on the information from 
these interviews, the Coalition Committees are conceptualized in a slightly 
different manner than in the Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) study. The main 
reason for this is that due to the small size of the Baltic states, maintaining a 
strict distinction between the inner and mixed arenas, is rather impossible. In 
their approach, Andeweg and Timmermans classified the Coalition Committees 
as a mixed arena, as representatives from the coalition partners without the 
cabinet position take part in the Coalition Committee meetings. Meanwhile, 
internal arenas involved only cabinet members (Andeweg and Timmermans 
2008). However, in the Baltic states, such pure internal arenas do not exist. Due 
to the small size of the cabinet, holding informal inner cabinet meetings hardly 
makes sense. Instead, coalition partners tend to involve some representatives of 
the coalition in parliament or leaders of the coalition partners’ parties who do 
not hold a cabinet position when deliberating coalition related matters. There-
fore, here the Coalition Committees are understood as informal meetings 
bringing together the highest-level representatives of the coalition partners’ 
parties, who may or may not have a cabinet position themselves.  
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Though they did not mention it explicitly, the interviewees spoke about 
Coalition Committees in the Baltic states as having an “onion-structure” (see 
Figure 26) – at their core, each Coalition Committee has a task to coordinate the 
passage of legislation through the complex network of state institutions. 
Additionally, if there is a need, Coalition Committees can grow extra layers – 
take on additional functions, such as: negotiating abstract pledges in the Coali-
tion Agreement; reacting to and managing crises; disciplining coalition 
members.  
Passing any law is a long and complex process, while passing a law when a 
coalition cabinet is in office is even more complicated, as it requires extensive 
coordinating between different parties. Coalition partners have to be involved 
every step of the way from preparing the draft text of the bill, through all the 
steps of deliberating and amending it parliament, to the final vote on the 
plenary. Coordination requires not only to ensure that the interests of all 
coalition partners are adequately represented, but also that enough MPs would 
show up to vote during each step of the process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Onion structure of the Coalition Committees’ tasks 
Coordinating 
the passage of 
legislation  
Enforcing Coalition 
Agreement 
Reaction to crises 
Sanctioning coalition members  
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The process of policy process coordination usually starts in a middle of the 
week, when over the span of a couple of days coalition partners hold their PPG 
meetings, where among other things, they come up with agenda items for the 
next Coalition Committee meeting. This meeting takes place on Monday of the 
following week and during it coalition partners go through the plenary, com-
mittee and cabinet agendas and discuss the status of various bills and upcoming 
challenges for the week. Also, during Coalition Committee meetings represen-
tatives from different ministries or parliamentary bodies (i.e. parliamentary 
boards or standing committees) would present status reports on how different 
pieces of draft legislation are moving through the legislative pipeline towards 
the final vote. If there is a need, Coalition Committee could order some changes 
to be made to a certain draft bill, so it would better reflect the interests of the 
whole coalition. In Lithuania and Estonia, the process then moves to the plenary 
session where draft legislation is voted on and then the cycle of coordination 
begins anew. In Latvia another Coalition Committee meeting is held right 
before the plenary session.  
Coalition Committee meetings also provide coalition partners with a way to 
resolve their differences and find a path forward. In all three Baltic states, it is 
fairly common for coalition partners to specify several policy areas in which 
they cannot agree and in which they can vote freely without upsetting their 
coalition partners or breaking the Coalition Agreement. However, such 
instances also require coordination in the Coalition Committee, so that coalition 
partners would have a clear idea of how many MPs are opposing the bill and 
what behavior to expect from the coalition partners. This relates to both voting 
behavior and other matters, such as speaking out against cabinet policy or 
proposing a ‘poison-pill’ amendment. Coalition partners then share the infor-
mation and discuss options how to address such nuisances (Holsmer 2016; 
Smiltens 2016). 
Coordinating the passage of legislation is the main function of the Coalition 
Committees and it takes up most of their time. It is the only function that all 
Coalition Committees have in common. If the situation requires or if specific 
national or party-specific features demand, Coalition Committees can grow 
additional layers and take-on additional functions. The second most common 
function of the Coalition Committees, as mentioned by the interviewees, is 
enforcement of the Coalition Agreement and fulfilling its pledges to the greatest 
possible extent. More precisely, this involves turning the abstract notions in the 
Coalition Agreement into concrete policy measures. Though in most cases 
coalition members prefer to negotiate a coalition’s policy program during the 
coalition formation process, in some cases that is either not possible or some 
matters are not considered salient enough to be included in the coalition 
negotiations. This could occur due to many reasons such as rushing to form a 
coalition, which is quite common if a previous coalition collapses between 
elections, or coalition partners do not have enough information to make a 
commitment during the coalition negotiation phase.  
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A good example of it are all the cabinets that dealt with the financial crisis in 
the Baltic states in the 2008–2009 period (Ansip I, Dombrovskis I, Kubilius II). 
When the coalitions were formed and Coalition Agreements made, the exact 
scope and impact of the crisis were not yet clear. Consequently, when the 
information started coming in and the situation became clearer, cabinets had to 
adjust a number of their policies on the go and to come up with new important 
changes to the Coalition Agreements. Naturally, the Coalition Committees 
became the main venue where the changes and the implementation plans of the 
Coalition Agreements were renegotiated.  
The third function that Coalition Committees undertake, if the situation 
requires, is crises management and reaction to unforeseen events. In such 
situations the Coalition Committee becomes the main body which discusses, 
agrees and coordinates the cabinet’s responses to such event. Some cabinet 
members went as far as to distinguish between ‘high’ and ‘low’ functions of 
Coalition Committees. In their eyes more mundane functions of coordinating 
the passage of legislation through various institutions or enforcing the Coalition 
Agreement constituted ‘low’ functions of Coalition Committees, whereas 
dealing with crises and unforeseen events by creating brand new policy or 
making significant adjustments to how the cabinet functions constituted a ‘high’ 
function of Coalition Committees (Lang 2016). 
These unforeseen events can be either internal or external. A great example 
of an external event which occurred during the 2000s was the Orange Revo-
lution in Ukraine. The crisis required all three Baltic states to draft a policy 
response, which touched upon quite a sensitive area – relations with Russia and, 
thus, required coordination among the partners of cabinet coalitions in all three 
countries. Internal events which required a coalition response during the study 
period were numerous, mostly relating to various scandals involving cabinet 
members or parties.  
The final function of the Coalition Committees relates to how they act as 
sanctioning institutions. While the Coalition Agreements outline the rules of the 
cooperation, and Committee Chairs together with Junior Ministers monitor if 
these rules are upheld, it is in Coalition Committees that the decision to punish 
misbehaving parties is taken. When dealing with the misbehaving members, the 
tasks of the Coalition Committee are twofold: first, to provide the parties in-
volved with an opportunity to explain their actions and to alleviate the 
suspicions through communication, and, second, if that fails, issue sanctions to 
the misbehaving party.  
As North (1993) has pointed out, in order to be effective, any oversight 
institution has to have capacities both to acquire information and to issue 
sanctions. In the overall architecture of mutual oversight in the coalition govern-
ments, functions of the Committee Chairs and Junior Ministers on one hand and 
those of the Coalition Committees on the other, represent this division between 
the information acquisition tools and sanctioning mechanisms. Committee 
Chairs and Junior Ministers provide information about possible wrongdoing and 
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then Coalition Committees react by discussing the situation and, if there is a 
need, administering sanctions.  
Since Coalition Committees are ‘nerve-centers’ of coalition cabinets, they 
can administer sanctions to all coalition appointees: cabinet members, Junior 
Ministers, Committee Chairs, the Speaker, and other members of the parlia-
mentary boards. Also, they possess a full range of sanctions ranging from a 
verbal warning to dismissing a misbehaving member altogether, which in the 
extreme instances may mean terminating the coalition as a whole. Of course, in 
cases where a coalition appointee is dismissed or a coalition is terminated 
altogether, the final decision rests with the parliament and is voted on in the 
plenary, but, nonetheless, the first institution where such decision is agreed 
upon is the Coalition Committee.   
 
  
Coalition Committees: Definition and operationalization 
As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, Coalition Committees are secre-
tive and elusive institutions, which leave very little evidence of their activity. 
Furthermore, being truly informal, they naturally exhibit substantial variation 
between different countries and some variation between the cabinets in a same 
country. Therefore, even providing a working definition of this institution is 
rather difficult. Nonetheless, based on the experience of the Baltic states, Coali-
tion Committees can be defined as regular informal meetings between the 
leaders of the coalition parties (who may or may not be MPs or hold a cabinet 
position) and other relevant mega-seat holders, who are invited depending on 
Coalition Committee’s agenda.  
Measuring the activities of Coalition Committees is even more challenging. 
In their study, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) enlisted a network of experts 
to count how many conflicts occurred in coalition cabinets as well as the seve-
rity of these conflicts and the venue in which they were resolved. However, as 
the focus of the chapter is to determine how active the particular coalition com-
mittees were (as opposed to where the conflicts in coalition cabinet were 
resolved), the same coding scheme and operationalization cannot be applied 
here.  
Even after an extensive insider-interview program, it was not possible to 
cover all the coalition cabinets that were in office between 1992 and 2012. 
However, according to the testimonies of the interviewees, Coalition Commit-
tees were very much prone to path dependencies and the differences between 
the Coalition Committees in different cabinets were small, resulting mostly 
from incremental evolution and learning effects. Therefore, it was decided to 
assign scores to the coalition committees in a different way. The same score was 
assigned for all coalition cabinets from the same country, based on the functions 
the Coalition Committees typically perform in that institutional context. This 
decision was also in part motivated by the finding in Andeweg and Timmer-
mans study (2008: 287) that the coalition cabinets for the most part simply copy 
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and adopt the same conflict resolution rules and procedures from the previous 
cabinet, regardless of that cabinet’s partisan composition.  
The scores were assigned based on what roles Coalition Committees per-
formed in the coalition cabinets and what functions they undertook. If a 
Coalition Committee only performed its core tasks of coordinating the passage 
of legislation, then the score would be lower and if performed more functions, it 
would be higher. Since the previous section of this chapter outlined four distinct 
functions of Coalition Committees, the scoring scheme will have the following 
values: 
0 –  Coalition Committee does not exist; 
.25 –  Coalition Committee only coordinates the passage of legislation;  
.5 –  Coalition Committees coordinate passage of legislation and coordinate 
the fulfillment of imprecise pledges in the Coalition Agreement; 
.75 –  passage of legislation; Coalition Agreement fulfillment; and crises 
management; 
1 –  passage of legislation; Coalition Agreement fulfillment; crises manage-
ment; sanctioning misbehaving coalition members.  
Naturally, the presence or absence of certain functions in a Coalition Committee 
is never really clear-cut. In all the instances it is possible to see that Coalition 
Committees are doing a little bit of all the functions, however, the Coalition 
Committees do differ in how pronounced these separate functions are in their 
day-to day activities. For instance, all Coalition Committees discuss the critical 
events that take place, however some Coalition Committees become platforms 
for coalition partners to prepare a coordinated and unified response, while some 
do not.   
 
 
Coalition Committees in the Baltic states 
Since Coalition Committees operate in a larger institutional setting, they 
naturally acquire features that are endemic to that specific context. Consequen-
tially, their activities are to a large extent shaped by the institutional environ-
ment in which they are situated. This part demonstrates how the intensity of the 
Coalition Committee’s activities and the character of tasks they undertake are 
shaped by these national institutional contexts. Furthermore, this part explores 
what and how many of the tasks Coalition Committees undertake in each Baltic 
state and assigns scores based on the methodology outlined above.  
In Estonia Coalition Committees meet once a week most often during the 
work day in one of the government buildings. The committee usually consists of 
the PM (though it is not always the case) and three representatives from each of 
the coalition partners, though other people such as standing committee members 
can be invited, if there is a need. The Coalition Committee mostly deals with 
coordinating the passage of legislation through different stages of the legislative 
process. Other tasks like creating policy from an abstract pledge in a Coalition 
Agreement or responding to crises are present but to a much smaller degree.  
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The reason for this is twofold: first, one of the defining features of the 
absolute majority of Estonian coalition cabinets has been decision making via 
consensus. It means that even a smallest coalition partner has a power to veto 
any cabinet decision. This being the case, governmental parties in Estonia feel 
significant pressure to negotiate as many things as possible before forming the 
coalition and signing them into the Coalition Agreement, as any remaining 
abstract pledges would be nearly impossible to turn into governmental policy. 
Consequentially, knowing the tall odds of successfully pushing through the idea 
that was not included into the Coalition Agreement, coalition partners usually 
just content themselves with legislating things that are already agreed.  
Second, as of late the Coalition Committee meetings in Estonia have 
acquired very structured, almost bureaucratic character, due to the extension of 
Estonian e-government system to manage the internal affairs of the cabinet. As 
one of the former cabinet members puts it: “… it is becoming pretty bureau-
cratic. Even in cabinet meetings members use their computers and see a list of 
documents to look through and there is even a proposed decision already 
formulated before the meeting. We aren’t so flexible anymore in making 
decisions.” (Lang 2016). In other words, Estonia has somewhat moved away 
from “gentlemen’s club”-style Coalition Committees, which are characterized, 
among other things, by free exchange of ideas or grand discussions of the future 
course of the country. Instead, it adopted a more structured and formalized 
approach to the activities of the Coalition Committees. Such approach has made 
Coalition Committees (and coalitions themselves) more stable and predictable, 
but at the same time more ridged and bureaucratic.   
Naturally, Coalition Committees in Estonia take on crisis-management roles. 
However, the same reasons that make introducing new legislation not outlined in 
the Coalition Agreement difficult, make it not easy for a coalition to come up with 
a more active and dynamic response to crises. A good example of that is the 
situation of the cohabitation law in Estonia. Chancellor of Justice declared in 
2011 that existing legal situation when people cannot form partnerships regardless 
of their gender is in conflict with norms of Estonian Constitution. In doing so he 
created a situation when either the Constitution had to be amended or a gender-
neutral cohabitation law had to be adopted. Since none of the options is attractive, 
coalition parties kept postponing any decision on the matter thus perpetuating the 
crisis. Though a version of a law has been passed in 2015, it cannot function, due 
to the lack of supporting regulation, which creates legal conflicts and loopholes. 
The legal vacuum exists to this day, allowing same-sex couples to file law-suits 
against Estonian state. Despite all this, political parties in Estonia cannot seem to 
find a way forward and solve this issue.     
Meanwhile in Lithuania, Coalition Committees also meet mostly once a 
week on Monday and also feature the PM and three delegates from each 
coalition partner. However, these meetings are considerably less official usually 
taking place outside of government buildings over breakfast. Yet deviations 
from this norm are fairly common place. Andrius Kubilius, a former PM, recalls 
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that in many cases Coalition Committee met in his residence after a work day 
and committee meetings would often stretch late into the night (Kubilius 2014).  
Such a different character of Coalition Committee meetings is a result of two 
major factors: first, unlike in Estonia, decisions in Lithuanian cabinets are 
usually made not by consensus, but by a qualified majority vote. This results in 
a situation when a junior coalition partner can simply be outvoted when an 
important matter is deliberated. Knowing this, partners are more likely to 
engage into lengthy bargaining rounds, during which they attempt to get at least 
some concessions from the senior coalition partner. Second, in Lithuania full 
government alteration is not uncommon and thus if all coalition partners come 
from opposition they often find it impossible to negotiate a precise coalition 
policy program before taking up office. Consequentially, the function of a 
Coalition Committee to turn abstract pledges from a Coalition Agreement into 
policy is more pronounced in Lithuania than in Estonia. This means that Coali-
tion Committees spend more time negotiating future policy which increases the 
length of the coalition meetings. For more details see Box 4.  
 
Box 4. Case study of Kubilius II and III cabinets 
Kubilius II and III cabinets serve as good examples of how Coalition Committees can 
take on roles of enforcing Coalition Agreement. Kubilius II cabinet assumed office in 
2008 just before the effects of the financial crisis started being felt in Lithuania.  
Kubilius III was essentially the same cabinet, but as one of the junior partners 
National Resurrection Party split into two PPGs, one of which withdrew from the 
coalition, it was coded as a cabinet change, even though no changes to the cabinet 
itself occurred.   
Despite writing a very long and comprehensive Coalition Agreement (see Box 3), 
coalition members assumed office without knowing the precise magnitude and scope 
of the effects of the financial crisis. Their situation serving as a perfect example of 
why Strøm and Müller (1999) called Coalition Agreements ‘incomplete contracts’. 
Once the information started coming in on the precise tax revenues coming in as well 
as the country’s overall credit situation, coalition partners realized that the situation is 
somewhat more severe than originally anticipated and that preliminary action plan 
laid out in the Coalition Agreement will have to be significantly adjusted. This 
involved reducing the number of policy priorities and concentrating on a smaller 
number of key issues.  
Consequentially, this has led to the lengthy Coalition Committee meetings which 
took place in a variety of settings: sometimes over breakfast in the cabinet building, 
sometimes in the official meeting rooms, and sometimes in the private setting of the 
PM’s residence.  Often these meeting would stretch late into the night, as the coalition 
partners found it difficult to agree on which of the planned structural reforms should 
proceed and which should be postponed as well as which policy areas had to receive 
the biggest budget cuts. For instance, the need in order to find resources to implement 
new ambitious energy infrastructure projects, with shrinking GDP, declining tax 
revenues and limited availability of credit, a planned increase in defense spending 
was abandoned and instead the armed forces received a sizable budget-cut 
(Jukneviciene 2014).   
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Even though the Coalition Committees in Lithuania tend to play a bigger role 
turning abstract pledges in the Coalition Agreement into policy, they are not 
really capable of solving conflicts between coalition partners and sanctioning 
misbehaving ministers. For instance, in Brazauskas II (2004–6) cabinet, when 
some instances of ministerial agency-shirking were detected, the coalition 
partners could not agree how to proceed and decided to opt for the most painful 
but simplest solution – to expel the partner responsible for those spheres, Social 
Liberal party, from the coalition altogether. This left a two party (Social 
Democrats and Labor Party) coalition with just enough MPs to have a majority 
in the plenary, but with no credible possibilities to expand the coalition. Such 
situation led junior coalition partner, the Labor party, to believe that they are 
essential to the coalition and openly rebel against the senior partners in a couple 
of instances. Coalition was paralyzed and finally collapsed when the President 
initiated a vote of no confidence to two of the Labor Party ministers.  
Finally, in Latvia Coalition Committees function in a slightly different 
manner compared to their neighbors. As mentioned before, Coalition Commit-
tees in Latvia usually meet not once, but twice a week. On Monday there 
usually is a ‘big’ Coalition Committee meeting featuring the PM and five repre-
sentatives from each of the coalition partners. In this meeting, Coalition Com-
mittee all the relevant discussions take place either regarding the coordinating 
the legislative effort or managing crises or creating new policy from the abstract 
pledges in the agreement. The second ‘small’ meeting usually takes place on 
Thursday, right before the plenary session featuring the PM and one represen-
tative from the coalition partners. In this meeting, usually only the items related 
to the upcoming plenary session and voting discipline are discussed. All the 
Coalition Committee meetings take place either in the government or parliament 
buildings. 
Latvia adopted such a Coalition Committee design out of necessity. Since 
the mid-2000s all the cabinet meetings in Latvia were made open to the public 
and the media (by allowing members of the media to take part and record the 
cabinet meetings); as a result, coalition partners felt a need to move more sensi-
tive discussions to a more private stetting, and Coalition Committees therefore 
began to function as venues where coalition partners could have those conver-
sations and deliberate certain matters behind closed doors.  
Furthermore, coalition cabinets in Latvia compared to the other two Baltic 
states are composed of more partners and are characterized by shorter duration 
and higher replacement rate of coalition appointees. Yet on many occasions 
coalition partners in Latvia have managed to reshuffle cabinet positions (in-
cluding the PM) between coalition partners, while maintaining their coalition in 
parliament intact. For this reason, Coalition Committees in Latvia are capable of 
dealing with issuing sanctions to the misbehaving cabinet members and 
replacing them more often than their counterparts in Lithuania or Estonia. Table 
15 below, presents the score table for the Baltic states. 
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Table 15: IMOM scores for Coalition Committees 
 Estonia  Lithuania Latvia 
Coordination of the legislative process + + + 
Creating new policy +/- + + 
Managing crises +/- + + 
Sanctioning members  - - + 
Total:  0.5 0.75 1 
  
Coalition Committees in Estonia have become increasingly formal and tend to 
concern themselves mostly with coordinating the passage of legislation. Though 
they also perform other tasks as creating new policies based on the abstract 
pledges in the Coalition Agreement or react to various crises, their levels of 
activity fall short compared to those of their counterparts in Lithuania and Lat-
via. Therefore, they are given a score of .5. Lithuania, meanwhile, is assigned a 
score of .75, because it the coalition a committee there takes on more roles, but 
cannot effectively sanction coalition members without breaking apart the 
coalition. Finally, Latvia receives a score of 1, since Coalition Committees there 
are the strongest in the Baltic states.  
 
 
Summary 
Apart from knowing that Coalition Committees exist in most of the Western 
European coalition cabinets and that they play an important role, precious little 
can be said about this institution. This partly occurs because of its informality – 
the Coalition Committee meetings are never recorded and produce no docu-
ments or other evidence that could be examined. 
Interviews conducted with high-ranking politicians who took part in Coali-
tion Committee activities, reveal that the functions the Coalition Committees 
perform can be perceived as having an onion-like structure: at the core, each 
Coalition Committee coordinates the daily activities of the coalition, and the 
passage of legislation through many institutional steps. If there is a need, Coa-
lition Committees can take on additional layers and functions: 1. they can assu-
me the role of coordinating the process of turning the abstract pledges from the 
Coalition Agreement into tangible policy; 2. they can lead the cabinet through 
crises and unforeseen events; 3. they can issue sanctions against misbehaving 
parties, which can include expelling a party from a coalition altogether.   
In a sense, Coalition Committees act as nerve centers of the coalitions: they 
collect information from the relevant bodies, process it and make decisions. 
They complement the IMOMs which help to establish the rules of governing 
together or gather information but have no sanctioning power and provide the 
‘muscle’ to make the overall system of oversight effective.  
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Coalition Committees in the Baltic states are similar because they are 
organized along the same principles of informality and functioning behind 
closed doors. They also are similar in their core function of coordinating the 
passage of legislation and managing the legislative pipeline.   However, there 
are significant differences between them regarding their overall role in the 
architecture and the functioning of the coalition. Coalition Committee meetings 
in Estonia are a way for the coalition members in the executive branch to 
coordinate their efforts with their colleagues working in the parliament. In a 
way they serve as an extension of cabinet meetings and share many of the same 
formalities. In Lithuania these meetings provide coalition partners with a 
platform to discuss new policy proposals and share information which was 
unknown to them prior to assuming office. Finally, in Latvia Coalition Com-
mittee meetings allow coalition partners to discuss their business in private or to 
deal with the coalition members who refuse to follow the coalition line.  
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PART III: IMOM PATTERNS IN THE BALTIC STATES 
Chapter 8: Patterns of IMOM use 
After discussing the theoretical underpinnings of IMOM use and how each 
individual IMOM has been utilized in the Baltic states, the next logical steps are 
to see how 1. IMOMs have been used together as a whole; 2. whether the hypo-
theses raised in Chapter Two have been verified; and 4. whether the overall 
IMOM use has any effect on cabinet stability and duration. These questions are 
answered in this part. Chapter Eight discusses what IMOM patterns could be 
observed in the Baltic states between 1992 and 2012, summarizes the findings 
from the previous chapters, and checks whether the initial hypotheses have been 
confirmed. Chapter Nine asks whether the intensity of IMOM use had any 
observable consequences and concludes that more intensive IMOM use has 
contributed to increased cabinet duration.  
 
 
How IMOMs were used in the Baltic states? 
In order to analyze IMOMs collectively, the scales to measure the intensity of 
each individual IMOM use were standardized to range between zero and one. 
Variables for intensity of using CCs, JMs and Coalition Committees needed no 
additional recoding, as they already followed the 0–1 scale. Meanwhile, 
variable for comprehensiveness of Coalition Agreements was first normalized 
using z-transformation, and then standardized ((V – min V)/(max V – min V)). 
Figure 27 depicts the IMOM use in the Baltic states, the cabinets are ordered 
chronologically with the earliest cabinets being on top. 
Figure 27  reveals three things: first, there are no clearly distinguishable 
differences in IMOM use in the Baltic states – in most of the cases, the manner 
of IMOM use is fairly similar and the differences fairly subtle. Second, there 
was a slight tendency for the overall IMOM use to increase through time. Third, 
subtle differences in IMOM use emerge mostly along the national lines.  
This is not surprising: one of the reasons why this dissertation analyses the 
Baltic states is that their institutional structures share a wealth of common 
features (strong ‘working’ parliaments, high degree of correspondence between 
ministries and parliamentary committees, etc.). These commonalities allow us to 
compare these states but, at the same time, mean that they do not allow 
substantial differences in the way IMOMs function to emerge. For instance, 
powerful Committee Chair positions in all three Baltic states mean that shadow 
CCs are powerful oversight instruments and are intensely used as IMOMs. 
Meanwhile, the small number of political appointees in the executive branch in 
all three Baltic states mean that any attempt to appoint shadow JMs would be 
perceived as very intrusive, thus making JMs not very attractive as mutual 
oversight instruments.  
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Figure 27: IMOM use in the Baltic states 
 
 
The Baltic states are simply too similar for truly distinctive IMOM patterns to 
emerge and this is why the existing differences are fairly subtle and mostly 
driven by smaller national nuances or particularities. For instance, the role of 
Coalition Committees is more pronounced in Latvia simply because of the 
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regulation making cabinet meetings open to the media, which caused the 
deliberation of more sensitive matters to be moved to the Coalition Committees.  
Because of aforementioned lack of distinctive differences, a closer look at the 
IMOM patterns is needed to see how exactly the subtle differences between the 
Baltic states emerge. Furthermore, as the Figures 28–30 reveal, the subtle 
differences between the Baltic states are not stable and change through time.  
 
 
Figure 28: IMOM patterns in Estonia 
 
 
In Estonia oversight in coalition cabinets is mostly carried out by using Com-
mittee Chairs to oversee the ministers from coalition partners’ parties. Cross-
appointing Junior Ministers is not used, and Coalition Committees play a rather 
weak role. The importance of Coalition Agreements is significant and has 
increased through time.  
In Latvia, the situation is rather different. Though Committee Chairs are 
responsible for a significant part of the overall oversight, a much higher em-
phasis is placed on Coalition Committees and, in some cases, shadowing Junior 
Ministers is also used. Coalition Agreements, however, play only a marginal 
role. 
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* Incomplete data 
 
Figure 29: IMOM patterns in Latvia 
 
 
Finally, in Lithuania all oversight mechanisms are employed to some extent. 
Just like in Estonia, a bulk of oversight is carried out using Committee Chairs 
and Coalition Agreements play an increasingly important role. Also, just like in 
Latvia, experimentation with using JMs for oversight is present to an extent. 
Furthermore, since all IMOMs are used in Lithuania quite extensively, the 
overall intensity of oversight is higher as well.  
Coming back to the issue of democratic regime type raised in the Intro-
ductory Chapter, it is hard to clearly answer whether the fact that Lithuania has 
a semi-presidential system has had any effect on IMOM use. On the one hand, 
the president does play a role in coalition cabinets, especially during the 
coalition formation phase, when potential cabinet members are nominated. 
Furthermore, we can observe that the overall IMOM use is significantly higher 
compared to the other two Baltic states (see Table 19). However, these two 
things are not causally related: though in some aspects IMOM use in Lithuania 
differs from that in Latvia and Estonia, this does not appear to be a result of a 
more pronounced role of the president in Lithuanian political system. 
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Figure 30: IMOM patterns in Lithuania 
 
Patterns of IMOM use in the Baltic states 
Having said that IMOMs in the Baltic states have been used in a fairly similar 
manner and that there are no distinct differences between the different cabinets 
or different states, we can still seek to identify certain IMOM patterns based on 
the subtle differences that exist between the cabinets. To this end, the IMOM 
scores have been recoded into a four-point ordinal scale. Scores for each IMOM 
were assigned to each cabinet in the following manner: if a cabinet score for a 
certain IMOM was in the first quartile, it received a designation of “--”; it was 
in the second – “-”; a “+” if it was in the third and “++” if it was in the fourth 
quartile.  
Imposing such ordinal scale on the cabinets helps to amplify the existing 
cross-cabinet differences. This is an effective technique to expose the under-
lying variation and make it more apparent. However, it is of paramount impor-
tance not to lose sight of the fact that the analysis below merely helps to make 
subtle differences more visible rather than expose a significant variation in how 
IMOMs were used in the Baltic coalition cabinets. Table 16 shows the scores 
for the Baltic coalition cabinets recoded to the four-point ordinal scale.  
 
 
 
113 
Table 16. IMOM use in Baltic coalition cabinets 
Cabinet Committee 
Chairs 
Junior 
Ministers 
Coalition 
Agreements 
Coalition 
Committees 
EE 
Laar I - -- - - 
Tarand ++ -- -- - 
Vahi I -- -- -- - 
Vahi II -- -- -- - 
Vahi III -- -- -- - 
Siimann -- -- + - 
Laar II + -- ++ - 
Kalls - -- -- - 
Parts - -- ++ - 
Ansip I ++ -- -- - 
Ansip II ++ -- ++ - 
Ansip III - -- ++ - 
Ansip IV ++ -- -- - 
LT 
Vagnorius  + ++ + + 
Paksas I ++ ++ ++ + 
Kubilius I ++ ++ ++ + 
Paksas II + -- - + 
Brazauskas I + -- + + 
Brazauskas II ++ ++ + + 
Brazauskas III - ++ + + 
Kirkilas  - -- + + 
Kubilius II + -- ++ + 
Kubilius III + -- ++ + 
LV 
Godmanis I -- -- -- ++ 
Birkavs - + - ++ 
Gailis - -- ++ ++ 
Skele I ++ ++ -- ++ 
Skele II ++ -- -- ++ 
Krasts I + ++ - ++ 
Krasts II - ++ - ++ 
Kristopans I - -- + ++ 
Kristopans II - -- + ++ 
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Cabinet Committee 
Chairs 
Junior 
Ministers 
Coalition 
Agreements 
Coalition 
Committees 
Skele III -- -- -- ++ 
Berzins ++ -- + ++ 
Repse ++ -- -- ++ 
Emsis + -- - ++ 
Kalvitis I ++ -- - ++ 
Kalvitis II - -- - ++ 
Kalvitis III - -- - ++ 
Godmanis II - -- -- ++ 
Dombrovskis I - -- - ++ 
Dombrovskis II -- -- - ++ 
Dombrovskis III - -- - ++ 
Dombrovskis IV - ++ -- ++ 
 
 
One of the best ways to identify the underlying patterns in the data is to employ 
data visualization techniques. However, since we seek to evaluate how different 
coalition cabinets are positioned based on four variables (the four IMOMs), we 
need to use some dimensionality reduction techniques prior to visualizing them 
in a two-dimensional space. To this end, Multidimensional Scaling7 was used, 
which helped to produce Figure 31 below.  
                                                 
7  “Classical” variant of MDS was used, calculations were done on STATA 14. 
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Figure 31. Cabinet clusters 
 
 
As could be expected, cabinets are quite closely clustered together. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to identify three clusters: Cluster C – on the left side of Figure 31; 
Cluster B – Right side, bottom of the figure; and Cluster A – Right side, top of 
the figure.  
The main defining feature of Cluster C is that the cabinets in that cluster 
used Junior Ministers for oversight. The main feature of Cluster B is that the 
cabinets in that cluster prepared lengthy and more comprehensive Coalition 
Agreements. Meanwhile, the cabinets in Cluster A did not use Junior Ministers 
and prepared shorter/less comprehensive Coalition Agreements. Cabinets and 
the clusters they belong to are presented in Table 17.   
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Table 17. Cabinets and clusters 
Cabinet Country Cluster Cabinet Country Cluster 
Ansip I EE a Brazauskas II LT b 
Ansip IV EE a Brazauskas III LT b 
Kallas EE a Kubilius I LT b 
Laar I EE a Paksas I LT b 
Tarand EE a Vagnorius  LT b 
Vahi I EE a Krasts I LV b 
Vahi II EE a Krasts II LV b 
Vahi III EE a Skele I LV b 
Paksas II LT a Ansip II EE c 
Birkavs LV a Ansip III EE c 
Dombrovskis I LV a Laar II EE c 
Dombrovskis II LV a Parts EE c 
Dombrovskis III LV a Siimann EE c 
Dombrovskis IV LV a Brazauskas I LT c 
Emsis LV a Kirkilas  LT c 
Godmanis I LV a Kubilius II LT c 
Godmanis II LV a Kubilius III LT c 
Kalvitis I LV a Berzins LV c 
Kalvitis II LV a Gailis LV c 
Kalvitis III LV a    
Kristopans I LV a    
Kristopans II LV a    
Repse LV a    
Skele II LV a    
Skele III LV a    
 
 
Here we can also observe that clusters did not perfectly follow national lines, 
but in many ways cabinets’ cluster membership is influenced by national 
institutional contexts. Lithuanian cabinets, are mostly split between Clusters B 
and C (with Paksas II being the only exception), as both Coalition Agreements 
and Junior Ministers are employed to a relatively large extent in Lithuania. 
Latvian cabinets are mostly in Cluster A, as Junior Ministers are used rather 
rarely and Coalition Agreements in Latvia tend to be shorter. Finally, Estonian 
cabinets are almost equally split between Clusters A and C, as Junior Ministers 
are not used for oversight in Estonia and the length of the Coalition Agreement 
varies (especially between the first and later cabinets).  
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These clusters help to identify three patterns of IMOM use that occur in the 
Baltic states. The Low-oversight pattern, corresponding to Cluster A mostly 
relies on Committee Chairs for oversight. Junior Ministers are not used and 
Coalition Agreements are employed only to a moderate extent. The Agreement 
pattern, corresponding to Cluster B, relies on a combination of Committee 
Chairs and Coalition Agreements for oversight. Junior Ministers are not used. 
Cabinets with such IMOM pattern mostly have occurred in the second half of 
the period, analyzed in this dissertation, as coalition parties had to learn how to 
effectively and efficiently draft Coalition Agreements.  
Finally, the Junior Minister pattern mostly differs from others that it relies a 
lot on using the Junior Ministers for oversight, while the reliance on other 
IMOMs varies. These cabinets mostly had some internal tensions from the 
beginning of their tenure and it was decided that additional layer of oversight 
would be beneficial. Though, most often it did not yield expected results.  
 
 
Total intensity of oversight 
Having analyzed IMOMs individually as well as the patterns they form, we can 
move on to answering the main questions of this dissertation: a. how well does 
the model with two groups of IVs: 1. coalition make-up factors, and 2. oversight 
costs factors, explain the IMOM use?; b. Does the model performance improve 
when IMOMs are analyzed collectively rather than individually?  
This requires us to determine a way to assess the usage of IMOMs collec-
tively rather than individually. In other words, it requires a way to turn four 
different scores for each of the IMOMs into a single measure. There are many 
ways to achieve this, each involving its own benefits and compromises. Since 
the nature of IMOMs is that they are essentially different means to address the 
same problem, and none of them is essential for others to be effective, one of 
the best ways to create an index of IMOM use would be a simple addition, 
where values of different IMOMs are summed to measure the total intensity of 
oversight. This way of creating an index is good, because it is simple, intuitive, 
and robust.  
However, it also has a drawback, since it essentially involves adding the share 
of certain type of Committee Chairs to the number of pages in the Coalition 
Agreement to draw conclusions about the overall system of mutual oversight in 
the cabinet coalition. This is a problematic aspect of using any indices. Fortu-
nately, in this dissertation, we can rely on the collected data and accounts of 
individual IMOM use in the Baltic states established in the preceding chapters to 
ensure that this index adequately reflects and does not distort the reality.  
By adding up the scores of individual IMOMs, a new variable “Total use of 
IMOMs” is created. This new variable can in theory range between 0 and 4, 
with 0 meaning that no IMOMs are used at all, and 4 meaning that all of them 
are used to their fullest extent. In the Baltic states the Total use of IMOMs 
ranged between 0.5 and 2.4. On average it was highest in Lithuania and lowest 
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in Estonia (see Table 18), the difference being statistically significant. Further-
more, Total use of IMOMs also varied through time and had an observable 
tendency to increase, as indicated in Figure 33. 
 
 
Table 18: Total use of oversight in the Baltic states 
 Total use of IMOMs 
(mean) 
Total intensity of IMOMs  
(standard deviation) 
Estonia 1.00 .35 
Latvia 1.55 .31 
Lithuania 1.64 .46 
  
 
The Model 
The first part of the dissertation formulated five hypotheses, how the factors 
associated with the coalition make-up factors and costs of using IMOMs should 
affect the way IMOMs are used and the intensity of their use. Additionally, it 
was suggested that IMOMs can be best understood as a comprehensive system 
of oversight and, therefore, should be analyzed together rather than separately. 
In this section, we evaluate the model and determine whether the initial hypo-
theses were verified. 
 Table 19 presents the results of the multivariate regression models. There 
are four sets of independent variables: M1 – coalition make-up factors model 
with the number of parties in a coalition and the ideological distance between 
them as the independent variables; M2 – costs of using IMOMs model with 
coalition experience, minority coalition and country dummies and the 
independent variables; M3 – model bringing together both sets of variables in 
their original form; M4 – a standardized and normalized version of M3. These 
four sets of variables were used to explain four dependent variables: 1. intensity 
of shadow Committee Chair use; 2. intensity of shadow Junior Minister use; 3. 
comprehensiveness of Coalition Agreements (Coal. A); and 4. total use of 
IMOMs. Coalition Committees have been omitted from analysis as a separate 
IMOM, because of how the scores were assigned. However, they are included 
in the total use of IMOMs index.  
First, it is important to note that R squares for total use of IMOMs are 
consistently higher than for any individual IMOMs in all four models. This lends 
credence to the approach used in this dissertation that IMOMs ought to be studied 
not individually, but to together as a comprehensive system of oversight.  
Moving on to the specific hypotheses, all variables identified in the model 
had a significant effect on the total use of IMOMs, though in some cases the 
effect was in the opposite direction than anticipated.  
H1: As the ideological distance between coalition partners increases, the 
IMOM usage increases.  
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Table 19: Model results 
  CCs JMs Coal. A. T_IMOMs 
M1 Ideological diversity -.04 (.06) -.02 (.02) .00 (.05) -.2*** (.09) 
Number of coalition 
partners 
.11*** (.03) .02* (.01) .00 (.02) .21*** (.04) 
Constant .15** (.08) .02*** (.03) .14** (.07) 1*** (.13) 
N 46 46 46 46 
R2 .32 .05 .01 .38 
M2 Coalition experience .01 (.02) .00 (.01) .03*** (.02) .04 (.03) 
Minority cabinet .2*** (.08) -.04 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.25*** (.12) 
LT .00 (.02) .07** (.04) .3*** (.07) .12 (.15) 
EST -.04 (.1) -.04 (.03) .11* (.07) -.48*** (.14) 
Constant .51*** (.1) .05 (.03) -.05 (.07) 1.51*** (.15) 
N 46 46 46 46 
R2 .12 .22 .28 .37 
M3 Ideological diversity -.11* (.06) -.03 (.02) -.04 (.05) -.18** (.09) 
Number of coalition 
partners 
.14*** (.03) .02** (.01) .02 (.02) .19*** (.04) 
Coalition experience .01 (.02) .00 (00) .03** (.01) .04* (.03) 
Minority cabinet -.1 (.07) .01 (.02) -.03 (.06) -.11 (.11) 
LT .2** (.1) .1*** (.04) .33*** (.08) .37*** (.15) 
EST .19** (.09) .00 (.03) -.16 (.14) -.16** (.14) 
Constant .02 (.05) .02 (.05) .9*** (.2) .9*** (.2) 
N 46 46 46 46 
R2 .43 .29 .29 .58 
M4 Ideological diversity -.07* (.04) -.02 (.02) -.03 (.04) -.12** (.06) 
Number of coalition 
partners 
.24*** (.05) .04** (.02) .04 (.04) .32*** (.07) 
Coalition experience .02 (.04) .00 (.01) .06** (.03) .09* (.05) 
Minority cabinet -.09 (.07) .01 (.02) -.03 (.06) -.11 (.1) 
LT .19** (.1) .09*** (.04) .32*** (.08) .37*** (.14) 
EST .19** (.09) .00 (.04) .16** (.08) -.16 (.14) 
Constant .4***(.07) .02 (.03) .00 (.05) 1.43*** (.09) 
N 46 46 46 46 
R2 .43 .29 .29 .58 
* p <.15; ** p < .1; *** p<.05  
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Ideological diversity of a coalition has a significant effect on the total IMOM 
use in all the models. However, this effect is negative, indicating that as the 
distance between the coalition partners increases, the overall intensity of IMOM 
use decreases. In other words, the effect of the ideological diversity of the 
coalition is totally opposite than was expected. It is not possible to provide a full 
explanation why that is so within the confines of this chapter, but the most 
plausible explanation is that ideologically diverse coalitions tend to move 
towards an abdication or ministerial autonomy model of governance.  
Some of the interviewees from the Estonian Reform Party said the 
following, when asked about being in an ideologically diverse coalition with the 
Center Party:    
 
“… it was a very rational cabinet – we had a very limited number of things we 
agreed on, and we did them.”  
“[with other parties] it is more difficult – we can agree on quite many things, 
but there’s a danger that the other parties will interpret that in a different way, 
so we need to write everything down in detail on paper.” (Lang 2016) 
 
This demonstrates that ideologically diverse coalitions function in a different 
manner than those composed of similar parties. Such coalitions are perceived as 
incapable of carrying out substantial reforms or enacting major changes; there-
fore, coalition partners simply try to identify a small number of sensible little 
policy changes where they can both agree on and focus on those areas. Having 
such a limited policy program diminishes the danger for agency shirking, as 
ministers do not really have where to shirk or where to deviate from the 
Coalition Agreement, thus reducing the need for oversight.  
How does this finding relate to the previous studies which established a link 
between the ideological distance and oversight (Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin 
and Vanberg 2004; Dong Hun and Loewenberg 2005)?  It is difficult to say, 
because these studies focused on different things. They looked at how the ideo-
logical distance of an individual cabinet member affected the possibility that 
that member would be shadowed by a Junior Minister or a Committee Chair. By 
contrast, this dissertation analyses how the ideological diversity of the coalition 
as a whole affects the use of all IMOMs. These two aspects of IMOM use are 
not in conflict with each other, as it is possible that in an ideologically diverse 
coalition overall use of IMOMs might be lower than in a coalition made-up of 
ideologically similar parties, yet at the same time, the most extreme cabinet 
members in a diverse coalition would be the ones shadowed by Junior Ministers 
or Committee Chairs.     
H2: As the number of coalition partners increases, IMOM use increases.  
 
The number of coalition partners has a moderately strong significant effect in all 
the models, which means that the second hypothesis is confirmed.  
H3: Coalitions made-up of parties with more coalition experience use IMOMs 
more intensely.  
121 
Overall, this hypothesis is rejected, as the amount of coalition experience has 
either very weak or no effect on the overall IMOM use. However, it cannot be 
said that this variable is not significant. Previous chapters demonstrate that 
coalition experience has a significant effect on the use of individual IMOMs, 
particularly Coalition Agreements. Therefore, though it does not affect the over-
all IMOM use, coalition experience influences which individual IMOMs are 
used more intensely.   
H4: Minority coalitions use IMOMs to a lesser extent than majority backed 
coalitions.   
 
Overall, this hypothesis is rejected, as minority cabinet variable did not have a 
significant effect in all the models. However, it does not mean that this factor 
had no effect. The results above demonstrate that minority cabinet variable had 
a significant effect in the second model, which considered only the costs of 
using IMOMs. Furthermore, previous chapters have demonstrated that minority 
coalition cabinets do indeed use certain IMOMs, like Committee Chairs in a 
different manner compared to majority-backed coalitions. 
In other words, research carried out in this dissertation found some evidence 
supporting the hypothesis, but not enough for it to be confirmed. However, 
more research on this matter is needed. Future studies with bigger sample sizes 
and more statistical power could help to settle this issue with more certainty.  
H5a: Specific features of the national institutional contexts in different 
countries do not affect the overall IMOM use. 
 
This hypothesis is rejected, as the data in the Table 18 indicates, specific natio-
nal institutional context do play a part in the overall IMOM use. These diffe-
rences persist, even when controlling for other relevant variables. 
Because IMOMs function not in a vacuum, but in a specific institutional 
environment, their use is affected by many pressures that environment exerts on 
them. For example, as mentioned in Chapter Five, addressing the use Junior 
Ministers to shadow cabinet members, the same IMOM can mean a variety of 
different things in different countries. A Junior Minister in Latvia is first and 
foremost perceived as a minister’s liaison in parliament, whereas in Lithuania, 
for the most time Junior Ministers acted as heads of specific ministerial depart-
ments. Different placement in the institutional structure and the overall role of 
the Junior Ministers definitely affects how well a JM can function as an IMOM. 
All IMOMs without an exception are affected by these pressures from the 
national institutional contexts which is reflected both in preferences for specific 
IMOMs as well as the overall intensity of their use.  
H5b: However, the specific features of national institutional contexts in 
different countries affect the popularity of individual IMOMs.  
 
The first part of this chapter described the patterns of IMOM use in the Baltic 
states. Though no clear IMOM patterns emerged, there were some subtle diffe-
rences emerging across the national lines, which lend support for this hypo-
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thesis. It is important to note that, due to their similar institutional structure, the 
environment in the Baltic states is not really suitable for truly distinct IMOM 
patterns to emerge. Nonetheless, seeing some differences in IMOM patterns, 
though quite subtle, means that this hypothesis is confirmed. As mentioned 
earlier, due to specific national institutional contexts, environment in which 
IMOMs function differs and that really has an impact on the preference for 
specific IMOMs. 
Finally, the last outstanding question remains – how generalizable are the 
findings from this dissertation and to what extent they can applied to other 
newly democratized states? On one hand, this dissertation approached the 
analysis of IMOMs and their patterns to a certain degree sacrificing width and 
generalizability for depth and detail. The scope of the analysis was limited to 
the Baltic states precisely for the reason that with a smaller sample, it would be 
possible to gather richer qualitative evidence and to achieve a more in-depth 
understanding of how IMOMs function in these systems.  
On the other hand, this dissertation did uncover some aspects, how the Baltic 
states differ from the other countries in Western/Northern Europe. For instance, 
one of these aspects is that in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia Committee chairs 
preferred vehicle for mutual oversight, whereas the Junior Ministers are used to 
a much smaller extent of at all. It is suggested in Chapter Five that one reason 
for this might be the lack of strict proportionality requirements governing how 
committee chairmanships are allocated between the PPGs. Absence of these 
rules, in turn, allow the governing parties to amass disproportionally large 
shares of committee chair positions, which can then be used for oversight. 
While, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the newly democratized 
states in Europe in this matter could resemble the Baltic states more than their 
neighbors in Western/Northern Europe, this matter needs to be thoroughly 
tested.  
 
Summary 
Cabinets in the Baltic states have differed in how they have used IMOMs to 
‘keep tabs’ on their coalition partners. However, the differences are often subtle 
and no distinct patterns have emerged. What we can talk about are rather subtle 
differences, which are primarily manifested in a slightly stronger reliance on 
some IMOMs rather than others. These differences are mostly shaped by the 
national institutional contexts and emerge along national lines.  
In Estonia, the oversight is carried out by formulating an extensive Coalition 
Agreement and relying on Committee Chairs to shadow ministers. Coalition 
Committees are present, but function in a very formal way, mostly just co-
ordinating the passage of bills through the various stages of the legislative pro-
cess. Junior Ministers are not used at all. In Latvia, Committee Chairs carry out 
a bulk of oversight as well, though the main vehicle for coordination and over-
sight are the Coalition Committees. Coalition Agreements in Latvia tend to be 
less comprehensive and Junior Ministers are used as IMOMs only in excep-
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tional circumstances. Finally, in Lithuania just like in the two other Baltic states 
Committee Chairs are used extensively to shadow ministers and comprehensive 
Coalition Agreements have become increasingly common. Junior Ministers are 
used rarely, but to a higher degree than in Latvia or Estonia. Coalition Com-
mittees are more active than in Estonia, but less prominent than in Latvia.  
These tendencies or subtle patterns have not been stable and have evolved 
through time. Overall, the total intensity of oversight has increased over time 
and more emphasis is placed on creating a comprehensive Coalition Agreement 
in order to prevent potential disagreements during the time in office.  
The model to explain IMOM use performed quite well and the general 
approach to IMOMs as a comprehensive system of oversight was validated, as 
the explanatory power of the model increased when IMOMs were analyzed 
together rather than individually. Three of the initial hypotheses were con-
firmed, while the remaining two were not. Data analyzed confirmed that IMOM 
use is positively associated with the number of parties in a coalition and the 
amount of coalition experience.  
However, contrary to our expectations ideologically diverse cabinets were 
shown to use less IMOMs. Though more research is needed to determine the 
precise nature of the relationship between the cabinet diversity and the IMOM 
use, there is some evidence demonstrating that diverse cabinets simply commit 
themselves to a very small limited number of policy goals and do not embark on 
major reforms. Such limited policy ambitions limit the possibility of shirking 
and, therefore, the demand for IMOMs.  
Furthermore, it demonstrated that minority cabinet variable was significant 
in the second model, considering only the costs of oversight. However, the 
effect disappeared when all factors were analyzed together. This means that the 
forth hypothesis has to be rejected for now, but more thorough analysis with 
larger sample sizes are needed to fully determine if minority cabinets do indeed 
use IMOMs in a systematically different manner.  
Finally, national institutional contexts were shown to have an impact on not 
only the preference for specific IMOMs, but also the total volume of their use. 
Coalition cabinets in different countries face different pressures from their 
respective institutional environments, therefore, they face different levels of 
delegation hazards and different levels of information asymmetry. For these 
reasons the overall demand for IMOMs which mitigate these problems differs, 
just like the overall intensity of their use.  
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Chapter 9: Do IMOMs have observable effects? 
In the main part of the dissertation IMOMs are analyzed as the dependent vari-
able, looking for factors that might account for patterns of IMOM use in the 
three Baltic states. In this last chapter, we take the analysis further and look into 
the consequences of IMOM use. More specifically, the chapter focuses on 
whether cabinets that have used IMOMs intensely and those that have not differ 
in any meaningful way. Due to their informal nature and the small number of 
cases the effect of IMOMs is hard to estimate, but some support is found for the 
thesis that IMOMs contribute to the longevity of the cabinets.  
Answering the question whether IMOMs have any effect is difficult. This is 
mostly because if the overall system of mutual oversight works well and each 
individual IMOM functions like it should, nothing happens; coalition cabinets 
go about doing their daily duties and take care of business as usual. Only if 
IMOMs fail to prevent an instance of shirking and coalition partners find them-
selves in conflict, something happens that can be observed, counted or mea-
sured. IMOMs, therefore, present researchers with a substantial puzzle – how to 
measure the absence of conflict? 
IMOMs function as means to prevent conflict and to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the coalition. Therefore, one of the ways to measure their success 
and impact would be to look at the instances when they failed or were used to an 
insufficient extent. By doing so, we could catalogue under what circumstances 
these failures occurred and under what circumstances the system prevailed. There 
are a couple ways how this could be done and none of them is ideal. 
First, one could try to measure the number of instances when one coalition 
partner shirked from the Coalition Agreement in order to pursue their own personal 
goals. However, doing that is nearly impossible, as in some cases coalition partners 
would try to address such situations in private without informing the public, 
therefore acquiring valid and reliable data would be nearly impossible.  
Second, one could try to count the number of conflicts among coalition 
partners, as they are reported in the media. However, that also is problematic, as 
sometimes, especially right before the elections, coalition partners might stoke a 
conflict on purpose to gain additional exposure in the media and stand out from 
other parties in the coalition. In other instances, by contrast, coalition partners 
might seek to downplay their disagreements for fear of ‘rocking the boat’ and 
seek to preserve good relations with their coalition partners.  
In this dissertation we focus on a more tangible aspect, coalition cabinet 
longevity. If a coalition cabinet stays together for a long period, it is a good 
indicator that the informal system of mutual oversights works well and success-
fully mitigates potential conflicts between coalition partners.  
However, this approach also has its flaws, the biggest being that coalition 
cabinets can be terminated due to a variety of reasons. Here we seek to mitigate 
this effect by excluding the cabinets which were formed in the middle of the 
parliamentary term. Yet, even then it is possible that some of the cabinets were 
terminated early due to some external shock that had nothing to do with the 
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relations between the coalition partners (Damgaard 2010). Nonetheless, the 
cabinet longevity approach is the least problematic of the possible alternatives 
and, therefore, it is used in this study. 
There are 15 coalition cabinets in the Baltic states that fit the aforementioned 
criterion. They are presented in Figure 32. Their total intensity of oversight 
scores range from 0.5 to 2.4 and the duration from just about two months to 
three years and three months. However, it is important to note that the cabinet 
duration is counted here based on the definition of the cabinet change outlined 
in the first part of the dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 32: Total intensity of oversight and cabinet duration 
 
 
As such, the data in Figure 32 reveal very little, as the longevity of coalition 
cabinets has varied substantially. Seeing that the relationship between the two 
variables is not linear by any means, using OLS regression would not be ap-
proach. However, we can perform a Pearson correlation analysis, which shows 
that these two variables are correlated in a positive way. The correlation is 0.2 
which is rather weak but it is statistically significant.  
Finally, it is worth coming back to the IMOM patterns outlined in the pre-
vious chapter. In Figure 32, cabinets following the Junior Minister oversight 
pattern are highlighted. As can be visible from the figure, they tend to occupy 
(with the exception of the Vagnorius cabinet) the bottom right of the cabinet 
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cluster, meaning that these cabinets lasted the shortest among all the cabinets 
with similar levels of IMOM use.  
This should not be interpreted as a sign that such IMOM pattern negatively 
contributes to the cabinet longevity, however. As outlined before, in Chapter 
Five, it is usually the cabinets which are suffering from some sort of internal 
tensions or conflicts from the beginning of their tenure that opt to use Junior 
Ministers as an additional layer of oversight in the first place. Hence, it is not at 
all surprising that such cabinets tend not to last very long in office. Therefore, it 
could be argued that both phenomena –  the choice to use Junior Ministers for 
oversight and short life-span of these cabinets – are together caused by the same 
external variable: pre-existing tensions among coalition partners.  
It is rather impossible to pursue this investigation further, given our limited 
sample and the potential influence of external effects. Overall, these findings 
are not sufficient to say anything definitive about the impact of IMOMs on 
cabinet longevity. However, the significant correlation is interesting and merits 
more detailed inquiry in the future.  
However, when looking into the potential impacts of IMOM use, one always 
has to keep in mind that the main benefit they provide is indirect: they enable 
the coalition partners to coordinate their policies more efficiently without the 
fear of shirking or defection. That, in turn, allows the cabinet coalition to move 
away from inefficient governance through abdication to a more Pareto-optimal 
governance though policy coordination. 
Therefore, the most important finding that supports the claim that IMOMs 
matter and they are perceived as a very important part of coalition governance is 
that their use has increased over time. Figure 33 shows the mean value of total 
use of IMOMs per year in the three Baltic states. If coalition partners are willing 
to pay the costs of oversight and use IMOMs, that means that they have faith in 
these oversight institutions and think that they can work. If, in addition to 
making governance easier and more effective, IMOMs allow cabinets to stay in 
office longer, then it is an added bonus, further encouraging IMOM use, but 
never being the main reason in and of itself.   
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Figure 33: Total use of IMOMs through time 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation set out to achieve two major goals: 1. to provide a rigorous 
explanation of what factors influenced the manner and intensity of the use of 
informal mutual oversight mechanisms in coalition cabinets; 2. to provide a rich 
and comprehensive account of how IMOMs function in the Baltic states, with a 
special focus on how their use has evolved through time. Though the empirical 
sample here draws exclusively from the experience of the Baltic states, these 
findings could also be used as a set of expectations to be empirically tested in the 
future for other newly democratized states in Europe, which also adopted over-
sight practices from Western European countries, but did so at a very rapid pace. 
While fulfilling these goals, this study has offered three main contributions 
to the field of coalition governance studies: 1. analytical – shifting focus from 
the individual IMOMs to how they function as a comprehensive system of over-
sight; 2. theoretical – examining the influence of two new/understudied 
variables: coalition cabinet type and coalition experience; 3. empirical – pro-
viding a rich and detailed account of mutual oversight systems in the Baltic 
states which was previously lacking.  
Despite outstanding contributions to the field of mutual oversight in coali-
tion governments, our knowledge of the matter is fragmented and incomplete 
because previous contributions centered on analyzing how a single oversight 
mechanism (or a pair of them) functions in a particular set of countries. This 
approach allowed to uncover the basic logic of using informal mutual oversight 
mechanisms and most common patterns of their use. However, that did not 
allow us to explore how these mechanisms interact with each other and how the 
patterns of their use are shaped by the institutional make-up of the respective 
political systems. Therefore, the approach taken in this dissertation – to analyze 
a set of four of these informal mutual oversight mechanisms as a comprehensive 
system of oversight – provides a chance to combine existing knowledge in the 
field by extending hypotheses which in previous studies were tested on a 
particular IMOM, but not on the others (e.g. the effect of coalition experience 
on IMOMs other than Coalition Agreements), and to fully exploit existing 
complementarities between approaches. As Chapter Eight demonstrated, this 
approach was generally successful, as the explanatory power of the analytical 
model increased when IMOMs were analyzed together rather than individually.  
This dissertation views the informal mutual oversight mechanisms as a 
necessary, though imperfect, answer to the problems plaguing coalition cabi-
nets. Coalitions, by default, are made up of at least two distinct actors with 
competing, if not conflicting goals. Governing together, therefore, is a constant 
endeavor to ensure that each of these actors would pursue the interests of the 
coalition as a whole and not those of their own party. This challenge is often 
made more complicated by the fact that the ministerial defection in favor of 
one’s own party is more likely to be rewarded rather than punished. In such 
situations, coalitions are faced with a stark choice: either to govern by 
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abdication, allowing each cabinet member to pursue their own goals or try to 
coordinate their policies to make them more suitable for the entire coalition. 
Governing by abdication eliminates the danger of shirking or defection, as each 
member is free to pursue their own goals anyway. However, this approach is 
also very rigid, and does not allow for adjustments or adaptation to the change 
in circumstances. Moreover, it most certainly leads to sub-optimal policy out-
comes. Trying to coordinate can produce better and more stable policy, but at 
the same time forces cabinet members to enact compromises which they may 
not like, thus creating incentives and temptations for shirking.  
IMOMs emerge in this situation as a means to reduce the uncertainty and to 
discourage defection. These mechanisms help to mitigate delegation losses by 
establishing information channels for eliminating the informational advantage 
held by a minister. Additionally, they can impose sanctions on the misbehaving 
party to deter agency shirking. The very nature of coalition cabinets does not 
allow coalition partners to use formal means to hold the executive accountable, 
such as ministerial interpellations or votes of no-confidence. These actions 
would be perceived as too hostile and would risk breaking up the coalition. 
Furthermore, using formal accountability mechanisms is also not desirable 
because all the parties in the coalition stand to lose from airing their dirty 
laundry in public. For this reason, oversight in coalition cabinets is carried out 
informally, mostly by using mechanisms that have a well-established formal 
function, but can act as an oversight tool simultaneously. Four such mechanisms 
are analyzed in this dissertation: 1. strategic appointment of Committee Chairs; 
2. Junior Ministers; 3. Coalition Agreements; and 4. Coalition Committees. 
Together, they form a system of mutual oversight in coalition cabinets and help 
coalition partners to ‘keep tabs’ on each other.  
Based on existing research, and the extension of existing theoretical frame-
works, this dissertation uses a five-factor model to explain the intensity of use of 
these mechanisms. These factors can be divided into two groups: relating to the 
coalition make-up factors and cost of IMOM use. The first group of factors 
associates the intensity of IMOM use with the demand for oversight in a coalition. 
As coalitions can take on a variety of forms, it is natural to expect that they will 
differ in the overall demand for oversight. The first factor is the ideological 
heterogeneity of a coalition. Since as the distance between the coalition partners 
grows, the coalition compromises become more distant from the ideal preferences 
of each partner, the incentives to shirk rise. Consequentially, we can also expect 
the demand for IMOMs and the intensity of their use to increase. 
The second factor is the number of partners in a coalition. As this number 
increases, coalitions become more difficult to manage and the possibility of 
shirking increases. Therefore, second hypothesis states that the number of part-
ners in a coalition is positively associated with IMOM use 
The second set of factors relates to the cost of IMOM use. Using IMOMs 
always involves costs, occurring due to a variety of reasons, at a very least 
because using these mechanisms signals lack of trust among coalition partners 
and can be perceived as intrusive. However, these costs could increase or 
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decrease depending on a number of circumstances. First, we expected that 
cabinet parties with time would become better at carrying out mutual oversight 
and would manage to do it more efficiently and effectively. This, in turn, would 
allow for better coordination among partners and more intensive IMOM use.  
Furthermore, we expected that intensity of IMOM use would be contingent 
on the amount of resources in a coalition’s possession. Minority coalitions need 
the support of opposition parties to assume office and to pass legislation. In 
turn, they have to allocate some of the resources (mega-seats or agenda items) 
to these opposition parties. Consequentially, this would leave cabinet parties 
with fewer resources for mutual oversight, which would mean less intensive 
IMOM use. Finally, we can expect that the national institutional environment 
exerts an influence on IMOM use. More specifically, we expected that national 
institutional contexts would impact preferences for certain IMOMs, but would 
not affect the intensity of oversight as a whole.  
The empirical analysis revealed that all the identified factors had a signi-
ficant effect on IMOM use either taken together and or for some of the indi-
vidual IMOMs. However, in some cases the effects were small and sometimes 
ran in the opposite direction than expected. We found a negative association 
between the ideological diversity of a coalition and IMOM use. Interview data 
suggest that this happens mostly because ideologically diverse cabinets tend to 
lean towards abdication governance. They seek to accomplish only a limited 
number of tasks and achieve goals on which all partners agree without making 
painful compromises. Such an approach to governance leaves very limited room 
for shirking or defection, hence reducing the need for IMOMs.  
The second hypothesis was confirmed: we found robust evidence that the 
number of coalition partners is positively associated with more intensive IMOM 
use. This result is significant for both overall IMOM use as well as for two 
individual IMOMs – CCs and JMs.   
We found some evidence supporting the third hypothesis that coalition expe-
rience is positively associated with IMOM use. However, the overall effect was 
weak and very unevenly distributed across the individual IMOMs. As expected, 
we found that it has the strongest effect on the comprehensiveness of Coalition 
Agreements. However, overall evidence supporting this association remain weak. 
Next, we found some support for the claim that IMOM use depends on the 
coalition cabinet type, namely that minority cabinets have use IMOMs less inten-
sely. Minority cabinet variable had a significant effect in some of the models and 
the data have demonstrated that minority cabinets use certain IMOMs, like the 
committee chairs, less intensely. However, this hypothesis had to be rejected, as 
this evidence was not sufficient to claim that the forth hypothesis is confirmed. 
Finally, contrary to the expectations, we found that national institutional 
environment affects not only preference for specific IMOMs but also the overall 
intensity of their use. The Baltic states offer plenty examples, how the insti-
tutional contexts shape IMOM use. In Estonia, Junior Ministers never became a 
real institutional component of coalition government. In Latvia, making cabinet 
meetings open to the media resulted in a situation when a big part of cabinet 
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deliberation was shifted from cabinet meetings to Coalition Committees. Over-
all, though the Baltic states offer only subtle differences in the patterns of 
IMOM use, these differences emerge mostly along the national lines, as the use 
of IMOMs is path-dependent.  
At the same time, even when controlling for the different factors enumerated 
above, national institutional contexts maintain a significant effect on the overall 
intensity of IMOM use. On average, IMOMs are used more intensely in 
Lithuania and less intensely in Estonia with Latvia being in the middle. The 
differences between the states are statistically significant.   
However, despite this difference in the overall volume of IMOM use, the 
overall patterns of IMOM use in the Baltic states were rather similar. This mostly 
occurred because the same institutional similarities among the Baltic states which 
allow to carry out comparative analysis, contributed towards making certain 
IMOMs particularly useful and attractive. For instance, compared to many 
Western European states, parliamentary Committee Chairs are rather powerful 
and the rules appointing them are rather liberal in a sense that there are no strict 
requirements to maintain the proportionality among different parliamentary party 
groups when Committee Chairmanships are allocated. For these reasons, using 
Committee Chairs for oversight in the Baltic states is both easier and more useful 
than in some Western European countries. It is easier because cabinet parties can 
simply get more Committee Chair positions than in countries with strict 
proportionality rules, and it is more useful because Committee Chairs and 
committees themselves command more power in the Baltic states.  
Meanwhile, the usage of Junior Ministers in all three countries is low. In 
Estonia they are not used at all, while in Lithuania and Latvia they are used 
sporadically. Evidence suggests that they are mostly used in larger coalitions, 
when overseeing coalition partners using only CCs becomes increasingly 
complicated. In the majority of situations, in Lithuania and in Latvia using Junior 
Ministers for oversight is perceived as being intrusive and signals the lack of trust 
from the coalition partners towards a particular minister. Qualitative evidence 
even allows to argue that the Junior Ministers are mostly employed for oversight 
in cabinets which experienced tensions between the coalition partners from the 
very beginning. Junior Ministers are employed as possible means to relieve these 
tensions, but it rarely leads to the expected results.  
Coalition Agreements are gaining momentum as an oversight mechanism 
with their use having increased significantly in recent years, especially in 
Lithuania and Estonia. This IMOM differs from the others in the sense that it is 
less related to coalition composition and more strongly associated with each 
party’s coalition experience. More experienced parties tend to opt for longer and 
more comprehensive Coalition Agreements, as they tend to perceive them as a 
good way to prevent conflicts among coalition partners and to ensure a 
smoother tenure in office.  
Finally, Coalition Committees emerge as means to fill any gaps in coalition 
governance model. In Estonia, where the tandem of comprehensive Coalition 
Agreements and extensive use of shadow Committee Chairs functions well 
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(partly because in Estonia coalitions have fewer partners and are, therefore, 
more easily manageable), Coalition Committees have become rather dull and 
formal, mostly tasked with coordinating the passage of legislation. Such 
situation even led one of the interviewees to conclude that “…in cases where 
you have a good coalition agreement, coalition committees do not have much to 
do.” (Lang 2016)  
In Lithuania, on the other hand, larger coalition size and substantial altera-
tion between governing parties mean that coalition partners have difficulties 
negotiating every item on cabinet’s agenda before assuming office and, hence, 
have to rely on Coalition Committees more heavily to fine-tune aspects of the 
Coalition Agreement during the governance phase. Finally, in Latvia, the 
experiment to hold open cabinet meetings where representatives from the media 
have a right to observe, resulted in a situation when cabinet members have 
shifted the discussions on more sensitive matters to the Coalition Committees. 
Therefore, there this institution is the most active and has larger influence over 
the day-to-day work of the coalition.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to employ analytical techniques which can help to 
make existing subtle differences between the data more apparent. Using a 
combination of ordinal recoding and multi-dimensional scaling, three clusters of 
cabinets, corresponding to different patterns of IMOM use emerged. In one 
pattern, cabinets relied more on comprehensive Coalition Agreements, in a 
second – they employed shadow Junior Ministers as an additional layer of 
oversight. Finally, in the third pattern Junior Ministers were not employed and 
Coalition Agreements were used to a smaller extent, meaning that these cabinets 
mostly relied on shadow Committee Chairs for oversight. It was demonstrated 
later that cabinets employing Junior Minister heavy oversight pattern also 
tended to last in office shorter. However, this was due to the fact that both short 
cabinet duration and the choice to use Junior Ministers were prompted by pre-
existing tensions between the coalition partners. Overall, though it is possible to 
discern some patterns of IMOM use in the Baltic states, it is important to 
remember that these patterns emerge only when small and subtle differences 
between the cabinets are purposely amplified and the overall IMOM use 
between the Baltic coalition cabinets is rather similar.    
The main conclusion from the analysis performed in this dissertation is that, 
though it is possible to uncover subtle patterns of IMOM use, and to identify 
factors that could explain the intensity of IMOM use, the way these informal 
mutual oversight instruments function is still very closely associated with the 
overall institutional context in which they operate. IMOMs emerge as a way to 
mitigate the problems associated with the process of power delegation and 
power sharing between the coalition partners. These problems, in turn, are 
shaped by the existing institutional environment and the overall political 
culture. In some cases, where efficient and effective information exchange 
mechanisms between the executive and legislative branches exist the danger of 
hidden-action and shirking would be smaller, which would translate into less 
demand for IMOMs. By contrast, where substantial information asymmetry 
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persists, the possibility of shirking increases, thus creating more demand for 
IMOM use. Furthermore, the same IMOM can function in a very different 
manner depending on the institutional context. As mentioned, differences in 
committee powers and in Committee Chairmanship allocation rules can result in 
substantial differences in the degree to which CCs are used to shadow ministers 
in the Baltic states and Western Europe, while rules regulating how to hold 
cabinet meetings meant that Coalition Committee influence and roles differ 
substantially between the Baltic states.  
 Therefore, for the field to develop further, there is a need for more in-depth 
case studies, which would analyze how the overall system of oversight func-
tions in each case. Currently, it is possible to piece together the picture of how 
IMOMs function as a comprehensive system in a small number of European 
democracies, especially the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and Germany and 
Austria, but there is persistent lack of data and knowledge about how mutual 
oversight between coalition partners functions elsewhere. This dissertation has 
provided a modest contribution to this end by showcasing these systems in the 
Baltic states, which could provide a reasonably good blueprint and a set of 
expectations for newly democratized states.  
Based on the findings of the dissertation, the future research on IMOMs 
could be advanced in two ways: first, the findings uncovered in this dissertation, 
such as ideological distance between the coalition partners negatively contri-
buting to IMOM use or the strong preference towards using committee chairs 
for mutual oversight over the junior ministers could be tested on a larger sample 
of countries, preferably on a mixed sample of the newer and older democracies. 
Having a bigger sample size would allow to overcome statistical limitations of 
this dissertation and would allow to determine how far can the insights from the 
Baltic states be extended to other countries. 
Second possible avenue for future research would be to still further explore 
how the different IMOMs interact with one another. This dissertation made 
some contributions in this area; however, our understanding still remains rather 
limited. Exploring this avenue further would require gathering a vast amount of 
qualitative evidence and insider information in order to truly grasp how cabinet 
members perceive different IMOMs and use them in a systematic manner. 
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Table I: Interviews conducted for the dissertation 
No. Name: Position: Date: Place: 
1. Egidijus Masiulis Former minister, LLRS 12/03/14 Vilnius 
2. Andrius Kubilius Former PM, TSLK 13/03/14 Vilnius 
3.  Rasa Juknevičienė Former minister, TSLK  13/03/14 Vilnius 
4. Remigijus Šimašius Former CC, LRLS 13/03/14 Vilnius 
5. Veiko Spolitis Former JM, V 01/12/14 Riga 
6. Remo Holsmer Former CC, RE 25/01/16 Tallinn 
7.  Rein Lang Former minister, RE 15/02/16 Tallinn 
8.  Rihards Kols Former JM, NA 08/03/16 Riga 
9. Edvards Smiltens Former JM, V 09/03/16 Riga 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Mitteametlikud vastastikuse järelevalve mehhanismid 
koalitsioonivalitsustes: teoorialoomelised järeldused  
Balti riikide juhtumitest 
Käesoleva doktoritöö raames analüüsitakse kolme Balti riigi koalitsioonivalitsu-
si, mis olid ametis aastatel 1992–2012. Täpsemalt keskendub töö erinevatele 
viisidele ja mehhanismidele, mida koalitsioonipartnerid kasutavad üksteise te-
gevuse jälgimiseks ning huvide konfliktide lahendamiseks. 
Uurimisteema on oluline, kuna koalitsioonid ning nende valitsemine on juba 
olemuselt keerukad. Koalitsiooni kuulumisega kaasnevad ressursid võivad 
pakkuda erakondadele stiimuleid tegutseda vastuolus koalitsiooni ühiste ees-
märkidega. Näiteks on igal erakonnal huvi võita valimised, kuid selleks peavad 
nad koalitsioonipartnerite seast välja paistma ja veenma valijaid, et ametis 
olemise jooksul on nad valijaskonna huve paremini esindanud. Võib ka juhtuda, 
et erakond samastub mõne konkreetse valijagrupiga rohkem ning üritab valit-
suses olemise ajal leida võimalusi just selle grupi huvide edendamiseks, mis 
omakorda ei pruugi aga olla kooskõlas koalitsioonileppes püstitatud ees-
märkidega.  
Probleem ei seisne ainult selles, et erakonnad tahavad koalitsioonipartnereid 
„üle trumbata“ – ka koalitsioonivalitsuste ülesehitus pakub oma liikmetele mit-
meid võimalusi selle tegemiseks. Olgugi et valitsusotsused tehakse kollektiiv-
selt, on igal ministril vabadus ise oma poliitikavaldkonnas seaduseelnõusid 
koostada; lõppeks saab ju ainult minister oma valdkonna tegevuskava kujun-
dada ja seadusandlust hallata. Eelnõude ettevalmistamiseks võib minister kaa-
sata ekspertarvamusi enda alluvuses töötavatelt avalikelt teenistujatelt, saada abi 
valdkonna asjatundjatelt või põhineda otsustes oma varasematele kogemustele. 
Nii tekkiva informatsiooni asümmeetria abil saab minister aga suunata seadus-
andlust selliselt, et esindatud on ministri partei huvid üldise koalitsiooni „hea-
olu“ arvelt. 
Stiimuleid, mis edendavad iga koalitsioonipartneri sisemisi eesmärke, nime-
tatakse võimu delegeerimise probleemideks ja olulisemateks neist on just infor-
matsiooni asümmeetria ja partnerite eesmärkide konfliktsus. Sellised problee-
mid esinevad igas olukorras, milles üks erakondadest delegeerib mõned ülesan-
ded teisele ja teeb seeläbi nimetatud protsessi veelgi keerukamaks. Valitsus-
koalitsioonides kerkivad taolised probleemid eriti teravalt esile, kuna üldine 
võimu delegeerimise protsess ise on nõudlikum – selline valitsemisviis vajab 
delegeerimist nii erinevate valitsusharude kui ka erakondade vahel. Seega on 
iga minister valitsuskoalitsioonis vastutav mitmete erinevate osapoolte (otsus-
tajate) ees, kellel kõigil on oma konkureerivad või lausa otseselt vastukäivad 
eesmärgid.  
Tekib küsimus, kuidas koalitsioon saab üldse valitseda, kui seda kimbutavad 
delegeerimise probleemid ja ebakindlus koalitsioonipartnerite tegevuse suhtes? 
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Üheks võimalikuks lahendusviisiks oleks anda igale ministrile täielik sõltu-
matus poliitikavaldkonnas, mida ta juhib. Selleks võib rakendada ministri 
autonoomia mudelit, mis on ühtlasi üks esimestest katsetest kontseptualiseerida 
valitsuse tegevust praktilisel tasandil. Niisuguse valitsemisviisi eeliseks on 
vastutuse vältimise võimaluste vähendamine, kuna igal ministril on niikuinii 
lubatud kehtestada oma eelistatud poliitikaid. Samas on see mitmes aspektis ka 
ebasoodne: esiteks suurendab see koordineerimata ja vastanduvate poliitikate 
tekkimise riski, mis omakorda vähendab valitsuse üldist toimimist ja efektiiv-
sust. Teiseks võivad sellised koordineerimata poliitikad mõjuda negatiivselt 
koalitsiooni koospüsimisele – seega pole antud viis  kasulik ei valijatele ega 
koalitsioonierakondadele.  
Teiseks probleemide haldamise viisiks võib pidada ka kompromisside tege-
mist – koalitsioonipartnerid peaksid oma poliitikaid omavahel koordineerima ja 
leidma kompromissi, mis hõlmaks kõikide partnerite eelistusi. See suurendab 
mõneti eesmärkide konfliktsuse tekkimise riski, kuna koalitsioonipartnerid 
peavad kompromissi nimel kaugenema oma eelistatud poliitikatest, kuid selline 
lahendus teeb valitsemise üldises plaanis paremaks ja tõhusamaks. 
Eesmärkide konfliktsuse riski saab vähendada, kui teostada pidevat järele-
valvet, mille abil saaks iga valitsuskoalitsiooni liige jälgida kaaspartnerite tege-
vusi. Efektiivse tulemuse tagamiseks peaks selline süsteem täitma kolme 
kriteeriumit: 
1. võimekus koguda oskuslikult teavet, et vältida informatsiooni asümmeetriat; 
2. võimalus leppeid mitte täitvaid koalitsiooni liikmeid vastutusele võtta; 
3. eelnimetatut peab saama teostada, kasutamata sealjuures formaalseid protse-
duure või kaasamata ametlikke kontrollorganeid, et vältida avalikkuse ees 
musta pesu pesemist. 
Kuna ei leidu ühtegi kindlat mehhanismi, mis rahuldaks kõiki kolme kriteeriu-
mit, tuleb samaaegselt kasutada mitut mehhanismi, et järelevalvesüsteem tõesti 
toimiks. Antud doktoritöös analüüsitakse, kuidas nelja sellist mitteametlikku 
vastastikuse järelevalve mehhanismi (MVJM) (ingl k Informal Mutual Over-
sight Mechanisms (IMOM)) kasutati Balti riikide valitsuskoalitsioonides aastatel 
1992–2012. Nendeks neljaks mehhanismiks on: 
1. komisjonide „varijuhtide“ määramine; 
2. abiministrite määramine; 
3. koalitsioonilepete allkirjastamine; 
4. koalitsioonikomisjonide moodustamine koalitsiooni töö suunamiseks ja 
juhtimiseks. 
Eelnimetatud mehhanismid valiti ühelt poolt seetõttu, et nad on väga levinud, 
ning teiselt poolt erinevuste tõttu nende kasutamise puhul Balti riikide lõikes. 
Doktoritöö panus teadusvaldkonna arendamisse on kolmeosaline. Esiteks, 
analüütilisest küljest näitab töö, et ülalmainitud koalitsioonipartnerite omavahe-
lisi vastastikuse järelevalve mehhanisme peaks pigem mõistma ühtse süsteemi, 
mitte niivõrd eraldiseisvate instrumentidena – analüütilise mudeli seletusjõud 
kasvab, kui MVJMe analüüsitakse koos. Teiseks, teoreetilisest aspektist lähtu-
des analüüsitakse töös süvitsi kahte valitsuskabineti tüüpi (vähemus/ enamus), 
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mida pole varasemalt antud moel süstemaatiliselt uuritud. Kolmandaks, empii-
rilisest vaatepunktist pakub doktoritöö analüüsi valitsuskoalitsioonide kohta 
Balti riikides, mida pole samuti varem teostatud. Lisaks uutele teadmistele Balti 
riikide kohta saab töö tulemusi suuresti rakendada ka teiste hiljuti demo-
kratiseerunud riikide uurimisel Ida-Euroopa regioonis. 
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni keskne argument on, et MVJMide kasutamise 
intensiivsus sõltub kahest faktorist: 1) koalitsioonis esineva ebakindluse tase-
mest; ja 2) institutsionaalsetest kuludest MVJMide kasutamisel. Nimetatud 
põhiväite alusel on esitatud viis hüpoteesi, mille paikapidavust doktoritöös 
uuriti: 
 H1: Kui ideoloogiline kaugus partnerite vahel suureneb, kasvab ka 
MVJMide kasutamine; 
 H2: Kui koalitsioonipartnerite arv tõuseb, kasvab ka MVJMide kasutamine; 
 H3: Koalitsioonid, kus on varasema koalitsioonikogemusega erakondi, kasu-
tavad MVJMe laiaulatuslikumalt; 
 H4: Vähemuskoalitsioonid kasutavad MVJMe vähemal määral kui enamus-
koalitsioonid; 
 H5a: Riigi institutsionaalse konteksti eripärad ei mõjuta üldist MVJMide 
kasutamist; 
 H5b: Samas mõjutavad riigi institutsionaalse konteksti eripärad individuaal-
sete MVJMide levikut sõltuvalt konkreetsest riigist. 
 
Doktoritöö on jagatud kolme ossa, mis omakorda jagunevad peatükkideks. Esi-
meses osas analüüsitakse, kuidas saab MVJMe paigutada üldisesse koalitsiooni-
valitsemise raamistikku. Esimeses peatükis uuritakse, kuidas toimub delegee-
rimine ja vastutuse võtmine koalitsioonivalitsustes ja milliste võimu delegee-
rimisega seotud probleemidega puutuvad valitsuskoalitsioonid kokku. Peatükis 
näitlikustatakse koalitsioonikabinettide töökeskkonna omapärasid – ulatuslikku 
ebakindluse taset ja piiratud võimalusi sellise ebakindluse vältimiseks. Peatüki 
teine pool tutvustab MVJMe kui võimalusi, kuidas eelnevalt nimetatud eba-
kindlust hallata ja ületada delegeerimisega seotud probleeme nagu informat-
siooni asümmeetria ja eesmärkide konfliktsus. Seejärel tutvustatakse peatükis 
täpsemalt hüpoteese, mida käesoleva doktoritöö raames testitakse. 
Teine osa tööst on pühendatud MVJMide rakendamisviisidele Balti riikides 
ja neile omaste mustrite selgitamisele nii juhtumiriikide kui ajaperioodide 
lõikes. Kolmas peatükk tutvustab Balti riikide uurimise põhjusi, andmeallikaid 
ja analüüsimeetodeid. Peatükid neli kuni seitse käsitlevad iga MVJMi eraldi. 
Iga peatükk annab üldise ülevaate konkreetse MVJMi ja selle rakendamise 
ajaloo kohta Balti riikides ning selgitab, kuidas on iga riigi institutsionaalne 
kontekst mõjutanud selle mehhanismi kasutamist. Neljandas peatükis esitatakse 
detailne analüüs sellest, kuidas komisjonide varijuhte kasutatakse MVJMi tüü-
bina. Uurimistulemused näitavad, et kõigis kolmes Balti riigis on varijuhtide 
määramine soositud ja tavapärane järelevalve viis. Samas sõltub see, kuidas 
varijuhte tegelikult kasutatakse, omakorda koalitsioonierakonna suurusest. 
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Suuremad parteid eelistavad oma varijuhtide ülesannete ühendamist ministri-
kohtadega, et tagada enam kontrolli konkreetse poliitikavaldkonna üle. Samal 
ajal on aga väiksemate erakondade puhul varijuhtide kasutamise eesmärgiks 
pigem teostada järelevalvet koalitsioonipartnerite ministrite üle. 
Viiendas peatükis analüüsitakse, kuidas on abiministrite määramise meetodit 
kasutatud Balti riikides MVJMina. Olulise tähelepanekuna võib välja tuua, et 
võrreldes paljude Lääne-Euroopa riikidega kasutavad Balti riigid abiministreid 
järelevalve teostamise mehhanismina harva. Eestis isegi kaotati vastav ameti-
koht pärast selle lühiajalist rakendamist. Põhjus selleks on kahetasandiline: 
esiteks näevad koalitsioonipartnerid seda MVJMi kui liigselt sekkuvat meedet. 
Partnerid võivad seda tõlgendada kui usaldamatuse näitajat – kui n-ö konku-
reeriv koalitsioonierakond määrab mõne oma abiministri teise partei ministrile 
ja kokkuleppelisele poliitikavaldkonnale nii lähedale, peegeldab see käitumine 
usaldamatust vastava ministri ning vastava koalitsioonipartneri suhtes. Teiseks 
on Balti riikide reeglid erinevalt Lääne-Euroopa riikidest varijuhtide rolli regu-
leerimise ja jagamise osas parlamendierakondade vahel üsna vabad. See tähen-
dab, et valitsevad parteid võivad hõivata ebaproportsionaalselt suure osa 
olemasolevatest varijuhtide kohtadest (mida nad tavaliselt ka teevad). Vari-
juhtide mehhanismi olemasolu järelevalve teostamise viisina vähendab vajadust 
kasutada abiministreid ja selle tõttu kasutatakse neid Balti riikides väga harva 
ning sedagi siis, kui tekib vajadus lisajärelevalve üle. 
Koalitsioonileppeid käsitlevas kuuendas peatükis nähtub, et selle MVJMi 
kasutamine Balti riikides järgib suuresti üldisi Lääne- ja Põhja-Euroopa trende. 
Balti riikide koalitsioonid on selgesõnaliselt leppinud kokku nii poliitiliste 
prioriteetide kui ka otsustamisreeglite küsimustes. Aja jooksul on need kokku-
lepped muutunud üha formaalsemaks, pikemaks ning detailirohkemaks (kuigi 
sellist trendi pole niivõrd võimalik täheldada Läti puhul). Võimalik on ka 
eristada asjaolu, et erakondadel, kellel on rohkem koalitsioonikogemust, on 
tendents teha pikemaid ja sisulisemaid koalitsioonileppeid. Selliselt võib öelda, 
et antud MVJMi kasutamise puhul eelneb mehhanismi soodsatele tulemustele 
erakondade kogemus ja mõningane „harjutamine“.   
Koalitsioonikomiteedest kõnelev seitsmes peatükk selgitab, kuidas seda seni 
vähemuuritud MVJMi on Balti riikides rakendatud. Peatüki keskmes on tähele-
panek, et koalitsioonikomiteede täpne vorm ja omadused  sõltuvad mitmest 
asjaolust, näiteks teiste institutsioonide rollist või partnerite vahetumise volatiil-
susest koalitsioonivalitsuses. Eestis on sellised komiteed omandamas üha enam 
formaalset võimu ja nende ülesanded on peamiselt seotud eelnõude juhtimisega 
erinevate tasandite ja institutsioonide vahel. Leedus on need dünaamilisemad – 
tihtipeale on neil veel muid funktsioone, nagu näiteks koalitsioonilepetes sätes-
tatud abstraktsete poliitiliste eesmärkide vormistamine konkreetsemateks 
poliitikaväljunditeks või uutele poliitilistele kriisidele-arengutele vastamine. 
Samas on antud MVJM laiaulatuslikum ja enim arenenud just Lätis, kus 
koalitsioonikomiteed on de facto asendanud valitsuskabineti koosolekud kui 
kohad, kus arutatakse kõige olulisemate poliitiliste küsimuste üle. Seda võib 
peamiselt selgitada asjaoluga, et Lätis on valitsuse koosolekud avalikud ning 
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seetõttu on koalitsioonid sunnitud tundlike küsimuste arutamiseks leidma 
alternatiivseid viise. 
Dissertatsiooni kolmandas osas analüüsitakse MVJMi kasutamise mustreid 
Balti riikides ja nende üldist kasutamisintensiivsust. Kuna Balti riigid valiti 
antud uurimise teostamiseks suuresti just nende omavahelise sarnasuse tõttu, ei 
erinenud nad loomulikult märkimisväärselt ka MVJMide kasutamise poolest. 
Erinevused olid väiksed ja esinesid enamasti riiklikul tasandil. Samuti oli tähel-
datav MVJMide rakendamise määra suurenemine aja jooksul. Eestis teostati 
järelevalvet koalitsioonipartnerite vahel peamiselt kasutades koalitsioonileppeid 
või varijuhte. Lätis mängisid koalitsioonilepped väiksemat rolli, kuid sõltuvus 
koalitsioonikomiteedest oli märgatavam. Leedus aga rakendati kõiki MVJMe, 
kuigi võib öelda, et varijuhtide ja koalitsioonilepete kasutamise osakaal järele-
valvemehhanismidena oli kõige suurem.  
Lisaks sellele esitatakse peatükis ka lõplikud analüüsitulemused ja testitud 
hüpoteeside järeldused. Üldiselt toetavad tulemused väidet, et MVJMe peaks 
mõistma ja uurima kui järelevalvemehhanismide süsteemi, mitte kui indivi-
duaalseid instrumente, sest mudeli analüütiline seletusvõime suureneb märki-
misväärselt, kui kõiki MVJMe analüüsitakse koos. Mis puudutab hüpoteese, siis 
esimene neist ei pea paika: ideoloogiliselt vastandlikud koalitsioonid ei kasuta 
rohkem MVJMe; nad kasutavad neid vähem, kuna sellised koalitsioonid on 
mõjutatud pigem ministrite autonoomia mudeli põhimõtetest. Teine hüpotees 
kehtib ja võib öelda, et koalitsioonid, milles on rohkem osapooli, kasutavad 
MVJMe intensiivsemalt. Kolmas hüpotees ei pea paika: koalitsioonikogemusel 
on märkimisväärne mõju ainult siis, kui vaadelda koalitsioonilepete mehha-
nismi. Neljas hüpotees ei pea paika: vähemus- ja enamuskoalitsioonid ei kasuta 
MVJMe erinevalt. Ka viies hüpotees kehtib: riiklikul institutsionaalsel 
kontekstil on märkimisväärne mõju MVJMide kasutamisele. 
Üks küsimus, millel selles töö osas veel peatutakse, selgitab kas MVJMi 
kasutamisel on mõju koalitsioonikabinettidele. Analüüs üheksandas peatükis 
viitab sellele, et aja jooksul on suurenenud nii MVJMide kasutamine kui ka 
kabineti püsivus ja et rohkemal määral MVJMide kasutamisel on olnud 
stabiliseeriv mõju Balti riikide valitsuskoalitsioonidele.  
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